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Abstract
This thesis begins by describing the conceptual problem with the moment of change, a
problem raised by Plato in the Parmenides. The thesis then describes how others have
dealt with this problem. The thesis argues that the 'solutions' to the problem assume a
tensed theory of time and it is for this reason that the solutions are inadequate (for, the
thesis argues, the initial problem of the moment of change is itself a symptom of a tensed
thcoryoftime). Finally, the thesis gives D.H. Mellor's arguments in favour of the B-
theory or the tenseless theory of time and change. The thesis argues that Mellor's
tenseless theory oftimc and change does avoids the problem of the moment of change.
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I Change and the Problem with Change
Richard Sorabji begins Chapter 26 of his work, Time, Creation and the
Continuum, by writing
'1be train leaves at noon,' says the announcer, But can it? Ifso, when is
the last instant of rest, and when the first instant of motion? If these are
the same instant, or if the first instant of motion precedes the last instant of
rest, the train seems to be both in motion and at rest at the same time, and
is not this a contradiction? On the other hand, iftbe last instant of rest
precedes the first instant of motion, the train seems to be in neither state
during the intervening period, and how can this be? Finally, to say that
there is a last instant ofrest, but not a first instant of motion, or vice versa,
appears arbitrary. What are we to do? This pUlZle has a long history. II is
found in Plato's Parmenides. 1
David Bostock tells us this is "an interesting puzzle [Plato] develops about things
that are in time." The "main thrust" ofthis puzzle concerns the "treatment ofchange."2
For the purposes of this chapter, "change" will mean 'an object having mutually
exclusive properties at different times', The aim ofthis thesis is to test the sufficiency or
adequacy of this definition ofchange.
As a prelude to the last chapter, I shall briefly say that what is meant by 'time'
will greatly affect one's conception ofchange. Thus the definition ofchange as above is
insufficient. One ofthe terms in the definition needs definition itself: for what is time?
On this matter I agree with Mellor.
'Sorabji,19S3,p401.
IBostock,1978,p231.
It is not enough to say that changes are things having incompatible
properties at different times. J
As defmed above, ifever the mutually exclusive states in a change be
simultaneous with each other, then what is known as a "contradiction" would ensue: the
simultaneous affirmation and denial of a certain property or truth claim. This suggests
either one of two things: that the notion ofa contradiction is defmed temporally in so fur
as the notion of simultaneity is employed, or that a contradiction can be defined in this
way.
Change, then, could be awkwardly phrased as 'a contradiction in succession'.
Change as a contradiction in succession, though perhaps an awkward description, is that
type of change commonly called a "c-change."
Tbere are at least two different kinds ofchange, and there are probably many
more! Besides a c-change, another kind ofchange is called an s-change. An s-ehange is
that sort ofchange captured by the phrase 'frrst this, then that.' An s-change occurs
between "two positive states.",'! Strobaeh argues that the change from rest to motion is
"'the most prominent example" ofan s-change. Plato himself uses the ehange of motion
'Mel1or,1998,p84
'Graham Priest, io 'To Be and NQl:lo Be: Dialecdcal Tense Logic,' writes that "'we should not suppose that
all cbanges 31e oecessarily of the same kind"(p 249). He thcn goes 00 to introduce three different kinds of
change, 11, ~ and y. Priest does oot name any ofbis three as either c-changes or s-changes. Nor am I
exactly dear (yet) ifany of Priest's types ofchangeoorrespond to either c-ehanges or s-ehanges(tboughat
pr=t I am inclioed to say there is 00 correspondence). This raises the possibility that there are no less
thanjivetypes ofcllange.
'Stroooch,l998,p2.
10 rest as his example in the Parmenides. In the s-change from rest to motion first we
have this (rest), then we have that (motion).
In contrast a c-ehange is best characterized by the phrase 'first this, then not-this.'
A c-change does not occur between two positi\-e states. (A 'posilive' state is '.r being P';
while a 'negative' state is the deniallhat x is Pl A c-change occurs between a positive
slale and its own negation. C-changes, then, "consist in the beginning or ending ofone
positive state:,o A c-change for example occurs between rest and non-rest or motion and
non-motion. If an s.change is characterized by 'first Ihis, then that,' then a c-change may
be characterized as 'first this, then nol-this.'
For a c-ehange to occur 'x is P' must hold for x; then 'x is P' must not hold for x.
In contrast, for an s-change to occur'x is P' must hold, then must 'x is Q,' with the
proviso that if P then nol Q and vice versa. We need this extra proviso for s-ehanges - a
proviso thai makes P and Q mutually exclusive - we need this proviso to distinguish the
(I) contradictory mutual exclusivity oftbe before and after states in a c-ehange from the
(2) merely contrary mutual exclusivit}' of the before and after states in ans-change. In a
c-cbange exactly one of P or not-P will be true and the other will be false. In an s-ehange
only one of P or Q could be true (thai is, P and Q are mutually exclusive); however unlike
a c-change, in an s-change both P and Q could be false (that is, -P and -Q are not
mutually exclusive.)
~trolw:b.I998.p2
C-changes and s-changes differ in that for c-changes only one property is required
while for s-changes at least two properties arc required. Both types of change require a
before and after state. The difference between c- and s-changes concerns how the after
state is definoo.
For c-changes the after stale is wholly defined by means of the first state (i.e. its
negation). Whereas in an s-change the second state is not simply the negation of the firs\.
If my car is green and a c-change with respect to il being green occurs, then we still do
not know what colour it is, only what colour it is not. In an s-change with respect to my
car being gret..n we would still know that a c-change with respect 10 green has occurred.
But if we observed an s-changc with respect to my car then we would additionally know
whal colour my car now is.
In effect, the before and after states in a c-change arc defined as contradictories.
Whilc in an s-change the before and after states are defined as contraries. For c-changes
true statements about either the before or aftcr state both have the same truth condition.
[n s-changes the before and after states do not havc the same truth conditions. That the
before and after states in an s-change have different truth conditions does not mean that
the states in s-changcs arc not mutually exclusive. For example, 'my car is green' and
'my car is red' cannot both be true, although both could be faIse. Changing from being
green to being rcd is an s·change. An s-change's states are mumally exclusive but not
contradictory. Whereas 'my car is green' is either true or faIse. Exactly and only one of
either 'my car is green' or 'my car is not-green' is true. A c-change's slates are mutually
exclusive arid contradictory.
Given the definitions of c- and s-ehanges, an s-change is composed of or can be
analyzed as a serial conjunct OflwO c-changes. lfthere is a change between two positive
states, say G and R, then the first positive state must have ended, while the second state
must have begun. In other words, the s-change from G to R, a 'first this (green), then that
(red)' change, can be analyzed as a conjunct ty.·o c-changes consisting of'G, -G, -R, R,'
(i.e. as 'first this (green), then not this (green); not that (red), then thai (red)').
When Strobach applies these definitions to the example of motion and rest he
concludes "the s-change between rest and motion, e.g., consists of a c-changc between
rest and non-rest and the c-change between non-motion and motion,',7
C-changes arc more problematic for the moment of change in so far as they are
more fundamental (i.e. in so far as s-changes can be expressed in terms of two c-changes).
It is C-(:hanges., then, that will be ofprime focus in this thesis.'
1.1 Plato's Parmenidaand tbe Moment orCbange
With the above definitions and remarks in mind the aim or goal of this first
chapter is to focus directly upon Plato's text, the Parme"ides (l55e-l57b), so that we
come to Wlderstand the conceptual issue presented by Plato concerning change and time.
1be immediate goal oflhis chapter is to understand why change could be thought 10 be
problematic or puzzling.
lStrobach,I998,p2
III ","OUtd be a mistake, howe\~, 10 think thaI addres5ing!be concept\.ll.l problem of!be momenl of change
solely in tmnliofc-clwlgail; !iUfficiml$UCh tbalJ--cqeti caobe forgolle:tlaboul, or~lOdsi~lyu a
co~1ex of~ ('--changes. S--changes and aD)' odIer fonm may aill need !lOme $pee.... trellmerl1 on!beir
own,bulthe5earebql>ndIbe5COpeoflbistbesis.
To achieve the immediate goal we will proceed in 1;\\'0 steps. First, by showing
how the moment ofchange can be isolated. Once the moment ofchange is isolated then,
secondly, 'we will see why the moment ofchange may be conceptually problematic or
puzzling. 1 say 'may' be conceptuaJly problematic or puzzling rather thaI 'is,' for there
are those who think that change is not puzzling at all. For G.E.L. Owen
There is nothing physically startling in most changes and nothing logically
startling in any ofthem'
But whether or not Owen's statement can be assented to remains to be seen.
When we initially focus upon Plato's Parmenides we will not be investigating nor
interpreting Plato's doctrine ofchange and time. Nor shall we consider or interpret
Plato's other works on change and time, such as the Timaeus. There are many
interpretations of Plato's analysis ofchange and time. These multiple interpretations
generate much controversy. The goal of this chapter is not to investigate Plato per se or
to engage in any ofthe controversial debates about what Plato tbought. There are many
excellent books on these controversies to which reference can be made. lO These debates
about Plato can be treated independently ofthe conceptual problem that Plato raises about
'Owen, 1975,p 124.
LOSee, for example, A.E. Taylor's Plato: The Man and His Work; Colin Strang's lUld K.W. Mills' 'Plato and
the 'nslant' Proceedings ofthe ArlsIO/eliaflSoe;ely, Supp!. Vo1. #48,1974, P 63-79. See also Niko
Slrobech's The MOf1U!nt ofChrmge: A Syslel1lotic H/s/oryin the Philosophy QfSpace and Time, Chapter I, p
20 - 46. For a oomparison of Plato and Aristotle on change and lime see G.B.!... Owen's 'Tithenai ta
Phainomella,' in Artides on Aris/otle, Vo!.l, 'Science,' edited by Jonalhan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and
Richard Sorabji, Duckworth, London, 1975, p 113-126.
change, the problem orthe momenl ofchange. J1 It is this problem that Strobach calls
"one ofthe oldest problems in the philosophy ofspace and time: how is the change from
one state to its opposite to be described?,,12
In so far as Plato articulates the conceptual issue associated with change in the
self-contained arguments about change in the Parmenides at (I SSe-15Th).U to that extenl
the Parmenides will provide a good starting point for our investigation orthe conceptual
issue. How Plato actually deals with the conceptual problem he raises. how his treatment
relates to his larger philosophy, and what in the end Plato's final opinion on change and
time are, are beyond the scope oflhis chapter. We will return to Plalo's treatment orlhe
conceptual problem in Chapter Two.
Nor should we think that Plato's puzz.le applies only to the change from motion to
resl or from resiiO motion. Charles Hamblin rightly points out that the conceptual
problem "is nol one that is characteristic of changes of motion as distinct from other kinds
ofchange.',14 We must nOllet ourselves be taken away by the fact !.hat in order 10 point
oul the conceptual problem with change Plato's example ofa change is Ihe change from
lIWt can, then. distinguisb betwtttl the collttptuill problem noixd by Plato.nd Plato's solution or nuns
o(~ingthiseoatqltlalplobkm.
IlStrObK"h,I998,Pft'face,pL
1J.r'he passage from 15k to 15Th in the Pa1?/lerlmesoolht eonc:cptual probkm with tht rmmml ofetlange
has bttn trealed by countless others u an isolakd, separated 01" self-contained artumclll about ehange in
genelll apart fromlhe ~st oflhe dialogue.nd from the rest of PlalO's philosophy. A.E Taylor, for
eX'lTI(llc,inPlmo: 71rIlManaJUlHis Work,calisthispassagcan"appcndix"(Taylor,1966,p366).
SlroNeh ~fers to tmillme passage as a "digl'l'Ssion" (Strobacb, 1998, P 20). Boslock shares Taylor'lterm
w!ltn he calls the pusage an "appendix" (Bostock, 1978, p 231)
"Hlmblin, 1969, P 400. This probkmOl" puzzle is 00110 be dissolved bythinkill& that change is insltad I
graduaiprocc$Soet'UJ'ringo"cran«ICDdcdperiodoftimeuopposedlOasuddeuinstaDlIIDeOUSswill:hiDg
for. toIItlllUCS Hamblin, ~gaduaIdwl~ lIise the probkln u ItIoJeh as sud&n ODd do.M
motion to resL
Colin Strang. author of Plato and the Instant, supports the claim that the
conceptual problem madc manifest in the example may be generalized for other changes.
"All that is said [in the Parmenides]," writes Strang, "applies indifferently to change as
such and to anything capable ofchange. 15 Strobach too makes this point. "What is said
about rest and motion may as well be presented in terms of an arbitrarily chosen propeny
F.,,16
That Plato's puzzle - the conceptual problem of change from motion to rest - is
applicable for change in general should not be a controversial point. Plato's own text
supports the generalization. Plato writes, "will the case not be the same in relation to
otherehangcs?" ''Yes, so it appears" is the reply.l?
As stated above. the first step will be to see how the moment of change is
isolated. Following the isolation of the moment of change we will, secondly, see why
change may be conceptually problematic or puzzling.
1.2 Isolating the Moment of Cbnge
Plato arrives at the moment of change by means of a four-part argument.
The first part of the argument is a slraightfonvard logical claim, namely, the 'law'
or 'principle' of non-contradiction: an object cannot have at the same time two mutually
lJStrang,1974,p73.
'"strobach.I998,p28.
IlPlato,1926,p299-301.
exclusive properties. This means that a thing cannot both be and not-be; it cannot be
moving and not-moving (i.e. be moving and be at rest), A thing cannot be red and not·
red; nor could a proposition be both true and false, etc.. Plato writes,
Can [an object), when it partakes ofbeing, not partake of it, or partake of it
when it does not panake of it? No, it cannot. Then it panakes at one time
and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can
partake and not partake oflhe same thing. 1'
In other words, both the before and after state in a c...change cannot share the same
tn' Ora c-change, either one or thc other state shall hold (either P or-p)o Plato, we will
see, takes great care to preserve the sanctity of the principle of non...contradiction. Major
conceptual problems associated with lhe moment of change concern the sanctity of this
principle. tll
Although Plato expresses the first part of the argument in terms of partaking and
not-partaking ofbeing, the principle ofnon...contradietion is not limited or restricted to
being as such. The principle can be generalized to cover any and all properties
whatsoever.
Strobach supports this conclusion about the first part of the argument. "Whatever
IfPlalo,1926,p297.
I~e sanctity ofthe principle ofconll'lldiction is where Graham Priest, in To Be and Not 10 Be: Dialecticol
Tense Logic, will differ from Plato and from the bislorical tradition ofthougbl in general. And it is this
very principle lbat A.E. Taylor lIlIyssuffers a "ponetllOUS result" in the Parmenidl!S. TIIougb, Taylor adds,
"it is quite certain that Plalo neverdreamc:d ofdenying the law ofcOnlradiCl;oo," Taylor's argument
indicates nicely the fact that we can hU! (I) Plalo's exposition oflhe conceptual probl~m (which is, alleast
according 10 Priest, actually)portenlous for the principle of contradiction, from(2)Plalo'ssolution!(lthe
conceptual problem, which some have inlerpTtted 50 as 10 show Ilia!. according 10 Plato, both the law of
non-conuadictioo and the iaw of excluded middi<' bold. ThisinlerpreuotiollofPialO'511Jgumenlisnol
withoulcontmvel1iy;itrequiret:lpe<:ialize,1inlerprelllcionsofkeyparuofPlato'SleJtl,andauthusbeyond
the I'llIlge of this cbJpler investiglhng the conceprual problem.
is true of partaking in being may well be assumed to be true ofany property.'>1\) This
assumption about the extension of the principle of contradiction is in line with the claim
that ''what is said about rest and motion may as well be presented in terms ofan
arbitrarily chosen property F.,,21 The principle of non-contradiction applies equally to
any arbitrary property F. Strobaeh swnmarizes the content ofthe first part ofthe
argument when he writes "nothing ever both does and does not have the same property
simultaneously.,,22
Bostock describes this first part of the argument as the claim that "at anyone time,
x is not both Fand not_F.'>2l What is more, if a thing at one time has a property Fand at
another time does not have the property F, then the difference obtaining in terms ofF and
not-FimpJies that the two times at which a thing is Fand not-Fare not the same time.
Thus a car is not at rest and not at rest at the same time. (x, Rx, tt) and (x, -Rx, tl) are
impossible and contradictory while (x, Rx, tl) and (x, -Rx, 12) or (x, Mx, 12) imply that tt:f-
The second part oftbe argument is rather straightforward as well. It is, like the
first claim, a logical qualificatioIL This qualification is that all objects in time are either
in motion or not in motKlO. Or more generally, for all objects and any given property P,
I·Strobach,I998,p27.
IIStrobach.I998,p28.
"Strobach,I998,p28.
J1Bostock. 1978. p2JI. The relation of this expressioD 10 the definition ofa c-chllllge should not be losl.
l'Strobach calls such a tempofllily indexed defiuition of the lawofnon.contradictiona~specialized"
definition for time. SeeStrobach,1998,p28.
10
these objects can only be eilher P or not-Po This means that. for any proposition. that
proposition can only be either true or false. It must be one or the other without another
alternative. Plato writes "there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in
motion nor at resl'~ This means that all propositions will be for Plato only either true or
false (but not both., as per the first part of the argument). In other words, for any e-change
that an object can undergo. that object is either in the state before the c-ehange or the state
after the c-change.
Bostock interprets the claim to mean "at any present moment x is either For not-
F:,J~ Owen's fonnulation is practically exactly the same as Bostock's. Owen writes
''there is no time in which a thing can be neither A nor not_A:,l? The second part of the
argument is thus a version of the 'law' or 'principle' of the excluded middle. Owen, who
says that Plato's "argument relics heavily on the law of the excluded middle," stresses the
impact of this second claim when he writes thai by the "law of the excluded middle not
only is there no period but there is no point of time at which a thing can be neither A nor
not-A."'>'
The first two parts of the argument are the cornerstones of classical or mwitional
logic. Together these mean that ''truth and falsity are exclusil"e and exhallsri\"e.'t29
l~lalo,1926,p299.
l6130SIOCk,1978,p231, Ag.in,lherelalionoflhhexpressionIOlhedefinilionofac-changcshould001 be
lost.
llOWCIl, 1975,1'122.
lIOwen, 1975,p123
l'pnesl, 1981,1'252. Emplwisminc:.
Thai truth and faJsityare "exclusive" is captured by the first pan ofthe argument:
If a proposition (P) is true, then that this same proposition (P) is also false is ruled out or
excluded by the fact that is (P) true. And, mutati,s mutandis vice versa. It would be
contradictory if(P) was both false and true. Thus, for any object capable of undergoing a
c-change with respect to some property F, the before and after states could nOi ever be
simultaneous with each other.
That truth and faJsityare "exhaustive" is captured by the second pan of the
argument - the law of the excluded middle. "Exhaustive" in this context means that with
respect to any proposition (P), (P) is either true or false such that 'true' or 'false' are the
only possible determinations for the status of(p). 'True' or 'false' completely denote all
the possible determinations of(P).JO Thus, for any objcct capable of undergoing a e-
change with respect to some propet1y F, either the before or after state will be.
The third pan of the argument is: ifthtte is an object with a quality at one time
and without that quality at another time, then that object must have changed from having
one quality to having another. The third part of the argument is that "it cannot change
without changing.'.)·
Bostock argues thaI this claim means "if at one time x is F, and at another time:x
JOsomc people, however, disringuiJIh between a proposition's 'trulh "alue' • eilber 'true' or 'false' - and a
proposition's "statemenl-value" -eilher 'true' or 'false' or 'neither lrue nor false'. This means lhat allituth-
values are stalel'Jl('nl·values but not vice \'crsa. The ootion of a sUltemem value, however, is obviously not
in line wilhthe Sl.'Condpart of the argurnent The notion ofl Italemcnt value violaln lheprillCiple of the
excluded middle, for the .tale1lX1l1 valllot' 'neitbcrtrue nor false' is a third value. Whereas iftbc: principle of
the excluded mMJdk holds then tbtn an only two possible values, the third havioa bem ruled out..
)lPlaIO,1926,pm.
12
is not-F, then there must be a time during or at which x changes from one to the other.',12
The third part of the argument distinguishes (a) the state an object is in, say P, from the
(P) changing ofthe object's state, !:J.P. The 'changing' rather than either the before or
after states, is what is important to take ootice of here. 'Change' in this sense means the
coming to be oftile mutually exclusive states, rather than simply as a successive
difference of mutually exclusive states.
That this part of the argwnent - that it CllIUlOt change without changing - appears
simple and self-evident does not mean that it is not of the utmost importance nor
uncontroversial. The very meaning of 'change' is at issue here.
The third part ofthe argument demands that when we are trying to explain change
we cannot in the end say that change is illusory or only apparent: if there is or has been a
change; that is, ifthere is an object with mutually exclusive properties at different
successive times (i.e., if there is a 'change' in the flfSt sense), then there must have been a
'change' in the second sense, an act or event ofchanging, the coming to be ofsuccessive
difference,3J
The third claim argues that we carmot explain away or fail to include an acCOWlt
of change in the second sense. We cannot, for example, say that the change from
we still have two mutually exclusive propel1ies rest and motion and two different times,
IlBostock, 1978, P 231. The empbasison 'chongeJ' is mine.
llThis point means tllat we must not confuse tile process of changing· the coming to be of the difference
between slales· witb tbeproductofthatprocess ofcltange, the successive difference between the old and
the new stale. Crispin Sartwell reinforces the distinetiOll in his 'Process and Product: A Theory ofArt.'
The Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy, Vol. VI, No.4, 1992, P 301·316,
]J
But in this latter case we also have two different objects, Xl and Xl. That there is Xl and Xl
altogether. 'Change' in this latter case has been replaced with and wholly reduced to a
simple succession of different objects (Le. XI and X2) with different properties at different
times. If, say, Xl is my car andX2 yours, then neither your car nor my car changes ifat
one o'clock m)' car is stopped and yours at three is moving.
To say that an object cannot change without changing means that 'to change' is
not the same as having a simple succession ofdifference. Ifwe analyse 'change' in tenns
ofa mere succeS1lion ofdifferences then there is no 'is changing' or event or process of
changing occurring at all. One way that change in the second sense can be analysed away
is to not have the same object at the two different times with mutually exclusive
properties, an object that undergoes changing. Analyzing change as mere succession of
differences keeps the product ofa change but omits the process ofchanging, the process
that produces the produet.l4 This means, G.E.L. Owen writes in Tithenai 10 Phainomena,
"change is not to be talked away:>.!' The third part ofthe argument demands that we
explain, mther than explain away, changing. One way that changing can be explained
away is to confuse change with a simple succession ofdifferent objects with different
l-lThoughitisbyfarbcyondlhesoopeofthislhesistomgageinafuriheranalysisofPlato's texl. 00 this
point about ehange (qllll product) and ehange (qUll process) I think Plato's text is mcnthan cIeat. When
Plato writes that ~it cannO( change without changing~ the Greek reads "a.U: 06& IIlJV II&tCliJ.6.Mst ('Ivt\l W1.I
Il&tCl~W.~ The"tooll£.t(t~v"isc1earlya verb in the infinitive and thus denotes the process,
activity or event ofchanging. The translator has made Plato's lnfinilive into a participle. Change, for PhilO,
seemstobeamixtureofII.F:[(tfltill.et,lI~tllllQA4w,JU>fallQllov. 'hisehanging,"tochangc,'and'a
change' are each separate. It is Ihe process or verb that WOIJld be omitted ifcbange is analysed as simple
suceessionofdifTerence. The importance of this sbouldnot be lost for, as we will sec, it is by means of the
process of changing that Plato isolates the momentofcltangc.
llOwen,1975,pl23.
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properties at different times.
That Plato wished us to make the distinction between change and simple
succession can be seen in the passage stipulating the ftrSl: part of the argument. This first
part is that quoted above regarding the notion ofcontradiction. There we saw that Plato
wrote "it [an object] partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the
only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.,,36 This ftrSl: pan of
the argument would not have been offered by Plato if be wished to argue that 'change' is
actually and only succession ofdifferent objects with different properties at different
times. For ifa contradiction is an object partaking and not-partaking at the same time,
and ifwe analyse change as (x], Rxl> td. (X2, Me2, tz), then there would be no
contradiction occurring if ever (Xl. Rtl, tl) and (X2, Mr2, tl) or (x\, Rx l, t2) and (X2, Mx2, t2)
were the case. There is no contradiction ifmy car is stopped at one o'clock while your
car is moving then. The presence of an Xl and X2 in the analysis would preclude the
possibility ofa contradiction from obtaining even ifXI, Rx] and x2,Mx2 shared the same tn.
That Plato stated what I call the 'first' and 'third' part ofthe argument as he did
strongly implies that Plato did not want to analyse change by means ofa simple
succession ofdifferent objects with different properties at different times. Had Plato so
wished to analyse change in this way he would not have had to worry about the
possibility ofa contradiction ever occurring. Nor, then, would the argument need its first
part for an analysis ofchange reducing it to simple sw.:cession would make the first claim
redundant.
l<iPlalo,1926,p297
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With respect to change and succession, we can say that all changes are successive
but not all successions are changes. The first and third parts oflhe argument point to this
fact and demands that we do not confuse simple succession with actual change. For
though change is successive change is not simply succession.
Plato in the Parmenides defines change in a manner much like Russell does in
chapter LIV of The Principles ofMathematics. There Russell writes that
Change is the difference, in respect oflruth or falsehood, between a
proposition concerning an entity at a time T and a proposition concerning
the same entity at another time T' ,37
Additionally, Newton-Smith defines change in the same way in his work, The
Structure ofTime. There NeWlon-Smith writes that change means that "something has
such-and-such a property (or, lacks such-and-such a property) at one time and then laler
the same thing lacks thai property (or, possesses that propeny):JI
The important similarity between Plato, Russell, and Newton-Smith concerns the
notion that it must be the same entity at both times. It is this same entity that changes in
the first sense, and when it changes it is changing in the second sense.
Mark Heller, in 'Things Otange,' describes Ihis definition ofchange as a "triadic"
definition. Plalo's, Russell's, and Newton-Smith's definitions of change are triadic. This
means, says Heller, that
l1Russ¢ll, 1964,p469. Emph3~i$mine.
'"Newton-Smith, 1980, p 14. This defmitiQn ofe~nge, ..'e learned in Chapter ODe. is what Mark HeUer
~led. triadic defurition. We.lso learned lhat Russell shares this definition.
For an object to change, on this proPOsal. is for the triadic having relation
to bold bet"""een that object, a given property, and a given time but not to
hold between thai same object, that same property, and some other time.39
D.H. Mellor also accepts the triadic definition ofchange such that it must be one
and the same entity at both times in order for a change to be a change rather than a mere
succession ofdifferent things with different properties at different times. Mellor writes,
"different entities [ie. XI andX2J differing in their properties do not amount to change."
"Change," continues Mellor, "requires one and the same changing thing to have both the
incompatible properties concerned.,,40 That there is one and only one entity at both times
is, says Mellor, "the prime requirement fur change..... l Thus Plato, Russell and Mellor all
agree on this point.42
"Heller, 1992, P 697. Emphasis mine. Heller in this paper is arguing fora '"temporal parts ontology." With
this sort ofontology in thechllllge (qua succession) (.r" Rrl,tl). (.rl,Mx1,tl},X, and Xl are considered to be
'"temporal parts" of the object x, where a 'temporal part' is wholly analogous 10 a 'spatial part.' Heller is
defending a temporal parts onlOlogy from the claim that such an onlOlogy implies "that nothing is really
changing-alltbat is happening istbat ooe item [i.e. X,] is being replaced byanotber ji.e.xl] with different
propertiC'S"p699, A lemporalpartsonlOlogyisoptn totbe objec:tion that it reduces change to succession
by omitting 'to change' from the analysis. It omits the event of changing while admitting only what would
be the product of that event, namely {he difference inx at tl when compared loxat t2- Heller is dcoying thai
a temporal pans lllIlOlogy precludes change. Mellor, in Real Time, chapter 7, pliO, will argue against
Heller's position and a temporal parts ootology precisely for the reason that itrcduces the change ofa Ihing
(singular)toasuccessionoflhingJ(pluraJ). Mellor argues that a temporal parts ontology is ok for events,
but not for things. Events can have temporal parts, but rhings douot. For Mellor, ifLhings bad temporal
pans then change woold be explained away. Nor would we be able to distinguish between change and
spatial variation. We return to Mellor's argument!! in Chapter Three.
~ellor,1981,pI11. Empllasismine,
"Mellor, 1981,p 111.
'lStrobach in The Moment ofChange docs not emphasise this point when he offers his definition of change.
Seep 1-2. ThooghofchangeliesaysoftbetwomulWlllyexelusiveproperties"theirobtaining
simultaneously would be a contnldiction." That the contradiction is a possibility suggests that for SlrObach,
like for Plato, Russell and Mellor, the objeci in both Ihe before and afler state mustbcidenticalquaidentity
(though obviouslynOl identical qua set ofproperties).
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1lle fourth part of the argument in the Parmenidu is that "it does not change from
rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving.,.43
The fourth.part oftlle argument builds upon the distinction generated by the third
claim, namely, the distinction between (a) the state an object is in, Suo and@the
changing ofthe object's state, ~S". The founh part is concerned with the 'changing' in
the second sense. It deals with when this cbanging can be thought to occur and what
status the object must have at or during this time. In other words, this fourth claim relates
change in the second sense to change in the first sense.
The meaning ofthe fourth part orthe argument is as follows. When an object is in
a state. SI. it is not yet in the state that it is about to become. 8 2. Nor after becoming a
state, say 82, is an object still in the state it was, namely 8 1(for SI and 82 are mutually
exclusive and thus only successive). Furthennore. and it is here where the fourth part of
the argument is of acute importance, when an object is becoming its fullowing state,
AS1,.",.2; when, that is, it is changing its state (AS) from the before (81) to the after (82)
state, it canoot yet be in that following state, namely 82. Nor when it is changing its state
can an object still be in the state that it was. namely 81. In other words. if an object is
changing its state, AS, then it has already (at least minimally) changed and cannot
therefore still be in the state that it was, 8 1• And if an object is changing its state then it
cannot yet be in the state that it is about to become, &.I, for as soon as an object comes to
be what it is about to become then that object must have already changed. But if an
object has already changed then it will have already become what it became, and this
"Plato,1926,p299
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implies that it would not in fact actually or still he changing.
Strobach argues the fuurth part oftbe argument means that "an event of changing
cannot take place while the old state still obtains; but when the new state already obtains
it cannot take place eitber.'.4ol The fuurth part ofthe argument limits when the changing
from the befure to the after can be thought to take place. Changing cannot occur when
the before state is, for then the change would not yet have occurred. Nor can changing
occur when the new state obtains. for by the time the new slate obtains the changing must
already be complete.
Owen writes that the fuurth part ofthe argument means that
When it changes from rest to motion it cannot be either at rest (for then the
change would be still to come) or moving (for then the change would be
past).4~
David Bostock clearly expresses the fourth claim when he writes that
While x is changing from being not-Fto being F, i.e. while x is becoming
F, x is not (yet) F. While x is changing from being not-Fto being F, i.e.
while x is becoming F, x is not (still) not.F.46
When x in the change fromnot-Fto Fis not yet Fnornot stilloot-Fthenx is
changing then. For "ifa change occurs somewhere within a stretch oftime then there
must, it would seem, be at least one moment within that stretch such that at that moment
"Slrobacb, 1998, P 6. Slrobach says that this premise is ortlle utmost importance. How one deals with this
premise is, says Strobacll, "one ofthe most interesting questions concerning the moment ofchange.·
.SOwen, 1975.p 123.
"Bostock, 1978, P 231. Notice should be taken of the 'yet'andthe'still'.
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the change either occurs or is occurring.n47 Change in the second sense must be present
and active at some moment, rather than either merely potential and yet to come to be or
already completed and thus non-active and past.
By means of the fourth part ofthe argument, wruch is a limitation upon when an
event ofchanging may be thought to be taking place, Plato isolates the moment ofchange
(qua event ofchanging).
The moment of change is, then, a temporal intermediate between the old state and
the new state at which change (qua event ofchanging) takes place. And this event is the
means by which the difference between the old and the new state comes to be. Owen
calls this temIXlral intermediate a "tertium qUid.'-A8 1bis means that in a change there are
at least three temporal determinations: tl is the date at which the object is in its old state.
tl>1<>2 is that date at or during which the object either changes or is changing its state.
While t2 is the date at which the object is in its new slate. These three temporal
determinations correspond to the states Sl, 68 1>,.,.2. and S2 such that SI #; 681:>n>2 i- 82
With respect to any arbitrary object x, for x to change its state, AS, x must be
continuous or identical through the interval (tJ. tl...",.2, h) while there must be a
discontinuity in at least one property composing the states ofx in the interval (tl, tJ...",.2, t2).
In summary, the isolation of the moment ofchange in Plato's conceptual puzzle
involves the following four claims:
<7Bostock,1978,p236.
"Owcn,1975,p 123.
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(I) Both the before and after states cannot occur in the same object
at the same time.
(2) There arc only two possible states for an object in time,
For not-F.
(3) It cannot change with out changing.·9
(4) "To change" cannot occur when the old state still is nor when
the new state has become.
The moment of change is isolated by means oflhese four claims. And this
moment is seen to be different than either the before or after state. Now why, given (I) to
(4), there are conceptual difficulties about change shall be our focus.
1.3 The Conceptual Problem with the Moment of Change
Owen writes that if we accept the above four claims then it "barnes us to say
when it makes the change from one to the other....xt What is barning is not only when the
change takes place: the status oftbe object's state when it is changing is also baffling.
1ms argument showing why a change from one state to another is potentially baffiing
requires thai we consider the entire set of claims (i.e. (I) to (4» used to isolate the
moment of change.
If, according to (I), an object cannot be both F and not·F at the same time; and if,
according to (2), an object can only be F or not·F at any time; and if, according to (4), an
object cannot be either F or not-F when it is changing from F to not-F, changing thai,
·'Thisc\aimcouldbeconSll'\IcdUlheclaimthatathingcanundeTgoall£ta.jlo(t).1ovifandOlllyif
lU='luflWJXI is lIUe of it at or for some time.
~"''l:n,1975,pI2J.
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according to (3), cannot be omitted from the analysis, then when an object is changing
thaI object is in a most problematic position: This object cannot be either F or not-F
according to (4). According to (2) it cannot be neither Fnor not-F. It must be one or the
other without alternative, something incompatible with (4). While according to (1) thaI
object cannot be both F and not-F.
The argument demonstrates the conceptual problem that occurs at the moment of
change, the tertium quid - the 851>n~2 interposed between 51 and 52_ Parts (1), (2) and (4)
of the argument used to isolate the moment of change conflict with each other at the
moment of change (that which (3) states must not be omitted). Premise (4) argues that
the object when it is changing from motion to rest cannot be either in motion nor at rest.
(2) argues that an object can only be in motion or at rest at any time. And pan (I) of the
argument prevents us from saying that when an object is changing the object is both in
motion and at rest.
The tertium quid - the moment ofchangc is most problematic. For such a thing
is demanded by parts three and four of the argument. In addition, part four implies a
certain description of the object at this moment, namely that it is not in motion nor at rest.
However, the second part of the argument, the notion of the excluded middle, rules out
both the tertium quid as such and the description of the object that this tertium quid
implies (i.e. that il is not in motion nor at rest).
In summary, Plato's puzzle raises a conceptual problem about the moment of
change by defining what a changc is. In so defining it differentiates a change from
changing, and both from simple succession. By means of changing the moment of
change is isolated. Isolating the moment of change demands an account of the 'when' of
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this moment as well as an account ofthe object's status at this moment.
The conceptual problem of the moment of change occurs and becomes most acute
when an account of the 'when' of this moment as well as an account of the object at this
moment is given in light of the claims used to isolate the moment ofchange. The
conceptual problem results from the fact that the very argument used to isolate the
moment of change is the very argument that seems to make such a moment unintelligible.
Tbis set of considerations is what leads to Sorabji's desperate sounding question: What
are we to do?
Charles Hamblin argues that the conceptual problem raised by Plato in the
Pannenides will not be addressed by ever finer observation of objects changing from
motion to rest or vice versa. The problem of change in time "is not," argues Hamblin, "an
empirical problem."sl Strobach continues on the import ofobservation, supporting
Hamblin's claim about the inability of observation to settle wholly conceptual difficulties.
5trobach adds, however, that there is nothing mysterious about our obsCTVations of
motion, rest, or Ihe change from one 10 the other.
We know what it looks like when a car is simply standing tbere; and we
know what it looks like when it is moving. So also we know what it looks
like when it is first simply standing there, and then moving.S2
This means thaI neither microscopes nor telescopes will avail us of the conceptual
"Hamblin, t969, P 400. This problem or puzzle is nOl to b<: solved by thinking Ihal change is a gradual
process occurring over an extended period of time. as opposed to a sudden instantaneous swilchingfor,
continues Hamblin. "gJ1Idual changes raise 1m. problnn as much as sudden ones do"
S2Strobach,1998,p3
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problem. Ofcourse, some might say that because we know what we observe we need not
treat the question of what we know any further. These are those people who think "what
is happening is obvious.',$) What we obviously observe, however, is different than both
what we think and what we think we observe. The problem then is not to observe, but to
think about what we observe so that we "find a satisfactory conceptuallreatment of what
we observe.,,54
"Neither," continues Hamblin, "is it one of how to describe the facts in ordinary
English."SS Plato's puzzle and the conceptual issues it raises will not be solved by fancy
but merely linguistic analysis.
Nor should we think that the conceptual problem associated with Plato's puzzle
might be solved with a simple, direct appeal to logical principles such as, for example, the
principle of non-contradiction. Strobach argues that the conceptual problem of the
moment of change will bring us "into conflict with the most fundamental laws of
traditionallogic."S6 This conflict of conccptuality will bring us 10 the "edge of logical
anarchy.,,57 Of using these fundamental, traditional or classical, logical laws to address
the conceptual problem associated with Plato's puzzle, Graham Priest argues that "the
principles of classical logic cannot...be invoked without begging the question."S8
llStrobach,I998.p2.
l'Strobach,1998,p2
llHamblin, 1969,p400
Jl;Strobach,1998,p3
l1Strobach,1998,p28
lIPriest, 198t, P252. To address Plato's puzzle and the conceptual problem of the moment of change Priest
argues !hal the pnnciple of non-contradiction should be abandoned. Priest o(fers in place oftr1iditionat
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The t\\'o goals of this chapter are now complete: we have (I) discovered how the
moment of change can be isolated and we have (2) seen why such a moment ofchange
can be puzzling.
We need now, in Chapter Two, to see how others have dealt with this conceptual
problem.
tradirionallogie what he calls a "dialecticaltmse logie.ft This logic, says Priest, "allo~ a rigorous proof
that ct1angeenlails eontradictiOll...[such that] true contrndictions are realized in some changes." Priest's
position, though controversial,is not radically novel. For a discussion ofhowa"reaJ oontrndietion is
acecpled in nature"aecording to pbilosopbers of the 14'· century see Simo Kuuttila's and Anjalnkeri
Lehtinen's 'Change and Contradiction: A Foortoenth-eentury Conlroversy,' Symhese 40,1979. 189-207.
The 14" century argument tbat oontrndictions exist is different from Priest's 20111 century argument. The
14" century argument appeals to a distinctiOll between lllI "instant of timeft and an"instantofnature." I
have yet to find such a distinction in any of the modem treatments ofchange and time. Priest's argument,
in contrast, does not depend on an ontological distinctiOil between an instant of time and an instant of
nature. Priesl instead limits his argumenl to fonnal,albeil 'paraconsislent',logie. Inhis 1981 work,for
example, he "specifies a formal logic which accommodates this possibility.../that] there are!lOllle changes
frompbeingtrueto-pbeingtruewheretruecontradictionsarerealized.ft Priestthllsdeniesthcprinciple
ofnon-rontradiction. Whereas, in contrast, in the 14" century arguments outlineded by Kllllttiia and
Lehtinen the law ofnon-rontradictioo is not violated when contradictions are realized in some changes.
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2 Addressing Plato's Puzzle
The completion of the two goals ofthe first chapter, namely, (I) to disrover how
the moment ofchange can be isolated and (2) to see why such a moment may be puzzling
leads, naturally, to the goals ofthe Second Chapter.
We need now see how the conceptual problem of the moment ofchange has been
deah with by others.
To begin with solutions to the problem, we must keep in mind Chapter One where
it was stated that an analysis of language alone, further observation alone, or a direct
appeal to logic alone will not solve the problem.
Observation, we learned in chapter one. seems to be wholly unambiguous: we
know that what we see· or. at the least. we know that what appears to be seen • is change
and becoming, Charles Hamblin agrees that there is no "mystery about what happens
when changes take place.,"9 The lack ofambiguity or mystery in observation means that
"from a certain point of view this problem is a very trivial one.,,60 But that from the point
of view ofobservation the problem appears to be trivial does not mean that the problem
does not remain in full force for, adds Hamblin, "it can hardly be suggested that the
solution to our problem is to be sought by closer observation ofaccelerating vehicles...61
The first important point here, so far as solutions to the conceptual problem ofthe
moment of change are concerned. is to introduce the placement ofan epistemological
"'Hamblin,1969,p410.
6OHamblin,1969,p410
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limitation upon the capacity ofobservation to settle the conceptual questions arising about
change.
The second, and much more important poin1 pertains to the degree ofthis
epistemological limitation ofobservation.
There are those who will so minimize the import ofobservation they will deny
outright the evidence ofobservation. These people claim that what we observe (i.e.
change) is not what we observe. These people claim that ifwe think we observe change
and time then we err. This means that for some the way things appear to us in
observation is not the way things are in reality. It is ofcourse the latter rather than the
former that is desired by philosophy for as Socrates remarked
All reject the appearance and demand the reality,62
Solutions to the conceptual problem ofthe moment ofchange fall into either one
of two camps: there are those who (1) deny or reject the reality ofchange and time
ahogether irrespective of the fact that as Zwart notes, according to the "exigencies of
observation...change and becoming fare] probably the most conspicuous features of
reality,..63 This first camp denies the 'exigencies ofobservation' and rejects the reality of
all change and time. For this first camp, reality is not as it appears to be.
In contrast, the second camp (2) offers a conceptual analysis ofchange and time
iI Hamblin.1969,p41O.
~lPlalo, The Repvblic, 502c·509c.
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that harmonizes with, or effects a compromise between, our observations and our thought
or logic. This second camp admits of many different analyses in its treatment ofthe
moment ofchange. We will consider these after we deal with the argwnents ofthe first
camp, the 'there is no-change' camp.
2.1 There is No-Change
Plato's puzzle leaves us in a peculiar position. In so fur as we believe observation
is a source ofknowledge, we know what happens when an object changes. But in so far
as we wish to offer a logical or conceptual analysis of the moment ofchange our
observations are less than useless. What's more, when we engage in a logical or
conceptual analysis of change and time our logic may fail, leading to Strobach's logical
anarchy. Or, alternatively, our logic may lead to a rejection ofthe reality ofall change
and time whatsoever. This latter alternative, perhaps best described as a logical
dictatorship, is the tack taken by the camp of no-change.
Ifthere is a conflict or an opposition between observation and logic, then what is
needed to address Plato's puzzle is accurately stated by Zwart in About Time. We need to
come up with some "compromise," Zwart writes, "between the exigencies ofthought
(which [is] unable 10 account for change and becoming) and the exigencies ofobservation
(for which change and becoming [are] probably the most conspicuous features of
.IZwart, 1976, P 17. Emphasis minco
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reality).'064
The no~changecamp argues that no such compromise can be made. And this
camp argues that ifand when our logic and our observations are in conflict, then so much
the worse for our observation".
Observations ~ especially scientific ones employing highly refmed modes of
measurement ~ must occur in a presupposed conceptual framework. one at least sufficient
to ensure accurate and consistent measurement. These concepts cannot themselves go
unanalyzed nor be defined. by the observations themselves. Zwart emphasizes this point
about the relation between concepts and observations as it arises, for example, with
definitions of time in empirical physics.
Zwart writes that empirical physics "cannot give a definition of time all by
itself.'.ti3 Continuing Zwart writes "such a defmition would have to be preceded by a
philosophical analysis." In this philosophical analysis the "concept oftime would be
examined.>.ti6 This philosophical and conceptual analysis would be wholly unlike
empiricaJ physics for "it goes without saying," writes Zwart. 'lhat such an [philosophicall
analysis would be completely outside the scope ofphysics.,,67
""Zwart,1976,pI7.
6lZwart, 1976, P 10. The empbasison 'cannot' is Zwart's
"The empbasis 00 'ooncept'ismine.
67Zwart, 10, 1976. Given the epistemoiogicailimitatioo of o])servatiOlls to define the empiricist's
"fundamental notions~ (p 10) in terms ofwbicb observations are themselves first cbar1lCterized, the
empirical doctrines ofmooern pbysics ba~ not eliminated the problems of lime and c1umge for, writes
Zwart, "Einstein's famous analysis was nolan analysis oftbe COl1Ceploftime,blll onJyao analysis ofthe
proce1s ofmeasuring time.~ The concept remains as elusive as ever: for the process ofmeasuriog and what
is measured are two different things. "Wbat lime really is and what quantity is really measured by a c1QCk~
are the questions that physics cannot 8nswer. Sucbconceptualproblems,coDlinuesZwart,are"insolubleby
purely physical methods." This applies no less to the problem of the moment of change.
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In support of Zwart and in support of the limitation ofobservation or empirical
methods to decide all the questions about change and time, Robin Le Poidevin uses the
example of the debate between 'closed' and 'linear' time. In closed time every time is
both before and after every other time, including itself. Time on this model is synunetric
and reflexive, whereas in linear time, time is asymmetric and irreflexive. This dispute,
says Le Poidevin, "is not an empirical dispute...a decision between closed and linear time
would have to be based upon a priori considerations." The a priori component is
necessary to decide the issue for the reason that "any empirical observation we made
would be compatible both with the hypothesis that time is linear and with the hypothesis
that time is closed.'>6& Thought and thought alone, says Le Poidevin, decides the debate
between linear and closed time.
The no--change camp denies the reality ofall change and time on the grounds that
thought and its concepts alone must decide the question about the reality ofchange. Such
concepts are necessary ifobservations are to be intelligible. Thought and logic for the
frrst camp, however, cannot make change logically intelligible. Change is contradictory
and, according to the first camp, what is contradictory cannot exist. We cannot therefore
actually be observing change. For the first camp it only appears as ifwe are observing
change.
Ahhougb in extreme opposition to the 'exigencies ofobservation,' the first camp
is ancient. It has a long history pre-dating even Plato's articulation of the conceptual
problem of the moment ofchange in the Parmenides. But this does not mean that there
"uPoidevill, 1993,p 159.
JO
cannot be found current examples of people who deny the reality of change and time.
The ancient position which denies all change and time is called Eleaticism.
According to the Eleatics, writes Zwart, "all change is only apparent and the world is in
reality absolutely changeless:>69 This 'aU' is meant to operate over absolutely everything,
even our (only apparently) successive, subjective observations or empirical experience of
change and time. This extreme position about change, time and the unchanging nature of
the world derives, says Zwart, "from our inability to make change and movement
logically understandable.,,10
[fwe accept that there are the 'exigencies ofthought' and the 'exigencies of
observation,' then the fIrSt camp's rejection of the reality of all change and time is based
upon the a priori claims ofthought and of logic alone. So such a rejection of change does
not just greatly limit or demote the importance ofobservation for knowledge. Denying
the reality ofal1 change and time additionally demands the stronger claim that what
appears to us in observation is categorically false and wholly unindicative of what is
actually the case. Far from just being simply useless for knowledge. observation for the
fteSt camp leads us to error. This means not that observation yields neither truth nor
falsity (I.e. is useless); rather, observation for the no-change camp only yields falsity.
Parmenides (the man, not Plato's dialogue ofthe same name), Zeno and Mellisus
represent the ancient origin of the no..change camp or the Eleatic school of thought about
change and time. For this school ofthought both change and time are, says Baird, "not
~Zwart.1917,p 16.
7OZWart, 1977,p 16. Ernphasisismine.
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possible." For Parmenides "the path oftruth leads us to see that being is one and cannot
be created, destroyed or changed." For Zeno his "'paradoxes were designed to prove that
plurality and change are not possible...Being is one seamless unchanging whole." For
Mellisus, "like Parmenides, MeUisus believed that being is one seamless unchanging
whole and, like Zeno, be [Mellisus] presented ad absurdum arguments to show the
impossibility ofplurnlity and change.,,71
The Eleatic argument points out and accepts that our perception and observations
appear to show change. But the change that is present in what appears in perception, the
argument runs, is not indicative ofwhat is actually the case, even in the case of our
subjective perceptions and observations.
'The Eleatic claim regarding the illusion or the appearance, as opposed to the
reality, of change and time is fully appreciated by a current member of the camp of ' no
change:' J.E.M. McTaggart. In The Nature ofExistence, McTaggart writes that
Nothing really changes. And nothing is really in time. Whenever we
perceive anything in time - which is the only way in which, in our present
experience, 'We do perceive things, we are perceiving it more or less as it
really is not.72
McTaggart claims the beliefthat change and time are reaJ results from an "illusory
perception." If'We "regard ourselves as perceiving things in time" then we are
1'Baird, 2000,p 19-28.
'IMcTaggart,I968,p22.23.
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"perceiving them erroneously.,,7l
To come to know that ifwe believe in change and time then we are in error
McTaggart argues we need to realize that this belief entails that one ''never escapes from
contradiction...74 A failure to acknowledge the illusory, erroneous nature ofperception
and the Wll'eality oftime would place us, as Parrnenides says., amongst the "dazed,
undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to be and nol to be are the same and not the
same."
To join the camp of 'no-change' ofParmenides and the like we must, argues
Parmenides, avoid using "an aimless eye or an ear or a tongue full of meaningless sound"
to guide us to knowledge. Nor, continues Parmenides, should we judge on the basis of
"habit, bomofmuch experience." Rather, says Parmenides, we must "judge by
reason.,,7S
This means that ifobservation or experience as distinct from reason or logic are in
dispute, then so much the worse for our observations. For the Eleatics as for McTaggart
the 'exigencies ofthought' trump those ofobservation.
The argwnent ofthe no-change camp proceeds as follows: if contradictions cannot
be; and if, according to Parmenides and McTaggart, change and time are contradictory,
then change and time cannot be, regardless of what we think we are observing. 1be result
IlMcTaggart, 1968, p22-23. Emphasis mine.
l'McTaggan, 1968, p22-23. The contradiction would accrue, argues McTaggan, whethC'J we define time
as "relations~ or ~qualities:' as "A-series"(tense) or "B·senes" (dates), it does not matter which. The exact
details ofMcTaggart's argument are not necessary 10 describe here. We will deal with these argumenls in
detailln Chapter Three. What is necessary to nole for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that
McTaggart appeals to tbe fogicalprinciple of nOlI-contradiction in order to ground hisconclusion.
7lPlllTIlcnides, see Baird, 2000,p 21
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of an Eleatic style analysis and the subsequent rejection ofchange and time is that "'the
real nature ofthe universe differs very much from the nature which it appears primafacie
The argument of the first camp has a four-part structure.
(1) It gi\'es negative epistemological import to observation.
(2) Logic, reason or a priori thought ground its conclusion.
(3) The principle of non-contradiction is absolutely binding or inviolable.
(4) When change is submitted to a logical analysis change is found to be
contradictory.
There are those who do not think that logic trumps observations. This means that
some people reject (I). Some have claimed that in light ofour observations so much the
worse for our logic.
Graham Priest, for example, with his 'dialectical tense logic', claims to prove·
contra Parmenides • that to be and not to be are the same and are not the same. This
means that Priest when he analyses change knowingly reconunends what Strobach calls
'logical anarchy,' namely the idea that ''there are some changes fromp being true to-p
being true where a contradiction is realized.nn For Priest, contradictions can and do
exist. Priest, then. rejects (3) and much as he rejects (2). We will see that Mellor, for
example, rejects (4).
The Eleatic anti-change argument is, then, discreditable on the following points.
'~cTaggart,1968,p193.
7lPriest, 1981,p249.
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(0) The distinction between reality and primafacie appearance and the
negative characterization ofobservation. This distinction is useless and
does not address nor prevent the questions concerning the moment of
change from arising.
(~) The appeal to classicaJ logic's principle of non-contradiction.
(y) The analysis or characterization ofchange as contradictory.
Ifwe, to deal with the first point, take McTaggart's claim that "whenever we
perceive anything in time - which is the only way in which, in our present experience, we
do perceive things, we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not," then we see that
according to McTaggart there are at least two things: (I) the 'way we perceive it to
appear' and (2) the 'way it is'.
Now, in 'reality' there is neither change nor time. But, according to the way
things appear, there is change and time. We must reject the latter and demand the
former. The numerical difference between (I) and (2) requires that we assume that the
'way things appear' along with the 'way it is' both equally exist. For ifour perception of
change did not exist then we could not perceive it as we do • as changing in time. While
iftbe 'way it is' did not exist then it would not be let alone be the way it is.
The distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' does not settle the dispute for
the reason that a change in that which appears (i.e. observations) is a change nonetheless
in what is. Ifthere is a change in what appears and ifappearances are real in SO fur as
they exist as appearances (i.e. in so fur as phenomenology is possible), then to that extent
the distinction between reality and appearance is useless for deciding questions arising
from a conceptual analysis ofthe changes that we observe to occur. In other words, even
if McTaggart is correct and we perceive the world more or less as it really is not, this does
not eliminate change.
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Zwart supports the claim thaI "it does not matter whether all this change and
becoming which we observe is real or only apparent." What is "essential," say Zwan, "is
that something changes; whether this something is real or only an appearance is not
important." The reason why the distinction between reality and appearance is useless to
decide the questions arising regarding the moment ofchange is that "a change in
appearance is a change too." This means that a change in appearances or observations is
no less a change in 'reality' than is a 'real' change in the 'real' reality. Change is not less
than change "even if one were to locate this change of appearance entirely in the mind."
Zwart therefore supports the claim that it is ''utterly pointless to postulate another timeless
reality behind the transient reality we observe around 05.,,71 Change remains in so far a~
we accept the (minimal claim) that there is at least the appearance of a changing and
transient world.
Priest, in support of the irrelevance and uselessness ofthe distinction between
appearance and reality for the conceptual problems associated with change, presents
change entirely from the perspective of a "phenomenological example.,,19 In the light of
this example, McTaggart's attempt to discredit the reality ofchange by arguing that
perception is erroneous and illusory is seen to be an insufficient reason against the reality
of change. One can. with Priest's example. raise all the questions about change without
making any appeal or reference to any perception or any observation.
In Priest's phenomenological example there is not 811 "independent physical
"Zwart, 1976,p 19.
l'IPriesI,1981,p252.
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state',w at all. In this example, therefore, we need not worry about whether or not what
we observe is an image of the real or the real itself. For Priest we can. as was stated in
Chapter One, generalize the problem oftile moment of change from a physical,
observable example (e.g. the change from motion to rest) to some arbitrary property F.
This arbitrary property Fcan be defined in terms ofthe change from not-knowing to
knowing the solution to a problem. Priest argues that in this case the "epistemological
state is all thereis:"l Priestwrites
For days I have been pU72ling over a problem. Suddenly the solution
strikes me...Now, at the instant the solution strikes me, do I, or do I not
know the answer? There appears to be no good reason for saying one
ratberthan the other. All I know is that befure, I could not say what the
answer was, whilst after I could. lbe situation is symmetrical Nor will it
really do to say that at that instant I detcnninately either did or did not
know the answer: It is just that we do not know and can not tell which.12
In this example, continues Priest, we do not need to ponder about some
"determinate physical situation at the instant ofchange which obtained independently of
our epistemological and perceptual abilities.."3 In so far, then, as the distinction between
reality and appearance can be made, to that extent the questions concerning the moment
ofchange remain, fur the problem arises in areas where observation and perception are
totally ignored, as in Priest's epistemological example.
~iest,1981,p2S2.
"priest,198Lp2S2.
IlPriesI,1981,p252.
"priesI,1981,p252.
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At best, the distinction between appearance (i.e. enoneous or illusory perception)
and reality (i.e. the 'nuth' independent of our epistemological and perceptual abilities)
made by the Eleatics and McTaggart explains away, rather than explains, change,
especially phenomenological change. We must, however, 'save the phenomenon.'
Change cannot be explained away. When an appeal to the distinction between
appearance and reality is made, the conceptual problem of change is merely delayed or
ignored, rather than addressed and explained.
We have already seen that observation alone will nol address the problem of the
moment of change. In the case of the no-change camp, however, the objection is that an
appeal to logic alone cannot solve the situation. In other words, Strobach's logical
anarchy should not be prevented by the Elcatic's or McTaggart's logical dictatorship,
especially a logical dictatorship that denies the reality of change for, as Zwart rightly
notes, according to the "exigencies of obserntion" change and becoming are the ''most
conspicuous features of reality...M Denying the reality of change and time and rejecting
or ignoring the exigencies of observation based upon the dictates of logical analysis alone
would require us to live with what Strobach calls "phenomenological unease...M
To deal with the second objection against the 'no-change' camp we should
remember that the Eleatics and McTaggart appeal 10 the first principle of classical logic,
the law of non-contradiction, in order to ground the conclusion that change and time are
not real. Both claim that contradictions cannot exist, change and time are contradictory,
"Z'MIrt, i976,p17.
llStrobach.I998,p12.
and so change and time cannot exist. Their argument that change and time are
contradictory would require it to be the case that, as Priest notes, "classical logic is right."
But, Priest continues, "it is exactly this point [the validity of classical logic] which is now
at issue."s6 On this head Priest says that, with respect to the problem of the moment of
change, "the principles of classical logic cannot therefore be invoked without begging the
question.'087
Priest argues that change and time are contradictory but that, against the Eleatics
and McTaggart, Priest argues that change can and docs exist as contradictory. According
to Priest the no-change camp's appeal to classical logic is insufficient to ground their
conclusion. Priest would argue that the no-change camp presupposes the principles of
classical logic rather than prove that such principles are binding.
The third objection against the no-change eamp concerns tbe claim that change
and time are contradictory. But are change and time contradictory? Or can change and
time be analyzed in such a way so as to show that change and time are not contradictory'!
EJ. Lowe, in The Indexical Fallacy in McTaggart's Proofofthe Unreality of
Time, writes that the structure of McTaggart's argument against the reality of time and
change is as follows.
(1) Time essentially involves change.
(2) Change can only be explained in tenns of A-series expressions.
(3) A-series expressions involve contradiction and so cannot describe
reality.
UptieSI,19S1,p2S3
r7PriesI,19SI,p252
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(4) Therefure time [and change} is unreal. lS
The third objection against the 'no-change' camp • whethcr change and time are
contradictory - pertains to parts (2) and (3) of McTaggart's argument. That change can
only be explained in tenns of A-series or tensed expressions, expressions using the tenns
'past', 'present' and 'future', is a debatable point,
It is conceivable that one could agree with part (3) of McTaggart's argument
while at the same time disagreeing with part (2). Only if both (2) and (3) are held will (4)
follow. There is no shortage of people who do not accept (4). Those who "oppose
McTaggart's conclusion," writes Llwe, "challenge either (2) or (3) or both:.89 One can,
then, accept that McTaggart proved that A-series expressions are contradictory and so
cannot describe reality. But one can still admit the reality ofchange and time. Admitting
the reality ofchange and time would be via a rejection of(2).
(2) does not concern whether or not change is contradictory. (2) concerns what is
meant by change or how change is to be defined. And (2) additionally concerns how the
terms used in the defmition ofchange are themselves to be defined. For an example, let's
take the term ''time'' and the position ofD.H. Mellor, who rejects (4).
Ifwe say that 'change' is 'a thing having mutually exclusive properties at
different 'times" and mean by 'time' past, present and future (Le. what is called "A-
series" time), then for Mellor we would suffer the problems McTaggart points out with
"Lowe, 1931, P 63. The 'indexical fuJlacy' results when words like 'here' and 'now' are confused and
misll$ed. Though interesting in its own right, Lowe's articulation of the fallacy and liisargllment about
McTaggart making it is not of importance for the Pl,ITJlOSes ofthis chapter, although Lowe's work does raise
thepossibilityof)·et anotherobjectioo 10 McTaggart'sargllment.
"Lowe, 1981,p63.
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this series. Whereas if we mean by 'time' the "B-series," a series ofdates (i.e. (tl, t2, h)),
then we would not suffer the problems of A-series descriptions.90 We will consider in
more detail the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory oftime in Chapter
Three and how they relate to change.
For the present it is enough to note that the acceptance or rejection of(2) and its
implied definition of time is what differentiates McTaggart from Mellor, who unlike
McTaggart accepts the reality ofchange and time. Lowe writes,
Mellor holds that McTaggart succeeds in demonstrating the unreality of
tense (there are, for Mellor, no tensed facts), but IlOt that oftime. since he
~~~~:~ holds that change can be explained without reference to the A-
The fuet that, for Mellor, ehange can be explained without reference to the A·
series means that Mellor does not accept (2). Of MeTaggart's argument Mellor writes
that
""McTaggart argues thai the A-series is more fundamental than the B-sc:ries. It is fur this reason that
McTaggan rejects the B-series lIS much as the A-r.eries based upon problems wholly within the A·series
alone. There is, therefore, within McTaggart'S argument, an additional (and questionable) premise
advocating a "reductionist thesis" ofB-series to A-series. This debate is however outside !he parameters of
this chapter. forourpuT]lOSC,itissufficienttoshowlhatpart(2)andthedebateSSUlTOllndingitaromo~
than cootroversial and COfIlplex and that the 'nlH:hange'carnpcan be questioned based upon their
definition ofchange and time. for more on the debate between A-series and B-series sec, fllStly, 10sh
ParSOll's 'A-Theory for B·Theorisu' in The PhiiosophicolQliOl'ferty, Vol. 52, No. 206,January 2002, p 1-
20. PatsonShereailtmpJJlOexplainthedifferencebetweentheA-andB-series. While,secondly,Stt
Clifford Williams' 'The Metaphysics of A-and B.Time' in The Philosophical Qliorterly, 1996, p 371-381.
WiI1iams' aim,hesays, is "10 get at what reaJly differenliates the two throries." But,unlikeandagainst
Parsons, Williams argues "that there is no coherent way ofstating what this [difference] is." For more OIl
the "reductiooist thesis" see Robin Le Poide~in's 'Time, Tense and Topology' in The Philosophical
QIIarterty, Vol. 46, No. 185, October 1996, P 467-481. See McTaggart's The Nature or ExisltfICt,
Cambridge University Press, London, 1968. plJ, paragraph 310-3t2 fof McTaggart'sarticlllation of the
reductiooistthesis. Mellorreje<:tsthereductiooislthesis.
"Lowe,1987.p63
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[T]he tensed view oftime is self-contradictory and so cannot be true.
McTaggart showed that in 1908, while trying to show tUne itselfto be
unreal. Time, hov.'ever is not unreal: the rest of McTaggart's argument is
wrong.9l
Mellor will take issue with what Le Poidevin calls McTaggart's "reductionist
thesis.."3 concerning the B-series and the A-series. lbe reductionist thesis argues that the
B-series "is to be analyzed in terms ofthe A-series, and not vice versa.,,9-4 lbe
reductionist thesis draws heavily on definitions of time and change that Mellor will not
accept. This means, says Lowe, that Mellor "accepts (3) but not (2). ,>'IS
Thus the no-<:hange camp's argwnent may be rejected based upon the no-change
camp's deftnition of change and time as contradictory.
What's more, ifaccording to McTaggart A-series propositions are contradictory
and cannot describe reality, then why wouJd McTaggart choose - and how could
McTaggart choose - to describe 'change' in terms ofan A-series? McTaggart argues A-
series tcnns are the only available candidates for describing change, B-series terms being
WlSUitable to the task for the reason that B-series terms are pennanent (i.e.• ifM is ever
carlier than N, then M is always, has always been and will al.....'3.ys be earlier than N).96 I~
'IMellor,1981,p5.
'ILePoidevin, 1996. P 470.
'l<LePoidevin,1996.p469
,sLcwe,1937,p63
"For McTaggart's argwnent that change cannot be expressed in B-series terms sec The Nalure o/Existence
Vol. 2, Bk. Y, Chap. XXXIII, Para. 310.
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ho\\'Cver, A-series terms cannot describe reality, then there is no way in which these terms
rould describe change. Change rould not, then, only be described in A-series terms. for
nothing can be described in (contradictory) A-series terms.
If A-series terms are rontradictory then, at best, McTaggart's conclusion must be
limited to the claim that A-series terms cannot describe change, not that change cannot be
real (this corresponds to MeUor's ronclusion). If McTaggart's premise (3) is true then his
premise (2) and conclusion (4) must be false: for A-series tenns that cannot describe
reality are tenns that cannot be used as a ground for the rejection of some phenomenon
that such terms are being (illicitly) used to describe, namely change.
In summary, the no-change camp creates a distinction between appearance and
reality. This distinction does not eliminate the problem of the moment ofchangc, for the
problem ofthe moment ofchange does not necessarily depend on observations or
perceptions for its articulation. Priest's epistemological and phenomenological example
indicates this fact. Secondly, the appeal to the principles of classical logic is not without
problems of its own, and there are examples of people who will reject these classical
principles. Thirdly, the ftrst camp's defmition ofchange and time are questionable and
have been rejected.
For these reasons the no-change camp's conclusion should be viewed with the
utmost scepticism if not completely rejected.
2.2 The Camp of Real Change
Ifwe do not want to claim that there is no such thing as change then a manner of
4J
dealing with Plato's puzzle that does not deny the reaJityofchange must be articulated.
We need now to see how those falling into the second camp -those who argue that
change and time are real - deal with change and time in such a way so as to address the
conceptual problem of the moment of change.
Strobach argues that all 'solutions' to the conceptual problem of the moment of
change are two-fold. Firstly, all entail their own, particular description ofthc moment of
change. Secondly, all the descriptions entail a classification of the moment of change.
Strobaeh captures the two-fold character of the various ways in which the conceptual
problem has been dealt with by means of the following two questions:
1. Which (if any) stale obtains at the limit between the old state and the
new state?
2. When (if at all) does an event of changing take place?9?
People who address these questions and offer a possible solution to Plato's puzzle
do not, as the Eleatics and McTaggart do, explain away change. 911
These two questions accurately indicate the conceptual problem ofllie moment of
change. To address the conceptual problem of the moment of change is to provide
systematic answers to these two questions. Strobach makes an additional, important point
about the relation between the two questions and their two answers that will help clarify
the problem and what a solution to it must take into account.
¥JStrobach,I998,p3
~McTaggartwould answer question (2) by saying an event of changing cannot exist (i.e. he would place
emphasis on the "if at aU" ofStrobach's second question). Thus for McTaggart to speak ofan old or a new
state is contradictory nonsense; he would nol, then, agree that question (I) can be asked let alone answfied,
givcn how he answers (2)
Strobach argues the two questions can be "answered fairly independently." Thus
we must always ensure that we have "distinguished the tv.'O questions explicitly." The
reason why such. an explicit differentiation must always be maintained is that "oth.erwise
an answer to one oftbe questions might easily be taken to be an answer to the other
question - which it is not.,,99
To further clarify what these two questions and their differentiation are supposed
to achieve, we should recall that, in Chapter One, the moment ofchange was isolated and
shown to be problematic by means of the following four-part argument.
(I) Both the before and after states cannot occur in the same object at the
same time.
(2) There are only two possible states for an object in time,
rest or motion.
(3) It cannot change with out changing. 100
(4) Changing cannot occur when the old state still is nor when the
new state has become.
And we saw in Chapter One that (1), (2) and (4) conflict at the moment of
"S!robach, 1998, P 3. As an example of the difference and relation betwun the two quesdons, consider
Strobach's intupretation of Plato'sand Hamblin'streatmentofthese questiOlls. Strobachwritesthat
~Hamblin agrees with Plato in describing the moment of cbange as fundamentally neither belonging to the
ending nor to the beginning one of the two states it separates.~ But that there ~lII'e fundamental and
interesting similarities~ bet.....een Hamblin wd Plato does not mean, Strobach argues., that there are not
~different motives for Plato wd for Hamblin using the 'neither-nor' option in describing the moment of
ehwge.~ In other wotds. two different descriptiona motivated by different argllments are not mutually
exclusive with respect to the classificatioo of the descriptiOll~. For Strobacb's interpretation of Plato sec his
Th<! MOffU!nJ ofChange, Chaptel' I, p 20-45, For his interpretation and comparison of Hamblin with Plato
~eeChapter4, §4.1.I.p 171-173. According to SlTobach's interpretatiOl'l of Plato, ~Platousesthe
neither/nor option and allows an event ofchanging to take place 01 1M Umlling ImIOIll." HambHn, in
contrast, also gets classilied as 'neithel'-Ilor';but unlike Plato, Hamblin "wantstoabolishinslaJlts
altogether."
loothisc1aim could beCOl1strued as the c1aim that a thing can undergoalittollQlloY ifandonlyif
llttollQUtl is true of it at or for some time.
"
changing from the before to the after, the 'changing' that (3) requires to be explained
rather than explained away.
1suggest that Strobach's first qucstion concerns the problctnatic tension occurring
betwecn (1), (2) and (4). This question concerns the states ofan object during a change.
Strobach's second question is concerned with part (3) of the argument used to
isolate thc moment of change. The second question is explicitly concerned with how 'to
change' from Fto not-F is related to 'a change,' the difference between F and not-F. The
second question is therefore concerned with the changing of the object's slates.
The Iwo systematic questions, when put in relation to the argument used to isolate
the moment of change, render clearer the nature of the problem and whal is required in
order to address it: all oflhe analyses must take into account (1) the object's slates and (2)
the changing of the object's slate.
Strobach offers no less than Iwelve descriptions of the moment of change. All
these descriptions are classified according to the following five-fold system.
(1) the eilher/oroption.
(2) the either-way option.
(3) the both-states option.
(4) the neither/nor option.
(5) neutral instant analysis.
Our task now is to describe each classification and 10 provide an example of each.
We must also come 10 understand why each classification is problematic for "a thorough
look al them shows thaI, when applied, they are nOI all equally successful." Some of these
options "tum out to be very implausible candidates,,,IOI
2.3 The Eitber/Or Option
According to the either/or option "exactly one of the t\\'o states obtains at the
limiting instant; either the old or the new slate... I02 The question that must be raised when
tltis response to the problem of the moment of change is given is 'exactly which state is it
that obtains at the limiting instant?' Advocating the either/or position means that one can
accept that it would bc a contradiction for both the old and the ncw statc to occur
simultaneously. And one can accept that either one or the other state obtains. This means
that the either/or position does not violate or call into question the principles ofclassical
logic; nor does it deny or demote the importance of observation.
The charge that can be raised against this position is that ofarbitrariness, If we
ask. Strobach's first question. 'which, if any, state obtains at the limit betv.'een the old and
the new stale?' and reply by saying 'exactly one,' then we have failed to understand or
answer the question, For if we agree that the old and the new states an: mutually
exc:lusive then we already know thaI only one state could be the case at anyone time,
especially at the limiting instant. Whal wc want to know is which state is the one thaI
obtains. Sorabji, an advocate of the either/or option writes,
'·'Strohilch,I998,p6,
'·'Strob.>.ch, 1998,p5, See Put 2, Olaple-r I,p 125·145 for Strobach'slU\3.lysisof the eithfi/or-option.
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Suppose we imagine that up to a given instant something is non-existent,
or invisible, orofa given colour, and that after that instant it is existent,
visible or of quite a different colour. What status ought we to assign to it
at the instant oftransition? With these discontinuous changes, there will
often be 00 considerations to guide us. H13
The trick required to make the either/or option palatable is to fInd a sufficient
consideration to guide us in our assignment ofa status to the object at the instant of
change "without arbitrariness."104 Strobach agrees with Sorabji in so far as it comes to
the need for a reason why the one rather than the other state should be at the limiting
instant. To answer the question we ~d "a reason for assigning the limiting instant rather
to the one than to the other state.,,10' Failure to provide such a reason would make our
assignment an "arbitrary decision.',I06
In the case ofdiscontinuous change and its limiting instant's status the situation is
fmely balanced between the new and the old state. We therefore need to have something
to recommend at least a "minor asymmetry"l07 between the old and the new slate in order
to escape the charge ofarbitrariness when we assign the limiting instant to either the old
or to the new state. Priest agrees and stresses in his epistemological example that "the
situation is symmetrical." With respect to the limiting instant between the before and
after, or knowing and not.knowing, Priest argues that "there appears to be no good reason
lG1Sorabji,198J,p406.
I"Sorabji.1983,p407.
lG'Strobach,I998,pI45.
I06Strobach,I998,p 13L
t01Slrobach,I998.pI26.
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for saying one [state] rJ.ther than the other [slate]"l08 obtains at the instant of change.
Priest offers the act of stipulation as a possible coursc. He argues that stipulation will not
help. Instead stipulation "underlies the problem [for] I am free to stipulate eithcr way."l09
It is here that the objection against the either/or option is most acute. For
whatever is said to provide the asymmetry necessary to escape the charge of arbitrariness
may be challenged and found possibly false or inadequate. The either/or option stands or
falls on that which is claimed to provide the necessary asymmetry.
As an example consider the debate between Sorabji and Strobach. Sorabji writes
that
The question is whether \\Ie should treat the instant of transition between
motion and rest as one at which the moving object is in motion, or at rest.
The decision is no longer so clearly dictated, but I think there is a
consideration which would justify our calling it an instant of rest. 110
The reason why Sorabji decides to say rest rather than motion occurs at the instant
of change or transition has to do with an "assumption," Sorabji writes, that "is the normal
one in contemporary physics."l11 This assumption connects "zero velocity with rest and
velocities about zero with motion.,,112 lfwe make this assumption continues Sorabji ''we
get the result that there is no first or last instant of motion, but that there may be first and
'"PrieS1,1981,p252.
'"Pries1,1981,p252.
II·Sorabji,t983,p406.
'
IO Sorabji,1983,p406
IIlSorabji,1983,p406
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lastinstantsofrest...m
Strobech ",rites tbat the asswnption from physics Sorabji recommends is that of
"momentary" or "instantaneous velocity.,,114 Strobach takes issue with this assumptKlD.
Physics has been using this concept very successfully since Newton: and if
something works, we tend 10 regard it as completely unproblematic. Il5
However, that a concept can sometimes be useful for physics does not eliminate
all possible controversy. The concept of momentary velocity is "not tmprOblematic.,,116
Charles Hamblin, for example, in 'Starting and Stopping,' BCgUCS that "the arbitrariness
of instantaneous \'31ues is itselfdisquieting."lIl For Hamblin the very idea ofan instant,
let alone an instantaneous value at an instant, is problematic. Hamblin asks "'why should
we ever talk about troth or falsity 01 an instant?"llt Hamblin in effect denies that there is
any meaning to the notion ofan instantaneous value or state.
What's more, tbere is no shonage ofexamples in the history of science where
once fimdamental and 'useful' concepts bave been completely rejected. II'
lIlSonbji.1913.p406.
"'StrobadJ.I99I.pl21.
1I1Strobach. 199I,p 129.
IltStrobach. 199I.p 129.
IllHamblin, 1916, p 412. The emphasis in is Hamblin'Sle~t.
l!1Hamblin, 1986, p 412. The emphasis in is Hamblin's len.
11~or an example COlIsideJ" the difference betw«n geocelluic, heliocentrie and acentrie cosmological
CQl:1eepu. K~'s work, Frmrr tM CIOIItd World 10 the l'!finilt Unillt'rw. describes the "d~lopmml of
the ntwCOJ/Ilolo&Y, wbichrepblced die I~ oranlhropooentrie world ofGreek and Medieval aslTOIIOllI)' by
the heliooenlrie. and 1ata".b)'tht~trdeuLllliYel'5eofmodentatrorlOllly.w Koyri.19S7. vii. Hennis
Strobach criticizes Sorabji's argument by writing that "if one refrains from tying
the definitions ofrest and motion at instants to the concept ofmomentaty velocity, [then]
there is no more justification for assigning the limiting instant to rest rather than
motion."I20 Strobach, like Hamblin, argues that the problems associated with momentary
velocity or instantaneous values mean that ''the description ofthe moment of change
between rest and motion should not be tied to the concept of momentary ve!ocity."12l
The problem with instantaneous values demands that Sorabji's "argument in favour of an
asymmetry must be rejected."m
In so fur as any particular description classifiable as advocating tbe either/or
option is questionable based upon that to which it appeals in order to suggest tbe
asymmetry neressary to escape arbitrariness, to that extent the either/or option will not
provide a sufficiently sound solution to the problem of the moment of change. The
import of a degree ofarbitrariness means that "the either/or option has shown itself as not
to be recommended.,,123
seen that rnutually exclusive COilcepts have all been held to be fundamentaL
11OStrobach.1998,p131
l~lStrobach, t998, P 145. The exact problems wilh the conceptofmomenwy velocity arc immaterial here;
whal is sufficient for our purposc here isto show that it is at Jeast problematic and questiOllablc as the
principle of asymmetry. For more on the problems associated with momentary velocity sec The Momenl of
Change, Par12, Chaptcr J, §J.I.3.and §J.J.4.,p 129·131. One such problem, for example, concemsa
"restrictiOl'ltoc){cludeabruptbeginningsofamotion." This restriction rcsults in a possible confusion
bclwun change and processes
l2lStrobach,I998,p131.
lllStrobach,I998,pI45.
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2.4 The Either·Way Option
Proponents ofthe 'eithcr.way option' claim that "in a certain respect, the old state
still obtains at the limiting instant, in another respe<:t it does not. Moreover, in a certain
way the new state already obtains at the limiting instant, but in another way it does
001.,,124 Brian Medlin is an example ofthis position. l2S
Richard Sorabji in his Time, Creation and the Continuum, discusses Medlin's
position. Sorabji writes "Medlin says., in effect, that a thing can be both in motion and at
rest at an instant, and equally neither in motion nor at rest at that instant.,,126
Although Medlin discusses change in terms ofrest or motion Medlin remarks "the
paradox appears to be quite generaL" And "it concerns not only motion but every thing
or property that begins or ceases to exist.,,127
QfMedlin's position Strobach claims that Medlin's "attempts fail" for the reason
that the either-way option "turns out to be quite unintelligible.,,121 Strobach argues that
this position "does not make any sense.,,129 Strobach argues that Medlin "would have
Il·Strobacb,I998,p5. See Part 2, Chapter 2,p 146-160,forStrobacb'sllllalysisofthceitber-wayoption.
IllMedlin, Brian, 'The Origin of Molion'. Mind, Vol. LXXII. No. 286, April 1963, P 155-175.
Il6Sorabji,1983,407
1l7Medlin,I963.p 155. This point bas betn stressed in CbapterOne.
l2IStrobach,I998,pl0.
1l9Strobach,I998,pI60.
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quite a lot to do to make his claim plausible (which he does not)."uo Why does Stroba<:h
think this position implausibly unintelligible?
Medlin's position in particular and the either-way option in general are, argues
Stroba<:h, contradictory and illogical. Stroba<:h thinks Medlin's position contradictory
and illogical for, as Sorabji notes in his Time, Creation aruJ the Continuum, ''the fiNit part
[of Medlin's argument) may sound as ifit violates the law ofnon-contradiction;" while
the second part of Medlin's argument sounds as if "it violates the law of excluded
middle."lJl
Medlin's argument in 'The Origin ofMotion' is as follows. Medlin writes,
if 12.00 is the moment of change then,
(l)The body was in motion at 12.00
(2) The body was at rest at 12,00
(1) The body was not in motion at 12.00
(2+) The body was not at rest at 12.00
are all true.1l2
Sorabji writes that Medlin's position allows that "all four statements can be true
together, namely, that a thing is in motion at an instant, not at rest at that instant, and that
it is at rest at that instant, not in motion at it.,,133
At first sight it appears that at Medlin's moment of change (I) and (I) contradict
IJOStrobach,1998,p158.
'"SOIabji,11183,p407.
IllMedlin,1%3,pln
"'Sorabji,J983,p407-408.
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each other as do (2) and (2'). Additionally at Medlin's moment of change it appears that
ifall four are true then the law ofthe excluded middle is also violated.
Strobach's criticism of Medlin concerns whether or not (I) and (n and (2) and
(2) are contradictory. Strobach argues they do contradict each other. Medlin (not
surprisingly) argues that Strobach's worry is a "groundless worry."ew Medlin would
contend that Strobach fails to comprehend a distinction that is generally overlooked.
"This distinction," claims Medlin, is that "between propositional and predicate
negation."m Strobach's debate with Medlin concerns "Medlin's keyword: 'predicate
negation. ,,,06
For Medlin, (1) and (1) do not contradict each other for (I) is a proposition
whose negation is -(I) not (lj. (Ij is not for Medlin the contradictory of(1), so the two
can be simultaneously asserted to be true without contradiction. If( I) is 'the body is in
motion at 12.00' then -(1) would be 'it is not the case that the body is in motion at 12.00.'
These two are, says Medlin, contradictory. "The propositions (1) and -(1) cannot,"
writes Medlin, "be true together under any circumstances.',137
(1"), in contrast, is 'the body is in non-motion al 12.00.' The propositions (I) and
(I) are thus logically different in nature in spite oftheir linguistic similarity: the 'not' in
the fonner is a propositional negation while the 'not' in the latter is a predicate negation.
ll'Medlin,1963,pI63.
llIMedlin.I963,p In.
Il6Strobacb, 1998, p 8. For Strobach's complete analysis of Medlin see The MomemofChimge. Pan 2,
Chapter 2. For Strobach's analysis of'predicatenegatioo' sce § 2.2.3.
"'Medlin,I963,pl71
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-(1) and (1+) are contradictory, as are -(1) and (1). But (1) and (\.) are not
contradictory. Medlin writes,
The propositions -(I) and (11 differ in tbat while -(1) is tbe propositional
negation of (I), (Ij...is merely the predicate negation. l38
Medlin argues all four of his statements can bc true due 10 the fact that the word
'not' in (I) and the word 'not' in (n are different in each. Medlin writes, "the
distinction between propositional negation and predicate negation is generally
overlooked." And he claims that the supposed paradoxes associatcd with change result
from failing to distinguish bctween predicate and propositional negation. If"wc continue
to think in terms of propositional negation then we have the paradox," says Medlin.1J'I
Medlin's distinction between propositional and predicate negation is described by
Strobach.
The objection to Medlin's position derives not from the notion of predicate
negation in itself. There is no objection to saying that 'a is non-white al t', though we
still do not know what colour it is. The objection to the eithcr-way option instead arises
from and concerns the relation bet\veen predicate and propositional negation. What does
lllMcdlin,1963,p172
"'Medlin, 1963,pl72.
55
'0 is non·white al t' entail? Does '0 is non·white at l' imply that '0 is not while at 1'?
Does predicate negation imply proJX)sitionaJ negation (or vice versa)? Iftbe former is
true and '0 is non-white at 1', could the latter be false and '0 not be not while at t'?
For Medlin's argument to hold, predicate negation must not entail proJX)sitional
negation otherwise a contradiction would ensue. If predicate negation implied
proJX)sitional negation then (I) would entail-{l). Medlin's (I) would then be
contradicted by his (I) via (1)'s entailment of-(I).
Medlin's distinction between proJX)sitional and predicate negations means that for
him the proposition '0 is non-white at t' does not entail that '0 is not white at t.' Strobach
writes, "'ifthe predicate negation implied the propositional negation, there would be the
very contradiction Medlin wants to avoid.,,141 Therefore Medlin "would like the
predicate negation to be true while the propositional negation is false.,,142 It is true for
MedJin that a thing is not white (qua predicate negation) while it is false, for Medlin, that
a thing is not white (qua propositional negation).
Sorabji writes Medlin's position "runs the risk ofcausing confusion.,,14J It seems
counter-intuitive to say that '0 is non·white at t' does not entail that '0 is not white at t.'
Medlin's manner of relating predicate negation with propositional negation is what
proves difficult for the intelligibility of his position, not predicate negation per se.
Let's assume that 0 is a lamp that is on and Medlin turned it off. Certainly '0 is
"·Strobacb. 1998.p l.w.
'·'Strobacll,1998,pI57.
"'Strobacb. 1998.p 159.
"lSorabji.1983.p408.
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not on' would be true ofa when it is changing. But in what sense a not-on lamp could
still be on enough to make 'a is not on' talse is unclear.
The introduction of predicate negation does little to clarify or reduce the
conceptual difficulty ofthe moment ofchange though it seems adept at making the issue
more difficult to Wlderstand. It is hard to understand why (1) what makes a predicate
negation either true or mise and (2) what makes a propositional negation either true or
false would differ. One does not, I would think, say any more or any less when one
asserts that 'a is not on at t' or 'a is not on at t.' Strobach writes,
One wonders in any case what, after all, a predicate negation is exactly
supposed to be, and how one is to understand the 'not' in (I') and (2).1'"
The distinction between predicate and propositional negation seems to be a
specious and questionable, and perhaps an unintelligible distinction. In so far as the
distinction is questionable to that extent Medlin's (1) and (1) and his (2) and (2) are
contradictory. A rejection ofthc claim that 'predicate negation does not entail
propositionaJ negation' means "the attempt to apply the either-way option to the
description of the moment ofcilange yields disappointing results.,,14~
2.5 The Both-States Option
'''Strobaeh,l99B,pI5S.
I'lStrobaeh,I99S,pI60.
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In the both-states option the claim is made that ''the old as well as the new stale
obtains at the limiting instant." This means that at the limiting instant, an objective
contradiction is realized. In the logic of this option ''the LNC [law ofnon-contradiclion]
does not hold in it."j46 Graham Priest is the exemplar ofthis position. For Priest "there
are some changes fromp being true to -p being true where a contradiction is realized."j47
Priest's essay, 'To Be and Not to Be: Dialectical Tense Logie,' is explicitly
concerned with ''the problem ofthe instant ofchange."148 Priest argues that there are
three types of change. To tmderstand Priest's three-fold distinction we should
Suppose that before a time to a system, S, is in a state &;.. After to S is in a
state Sj. Accordingly, at to it changed from So to Sl. What state was it in
at to? There appear to be three possibilities:
(l) S is in exactly one ofSo, Sl.
(2) Sis in neither So nor Sj.
(3) Sis in both So and 8j.149
Priest denotes the flrst type ofchange a type.a change, the second a type-jJ
change, and the third a type-y change. Priest's essay and argument about the moment of
change concern type-y changes. It is this class ofchange that instantiates a contradiction.
Priest argues that we cannot avoid the existence oftype-y changes. "We seem
driven," contends Priest, "to the conclusion that there are type-y changes." Let's consider
U·Strobacli, 1998,p 161-
I"PrieslI981,p249.
l<IPriest,1981,p249.
I"PrieslI981,p249.
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why Priest thinks we are driven to this conclusion
As an example consider the change in the truth value of a proposition, p. such as
'the car is at rest at t.' Priest then asks the question "are they [the changes in a
proposition's truth-value] type-13 or type-y ehanges?"lSO
Careful attention to this question shows it omits asking if such a change is a type-
a change. This is for good reason. Priest asks his 'either typc-p or type-y' question after
he rejects the claim that all changes are type-a changes. He WTites that "we have seen
thai some changes from p being true to -p being true (or vice versa) are not type-a
changes.,,151 That all changes are type-a is, he writes, merely the "standard
assumption.,,152
An essential component in Priest's argument that contradictions exist is his claim
that there are type-P changes, and that type-a changes are not sufficient to describe all
changes, especially a car's change from resl to motion. We need, then, to consider
Priest's argument that there are typc-j3 changes in order to understand why he asks his
question as he does, omitting from his question the possibility that the change from p
being true to -p being true is always or could only be a type-a change. An example will
be ofhelp.
As we have all experienced, ifa car at rest changes from rest to motion then while
at rest with zero velocity it is neither accelerating nor decelerating. When it does
accelerate it has zero velocity, although il does nol have zero velocilY immediately after it
'>OpriesI,1981,p253.
I"Priest,1981,p253
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aC(:elerates. After accelerating the car has, say, a velocity of 1mls (or, at the least, a noo-
zero velocity). Priest asks us to consider such a ear's behaviour in terms of the function,
v, of one variable, t, such that
v=Omlsforl~O
v=tmJsfort~O.
With respect to the velocity ofthe car, at the moment ofehange the car ehanged
from the prior state ofOmls at t = 0 to a posterior state of 1 mls at 1 =1. And this, says
Priest, "is unproblematically a type-a change" for, he continues, "at time t = 0 the car
changes from5Q, v = 0, to Sj v> 0." At the moment ofchange the car was in exactly one
of&. or Sl. And in this case the car was in So when it changed. Given this functional
description of a car's velocity with respect to time we can now, writes Priest, "address the
question whether all changes are type-a changes."m
We need remember that the point of this digression is to show why (1) all changes
are not type-a changes and (2) that type-~ changes exist. The reason why we need to
show that there are type-p changes is that, for Priest, type-p and type-y changes "hold or
failtogether."l~
Priest asks us to now consider the acceleration ofthe car, Jo/d/. "At time 1= 0,"
Priest writes, ..do/d/ is undefined."IH Unlike the type-a change ofthe velocity ofthe car,
"lPriest,198I.p250
lSJPriesl,pI981,p250.
Ij.lPriest,198J.p2H
U>Priest,1981,p250.
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which prior to its posterior state oflm/s was in its prior state ofOmfs (ie. So) when it
changed, when the car accelerates it enters a posterior state that it was not previously just
in, while, in addition, when the car accelerates, it could not be in its prior state either, for
at this prior time the object had zero velocity and no acceleration (ie. acceleration and
'"Idt does not have any value when v =0 at I '" 0 for t::::: 0). The Wldefmed value of';"ld/
when v and t = 0 for I::::: 0 means that with respect to the moment of its change of
acceleration the car is neither in the state it was in nor in the state it became when it
changed. Thi~ ofcourse, is a type-~ change. Priest writes,
more precisely, ifany change is represented by a function which has a
singularity where some derivative is undefined, it is a typc-~ change, for at
the singularity the derivative is in neither the state it was in before nor the
state it was in afterwards. l56
Priest uses this example to show that there are type-~ changes and that type-a
changes cannot account for all conceivable or physically possible changes, namely the
change ofan object's acceleration when its velocity changes from rest to motion.
Priest's question, Vie need now recall, is "are they [the changes in a proposition's
truth-value] type-~ ortype--y changes?" To answer his question, ifwe analyse the change
ofp's truth value as an instant ofa type~~change, then at the moment ofchange that 'p is
true' is false. And at this moment ofchange that'p is false' is also false. At the moment
ofchange in a type-~ change p is neither true nor false, neither So oor Sj. At this moment
ofchange the car's acceleration is not zero, nor is it non-zero; the car simply does not
'Mpriesl, 1981, P 250.
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have a rate ofcbange (acceleration) of its rate of displacement in space (velocity);
acquiring such a rate ofchange of its displacement is a type-~ change. And in a type-~
change neither the before nor after state obtains at the moment of change. Ifwhat is
changing is a proposition's truth value, then, Priest writes,
At the moment ofchange in a type·~ change it is not the case that either p or -p is
true. The car is not accelerating nor decelerating, neither getting faster nor slower for, in
fact, it is not moving at all. Priest writes that "'-<.p v -p). .appears to correctly describe
the situation at the instant ofa type-~ change."lSS
Priest argues, however, that such a change cannot just be a type-~ change. Priest
argues, as we noted above, that type-~ and type-y changes "bold or fail together." Priest
writes, ''ifthcre are type-~ changes, there must be type-y changes.',159 Strobacb supports
this interpretation of Priest. "'In Priest's opinion the existence ofy-changes follows from
the existence of~-changes."I60
Let us now consider Priest's argument that type-~ and type-y changes hold or fuil
together.
IJ1Priest,19Bl,p253.
'''Priest,1981,p253.
l!~iest,1981,p251.
'60Strobach, 1998,p 164. For Strobach's analysis ofPriest and the both states option see The Moment of
Change,Part2,Chapm2,p 161·170.
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We have seen that in a type·~ change p is false as is -p. lh..e assume that for any
proposition that is not true, then its negation is true, then the fact the both p and -p are
false imply, for Priest, the following:
since p is false -p is true, and since -p is false -p is true. Hence both-p
and -p and presumably therefore p, are true and we have a type-r
change. 161
What results, argues Priest, is that type-~ and type-r changes
must always occur together for, be continues, "to be neither true nor false, is to be
both true and falsel',l62 This means that for Priest asserting neither true nor false
is the same as asserting both true and false. "1be duality is, in fact, an identity,"
he claims. This means that to say a proposition is neither true nor false is
logically equivalent to saying it is both true and false. Priest's argument is as
foHows:
(l)-(pv-p) "(-p C -p)
(2) if-p--+ p then
(3) -(pv-p) "(-p Cpl.
For Priest, then, classical logic - especially the LNC and LEM - should be
rejected. He claims that classical logic is based upon an ''uoargued assumption that truth
and falsity are exclusive and exhaustive, and it is exactly this point which is now at
16'Priest,I998,p2S3.
,.lpriest,198I.p2S3.
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issue.,,16J Priest claims that classical logic's restriction to only two exclusive and
exhaustive truth-values means classical logic can only account for type-a changes. "if
cIassicallogic is right," argue'S Priest, "all sentences are either true or false but not both
[sol only type-a changes are possible."I64 To the extent that Priest has shown that there
are changes that are not type-a changes, to that extent, he claims, c1assicallogic is
insufficient to analyze change.
In place ofclassical logic Priest recommends his 'dialectical tense logic.' Priest
constructs this logic with the truth values of"tbe set, V, [{O}, {t}, to,l}] (false, true, and
both)." A fourth truth value "6 (neither) is possible." But, as we saw, Priest argues ''this
fourth value is unnecessary" for he takes "neither true nQrfalse to be the same as both
true andjalse.,,165
Priest points out that his reasoning "is not mandatory." And he claims that the
conclusion does oot follow "ifone is prepared to reject the claim that if a sentence is oot
true, its negation is true."I66 This means that his conclusion does not follow, he admits, if
one is prepared to reject part (2) is his argument (Le. that -p--o p).
It should be evident that Priest's arguments hold or fail based upon disputes
arising in formaJ logic. We have seen already, however, that appeals to logic alone yield
different results - no change in the case ofParmenides and McTaggart and contradictory
change in the case of Priest. A third position is Mellor's; he argues that change is real but
16lPriest,19&l,p252.
'''Priest,1981,p252.
16lpriest, 1981,p255. The emphasis is Priest's
JUpriest,1981,p253.
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not contradictory. Strictly logical arguments are insufficient to address the problem ofthe
moment of change in so far as such arguments lead to different and often mutually
exclusive conclusions.
To further see that Priest's logic is disputable consider Strobach's interpretation of
Priest. Strobach argues that Priest's claim that "-{p v -p) =: -p n-p... is not to be
disputed." \\!hat is disputable, Strobach's claims, is the "way Priest interprets this fact."
Priest contends that this logical furmula entails contradictions at the moment of change
due to the equivalence of-p with p. Strobach argues that ''this equivalence does not
describe any situation whatsoever. All that this tautology informs us about is that LEM
and LNC are equivalent and cannot be denied independently ofone another."167 Priest's
premise is correct but, argues Strobach, his conclusion is not.
It is sufficient here to say that in so far as Priest's appeals to logical subtleties are
questionable to that extent his strictly logical arguments are not the final word on the
moment of change, especially logical arguments that try to persuade us that a lamp that is
neither on nor off is both on and off. To what extent this could be possible is unclear.
We therefore should adopt a cautious approach with respect to Priest's 'logical' claim that
objective contradictions exist.
The strongest objection to Priest's argument derives from tbe question what is an
'objective contradiction'? It: according to Priest, there are objective contradictions, then
to what entity or event does "objective contradiction" refer? For some logicians a
contradiction is a relation between two propositions, not a thing like an orange or a
1·'Strobach, 199&,p 166.
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banana This means that there are ontological problems with Priest's claim. He is not
exactly clear in his essay whether 'contradiction' is a relation between two states, two
propositions or a non-relational thing in-itself. Nor does Priest contend that we can see
these contradictions at the instant ofchange so as to empirically determine their
characteristics. If>! Strobach outlines this problem with Priest'S analysis.
It may be disputed that the ooun 'contradiction' is used as referring to an
entity or an event in the world. Possibly 'this is a contradiction' is no
more that my comment on two statements whose contents stand in a
certain relation to one another. There would be no entity then, to which
the word 'contradiction' refers, but rather a relation ofcontradictoriness
between propositions. 169
The result ofthese logical, ontological and linguistic difficulties is that there are
no good reasons for adopting the both·states option. "One may say," Strobach writes,
"that Priest does not seem to have ofThred any reasons for the existence ofobjective
contradictions beyond his belief in their existence.,,170 Adoption ofthe both-states option
has "no real motivation for doing so apart from some kind ofemotionaJ affmity towards
contradictions."l11
Priest does not admit an emotional attachment to contradictions. But Priest does
try to ground his conclusion outside ofthe realm of pure logic. Priest appeals to ....."hat he
lOlpriestwrites, ~asif","Ceouldseewhelherit[lhepenlwllSonornotllll[thepaper]atlheiIlSlantof
ebange...Certainly Ihematter isnol settled by any pbysical theoryofwbieh J am aware. Neither,ofeoursc,
isitamattcrofobservation."SeePriesl,1981,p252.
'·'Srrobaeh, 1998,p 169.
I111Strobaeh, 1998, P 169.
lllSlrobaeh,1998,p11
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calls the "Leibniz continuity principle [LCPj."l12 This principle, say Priest, "definitely
entails the existence oftypc-y changes."173
Priest claims that the LCP is as follows. "A way of staling the LCP is this: given
any limiting process (whether arithmetic, geometric, physical or whatever) whatever
holds up to the limit holds at the limit.,,174 Priest expresses the principle in another fonn.
"Any physical state of affairs which holds arbitrarily close to a given time holds at that
time."ln He offers a third statement of the principle. "Since So occurs arbitrarily close to
to, it occurs at (0. Similarly SI occurs at (0. Thus both So and 81 occur at 10.,,176 Priest
claims "this principle is a very plausible one with a good deal of intuitive appea1." The
"LCP seems well grounded intuitively," he writes. But, Priest immediately adds, he is
"not absolutely ccrtain why.',m
First, that Priest is not certain why this principle should be held beyond his appeal
to intuition should make his claim extremely suspect. Indeed there are those who claim
that this principle is not intuitively plausible at all. Joseph Wayne Smith, for example,
writes that
There is an inherent weakness in any argument for real or objectivc
contradictions that rests on a principle Ihat is less plausible than the
principle of non-contradiction itse1f. 178
11lPriest,1981,p261.
11'priest,1981,p261.
074Priesl,t981.p262.
mpriesl,1981,p262
17"Priesl,I081,p263.
O11Priesl,1981,p262.
17JJoseph Wayne Smith, 'Time, Change and DlntradiclioD.' Australasian Journal ofPili/asapily, Vol. 68,
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Bertrand Russel~ in The Philosophy ofLeibniz, claims "there are three kinds of
continuity, of all which Leibniz asserts."l79 The fIrst kind is "spatio-temporal" continuity.
The second is the "continuity ofeases." The third is the "continuity of actual
existents."lIo The "general statement ofall forms of continuity," writes Russel~ is "that
nature makes no leapS."l'l Natura nonfadt saltus.
Priest appeals to the 'Leibniz continuity principle' for the reason that if this
principle does not hold then there would either be (I) a 'gap' or "hiatus"lS2 in nature or
there would be (2) an event ofchanging which took no time, there being instead a jump or
saltus across the discontinuity created by the hiatus between the first state and the second
state. But "surely," writes Priest, "if something happens, it must take some time. even if
just an instant. The idea that something can happen in no time appears so close to self-
contradictory."lBJ Strobach writes that Priest "reasons that it [the LCP] should be applied
since otherwise there would be a counter-intuitive jerk at the limiting instant."114
Russell however, like Joseph Wayne Smith, claims that Leibniz's continuity
principle is "destitute either ofself-evident validity or ofgrounds from which it may be
No. 2, June 1990,p 17&-188. CitedbyStrobach, 1998,p 169.
179Russell,1937,p63.
""Russell,1937,p63.
IIiRussell,1937,p64.
112RusseU,1937,p65.
IlJpriest,I998,p263.
""Strobach, 1998,p 167.
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proved:,185 This characterization of the LCP is diametrically opposed to Priest's
characterization. Furthennore and against Priest, there is Charles Hamblin who argues
that in spite of our time language with which we can define continuity, nature is not as we
define continuity and we would be well to reject the notion that natura non facil saltus.
Nature, contends Hamblin, is full of"clicks,jcrks, flashes, glimpses and impulses."l86
Priest's intuitive appeal to the LCP gets little or no support from the 'intuition' ofotber
philosophers. Such lack of intuitive agreement on this matter makes Priest's arguments
more than suspect.
The worst and most damaging objection to Priest's position is seen to arise when
his appeal to what he calls the 'Leibniz continuity principle' is taken along with his claim
that there are type-~ changes. When held or taken together, the notion ofa type-p change
and the LCP are inconsistent. This means that one eannol hold thaI (I) there are type-~
changes and that (2) the LCP is true. The LCP destroys the very notion of a type-13
change.
If, according to the LCP. that which holds arbitrarily close to the limit holds at the
limit then there could not ever be an undefined value for the INld' function at the moment
of change. The dVld, function would have, if the LCP is true. a value at its 'undefmed'
singularity. This value would be either the value it had when it was immediately before
and arbitrarily close to the limit or the value it had immediately after and arbitrarily close
to the limit. Or the value could have, at least in the case of Priest's argument, both the
lllRussell.1937.p64. Russell, interestingly, describes Leibniz's argumc:ntas resting upon''that[which)
give pleasure to the metaphysician." The relation to Strobach's characterization of Priest as emo/ionally
attachcd 10 contradictions should not he lost here
'""Hamblin,1969,p414
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value it immediately had before and arbitrarily close to the limit and the value it had
immediately after and arbitrarily close to the limit.
Priest's appeal to the LCP destroys the capacity of Priest to prove or claim that
there are type.j3 changes. The LCP argues that there are no undefined discontinuities.
The LCP would prevent the undefmed singularity in the derivative from existing for the
LCP, in effect, defines the.valueat any supposed.discontinuity ina continuum as that
which held arbitrarily close to the discontinuity. BUI we saw that to prove that there are
type-~ changes and type-y changes Priest appea1ed 10 the fuet <hId< is.undefined at some
point.
Priest's particular position and the both states option in gener.a.lU7 are not very
convincing. The notion ofan 'objective oontradiction' is oonfusing in itself. Proving that
such a thing exists, if it is intelligible,.is equally.problematic. Therefo.re,Strobachrightly
concludes, there are not "any oonvincing theoretical reasons as to why one should accept
something as problematic.as objective contradictions.,,!U
117There are others who argue that then: lITe 'objective contradictions'. This position also has a long history,
though forobvioos rC'8S00S it is and has not been popuhlT. For a view other than Priest's9te Simo
KnuultiJa'sand Anja Inkeri Lehtinen's 'Change and Contradiction: A FourletDth-Cenlury Controversy;
Synthese 40, 1979, 189·207. Though I shall not consider these argumen13 in this chapter it is worth noting
that. "in thissolutim," vn1te$ Klluuttibau.d Lehtinen, "a rcal CO/UnIdictiQll isaa:ep1ed ill naWre, bec.alue
the termi"i ofinstanlanrous change cannot, according 10 it. belong 10 different instants of time. The law of
non-contradiction is not, however, refuted in logic, because il was lhoughtthat the instant of time
oontaining aCOlltradictory state of alTairs can be divided ,although notphY5ically, inlo inSlants ofnature."
This position, though, ~ms more conUlldictory than Priest's for in this 14'" century argument the law of
non-cotltradictioDisv.iolat.ed.(ianatur:e)..and.isJl.llt~
,uStrobach,199&,p170.
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2.6 NeitberlNor Option
In the neither/nor option the momenl ofchange is described as belonging neither
to the old state nor to the new state. TIle neither/nor option. writes Strobach, asserts that
"it is both faJsethatQ isFand thalQ is I10t Fat the limi1 betw.eenan Fpbase and a no-F
phase.,,189 Advocates ofthis option do not argue that both states obtain at the moment of
change. Advoca1eS ofthis option do not., then, agree with.Priest's claim that to assert
'neither F nor not·F' is to equally assert 'both F and not·F'.
We will consider two examples ofadvocates ofthe neither/nor option. Plato and
Charles Hamblin. We need to use two examples to document the neither/nor option for
the reason that the neither/nor option may be reached via different (and often mutually
exclusive) arguments and it would be well to emphasise this point. This point concerns
the difference between the description of the moment of change and the classification of
anyone description. The neither/nor classification may be reached via different
neither/nor.descriptions.
Hamblin and Plato, tbough they both assert neither/nor, assert it for different
reasons. Strobach writes "Hamblin agrees with Plato in describing the moment of change
as fundamentally neither belonging to the ending nor to the beginning one oftbe two
states it separates." But that there "are fundamental and interesting similarities" between
Hamblin and Plato does nol mean, Strobach argues, that there are not "different motives
for Plato and for Hamblin using the 'neither/nor' option in describing the moment of
II9Slrobach. 1998.p 172.
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change."I90
This means that one can distinguish different reasons for saying that it is both
false thai a is F and that a is not F. In other words, two different descriptions of the
moment of change motivated by different arguments arc not mutually exclusive with
respect to the classification of the descriptions.
The ncither/nor advocatcs rcsolvc into two broad groups. There are those who say
that (1) true statements can be made about instants. And there are those who say that (2)
true statements cannot be made about instants. Plato, we will see, is an example of group
(1) Hamblin, we will see, is an example of group (2).
For group (I),
The limiting instant between the phases is a quite extraordinary 'lime' of
which it is neither true that a is F at it nor true that a is not F at it.
Howcver, there are statements which are true concerning this instant, for
example that at it, a change beNiecn two states is taking place. 191
Group (2) resolves into two subsets. There are those who argue that (2.1) true
statements cannot be made about instants for there are no instants. And there are those
who argue that (2.2) there are instants, but nothing true may be said about them for some
specific reason. For example, it might be said that instants are empirically inaccessible or
thai predicates cannot be attributed to instants.
Subset (2.1) holds that there are no instants, lei alone limiting instants thus,
'
iIOStrobach,1998,p171
19'5troN.ch, 1998,p 172. Plato asserts, as we saw, at least fourstatcments about lirnitinll instant ina state
of change
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nothing can be tnie ofan instant. Time is not a series of discrete instants or moments.
The 'moment' ofchange does not, then, exist. For this group the problem ofthe moment
ofchange is a problem generated by or based upon the faulty presupposition that time is
made up out of a series of instants or moments. Hamblin makes this point, for example.
"The concept of time as a continuum of instants has itself run minto troub1e.,,192 Subset
(2.1) is different than group (I) due to their conception oftime. For subset (2.1) to speak
ofa 'moment' is meaningless and incorrect. For this group we need to realize the
"pointlessness ofany attempt to be.precise about instantS.,,193
Group (2)'s seoond subset, (2.2), holds that there are instants, namely limiting
instants between phases; but nQlhing can be tnIe ofan insJanI. Subsets (2.1) and (22)
share the conclmion that nothing can be tnie ofan instant but differ in the reason that
leads to the conclusion. (2.1) argues that there are no instants so nothing can be true of
them but (2.2) argues that there are instants but nothing can be true ofthem. Hamblin, for
example. objects to subset (2.1). He argues that "'there are difficulties in the concept ofa
time-scale without instants, for surely there must be time intervals, and inlervals appear 10
require instants as their ends even if they are not in met actually made up ofeominuom
assemblages ofthem."l~ Hamblin is an example ofa neither/nor argument belonging to
subset (2.2); we will consider his argument after considering Plato, who belongs in the (I)
'neither/nor' group.
"'Hamblin,I969,p415.
lilHamblin,I969,p415.
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2.7 Plato's NeitherlNor Option
We met Plato's argument from the Parmenides in Chapter One when we
addressed the conceptual problem ofthe moment ofchange. We did oot in Chapter One
address bow Plato deals with the conceptual problem; we only considered the problem
itself. We need oow to concern ourselves with how Plato addresses the problem of the
moment ofchange and why he may be classified as advocating the neither/nor option.
Plato claims, fusHy, that there can be "no time in which anything can be at once
neither in motion nor at rest...19~ Secondly, Plato claims that an object cannot change
when it is in either its prior or its posterior state. Ifand when in the prior state the change
will not yet have occurred. When in the posterior state the change must have already
occurred. "It does oot change when it is at rest or when it is in motion,.. 196 says Plato.
Strobach calls this second claim "PIIl1O's premise." It is an important premise and
essential to Plato's argwnent. It is also, we noted in Chapter One, a source ofgreat
difficuhy for tbose who wish to lmow(l) when an object changes and (2) whaJ state that
object is in when it is changing.
Plato, as we also learned in Chapter One, argues "it [an object] cannot change
without changing."
There is a tension between Plato's ftrst claim that (I) an object is always either in
motion or at rest, (2) 'Plato's premise; and (3) a belief in an event of changing. For a
"'Hamblin,I969,p412.
'''Plato, 1926,p 299.
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belief in an event of changing, when conjoined to Plato's premise, proves troublesome for
the claim that all objects are either in motion or at rest. Plato's premise denies that at the
moment of the evellt of changing the object could be either at rest or in motion. This
tension between Plato's premise and events ofchanging leads to Plato's 'neither/nor'
argument. We should not lose sight ofthe profound importance of 'Plato's premise' in all
attempts to deal with the moment ofchar-ge, for 'Plato's premise' is a qualif1C8tion not
upon 'time' nor 'objects', but upon events ofchanging. Strobach writes,
A5 long as an author holds the view that there is an event ofchanging
related to the moment ofebange, the most interesting question is what he
thinks ofthc thesis I will call 'Plato's premise.' It is first to be found in
the Parmenides (156c) and can be expressed like this: An event of
changing cannot take place while the old state still obtains; but when the
new stale already obtains it cannot take place either. 191
The problem with saying that all objects in time are either in motion or at rest is
that Plato's premise denies that at the moment ofan event ofcb.arJgin-8an oQject could be
either at rest or in motion. For Plato claims in his 'premise' that the changing must have
occurred after rest, after the prior state - and it must oc.cuc before motion. before the
posterior state. This implies that when changing the object is neither in the state it was in
before it changed /lOr in the state it will be in after it changes.. Given the difficulty or
disharmony between Plato's first claim and 'Plato's premise; we still cannot, for Plato,
deny or analyse away the reality ofchange. For an object cannot change without
'96plato.1926,p299.
"lStrobach,J998,p6.
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changing.
An event ofchanging ahers a thing's state-specific predicates. At or during an
event ofchanging, and in accordance with 'Plato's premise', there will be a state different
than either the fonner state or the latter state. This means that there I1UlSt be at least three
states in a change. Plato's premise and the event of changing imply that there must be,
argues Plato, '"something interposed between motion and rest.,,198
For Plato, that which is interposed between motion and rest is the moment of
changing. This moment is arrived at by thinking ofa chaI)ge ofstate (S) ofan object x,
say for example, from a state of rest (R) to a Slate of motion (M). In Plato's analysis of
change there is an object, a.predicate relation, a time series, and states that follow one
another in the time series, i.e., SI(XI, Rxl, tl), Six!' Mx l , t2). Additionally there is the
changing, liS, of the object's.st.a1es within the time series. For Pla10 there are no less than
three states in a change at three different times: SI at tl. 6.81>..,.2 at tl>,.,.2 and S2 at t2 such
that Sitl 1: 6.SBtl>D:<2.¢ S.2U
That which is interposed between the two states in a change, 6.S.tl>..,.2, the event
of changing, has an "instantaneous nature." Changing, for Plato, instantaneously occurs
interposed between motion and rest.
This interposed instantaneous change is not a stale ofeither rest or motion for the
reason that this instant is that instant at which changing either occurs or is occurring. So
Plato's premise holds fur this instant. Given 'Plato's premise' the state at the inteJ])Osed
instant could only be neither the state before nor the state after.
"'Plato, 1926, p299.
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If we thought that the former state obtained at this moment then we would have
failed to understand that the changing must not yet have occurred and we are still stuck at
Sltl. Ifwe thought the latter state obtained then we would have failed to understand that
change must have already occurred and that we are at S212. We would have failed to
understand that 'it cannot change without changing'. In other words. Sltl*S2t2 iff
Given Plato's fltst claim thai an object is either at rest or in motion at any time,
and given Plato's premise, this instant ofcbanging is "not existing in any time:,I99
The reason why the moment ofchanging is not 'in time' is that this interposed
event ofchanging cannot take any time or be ofany duratioIL It is the event ofchanging
that is instantaneous not the time or moment at which the change occurs. 1bere is an
'instant' of change for the reason that change is instantaneous. Plato's premise and the
event of changing leads to an 'instantaneous nature,' not an explicit definition of the
elements oftime. Plato is.oot saying that time has instants and therefore change must
occur in the one between the two states. Rather he is saying that ifthere is a change then
it must occur instantaneously, it cannot take any time to occur.
The existence of ,instants' or durationless time~points are a possible implication of
Plato's notion of instantaneous events ofchaijging. There are those '.\!ho claim this is
SO.200 And tbcrc are those who claim that this is not SO.UlI These arguments about what
'''Plllto.1926,p299
200See, for eXllll1plc, CoLiu Slnult! and-K..W. Milli. 'Plato and thc1nsl.ant.' PrOU!ildings ojthe..4ri.fJoteJjan
Sociery,Suppl. Vo1.1I4S, 1974, p 63·79.
""See for example, David Bostock, Plalo on Change and Time in the Parmenides', PhroneJis, Vol. XX1l1,
No.3, 1\l7S, P 229-242.
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Plato thought about time are not overly relevant for the reason that the claim 'time is a
continuum ofdurationJess instants' is not a part oftheargwnent used to isolate the
moment ofchange. Nor would abandoning the claim that 'time is a continuum of
instants' entirely eliminate the problem of the moment or time ofchanging. This is made
evident in Hamblin's paper, 'Starting and Stopping,' where he builds a time·logic in
which instantsNe ,not fundamental and do not themselves bear truth·values, let alone a
third truth value. Truth value changes, hov.rever, must still be accounted for with his
intervals. Hamblin writes,
intervals appear to require instants as their ends even if they are not, in
fact, actually made up of continuous assemblages ofthem... [so] intervals
may have parts, and hence no predicate can be guaranteed to be uniformly
true of, or false of, a whole interval...wl
The problem oftbe moment ofchange arises whether we ask questions about the
instant or moment before the moment ofchange, the instant or moment ofchange itself
and the instant or moment after the change. The problem equally arises if we ask the
questions about the interval before, the interval· however short· of changing, and the
interval after. Plato's premise proves as problematic fur intervals as it does for instants.
Plato's premise is not a qualification upon time per se. Rather, it is a qualification
on events ofchanging that affects the time at which or during which such changing couJd
occur. Time may not be composed of instants; but a change equally occW'S even if this is
so or not so. Given Plato's premise it appears that change could not take any time to
2IIlHamblill, 1969,413.
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occur, irrespectiv~ of one's definition of time.
Iftbe event ofchanging ever took time to occur or had a duration then the object
would neither be at rest nor in mOlion for some or at some time. This sta1~, however, is
ruled out by Plato's first claim. This rul.ed.out state, however, seems inevitable giVetl
'Plato's premise' and a belief in an event ofchanging. However, on~ way that the tension
betWeen the first claim, Plato's premise and the event ofchanging can be addressed is by
qualifying the event of changing. This is what Plato does.
Any event of changing in any change must for Plato occur suddenly, It must be
durationless and to be durationless is not to exist 'in time.'2OJ This means that Plato first
argues that the event of changing is durationless or instantaneous, not the time at which it
occurs. In fact he argues Ihat there is no time in which it occurs. With these two clauses
the object can, for Plato, be neither in the before nor the after state when changing,
keeping 'Plato's premise' intact. And with these two elauses al this 'instant' of change
the object, though it will be neither alike to the state before nor alike to the state after, will
not ever be DOt eithtt in motion or al rest at or for some time. Plalo writes,
II is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion,
without changing..,
And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at
""Somcthinglhalcxisls 'intiDle' would besollJl:thing thaI would be able 10 have the t,in (x"lU,t,,)be
variable such Ihal S,I,(x" Rx, II), S,f~X" Rx, Il)' S,IJ(x" lU, Il) are all possible. In litis case x is al reSI in
somelillK' (1"I"I,}. TIt.a1~S'_lisnol'in time' andthatiloccun 'inslantaneously' mc:ansthaI M,I"
M,l" f1S,lJ are 001 possible. In a periodoflirne withconstanl resl we have S,t,{x" Rx, 1,), S,t;,(x" Rot, lv,
Stll(X" Rot, tJ) such IhaIS,t.-S,t. -S,t. when n - {1,2,)}. 10 aehallie"~ slill have three successive stales
and three limes. BUllhe Slales in a change are such thatS,I,'/. 6S"t,..,.)-;"S,I/. An insW1laDeOusehange b
then a state thaI is not preceded or followed by itselfsuch that whal pr-eccdes it (S,) is nol the same as whal
follo\\'5 il (51)'
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rest. ..
And certainly it cannot change without changing...
[and] it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion...
[so] there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed between
motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that
which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into
motion...
Plato describes the moment of change as neither/nor and he argues that an
instantaneous event ofchanging is occurring when an object is neither/nor. What needs
to be clear is the following. There is a moment ofchange not because time is a series of
little moments. It is Plato's premise and a belief in an event ofchanging that leads to that
which has the instantaneous nature.
Plato fits into the frrst group: instantaneous changes exist and true statements can
be made aoout this state, namely that (I) instantaneous changes do not exist in time, that
such (2) events of changing at instants occur suddenly or instantaneously, and that, e.g.
neither P nor -P hold at this instant.
Instantaneous events are events that do not take time or have any duration. This
means that changes, for Plato, are not tempomlly extended events like, for example, the
hearing ofa melody, or being in motion (different places at different, successive times) or
being at rest (being at the same place at different, successive times). In a period oftime
lCWPlalo,I926,p299.
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respect to S, Sltl =Slh = SIt) Rest, then, is a temporally extended event. But
instantaneous change is not an event akin to rest: the series AStI, ASh, ~) such that,
with respect to S, SIlt =Slh = SIt), is not possible. 'Plato's premise' holds whenSis
changing such that if t.St1 then Stl.l ;l':L\St1 ;1':811+1' Strobach reinforces the idea that the
event ofchanging is for Plalo instantaneous.
The event at the sudden [or instant] has no temporal extension whatsoever.
Nevertheless it is there, taking place: an object does not simply arrive in
the target position, but virtually switches from motion to rest. An object is
~iJust not F any more, but virtually switches from being Fto not being
Finally, for Plato at an instant ofchanging it is true that neither the before nor the
after state obtains.
Bostock supports this characterization ofP!ato's position.
Plato suggests the change occurs 'in the sudden.' When the thing changes
it goes from being in motion (say) to being 'in the sudden,' and from there
to being at rest. The sudden is somehow intermediate between the motion
and rest, and is not itselfin (at) any time.2M
Owen too agrees on this point.
In the Pannenides Plato argues that ifa change is construed as the passage
from not·A to A the change must be instantaneous; for there is no time in
which a thing can be neither A nor not-A, neither at rest (for instance) nor
lOlSlroooch.1998,p46.
lG6 Bostock, 1918,p 231.
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in rnotion. .. [Nonetheless] when it changes from rest to motion, it cannot
be either at rest (for then thec~e would be still to come) or moving (for
then the change would be past).20
For Plato, then, an event of change (1) does not occur in time for (2) it does not
take time. The change occurs suddenly or instantaneously. With respect to the state of
the object during its instantaneous change, for Plato (3) the state ofthe object at the
instant ofchange belongs neither to the prio.r nor to the posterior state.
There are problems with Plato's neither/nor treatment ofchange and the moment
ofchange. Let's review these problems with Plato's nei1her/nor treatment then consider
another argument in favour ofthe neither/nor option, Charles Hamblin's position.
First, there are logical issues that press upon Plato's neither/nor option. As we
saw above, Priest argues that to assert 'neither/oor' is to assert 'both/and.' Furthermore it
is unclear why entities that do not exist..in time co.uld violate the law ofthe excluded
middle. Nor is it clear why, ifthe law of the excluded middle can be violated by entities
not in time, the same law could not be violated by entities within time. What's more, if
this logical law can be easily violated why not other so-called 'laws'? Strobach. when he
raised his objection against Priest's claim that neither ploor not-p is equivalent to 'bothp
and not-p'. wrote that the "LEM [law ofexcluded middle] and LNC [law of non-
contradiction] are equivalent and cannot be denied independently ofone another.'.2G8 If
Plato's treatment ofthe moment ofchange is committed to rejecting the law of the
exclude middle will Plato not be forced to deny the law ofnon-contradiction as well?
l07Owen,197S,p 123.
'''Slrobach,199S,pI66.
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Such logical difficulties make Plato's position suspect.
Secondly, the very idea ofan entity that does not exist in time is problematic.
And given that in the case ofchange these in~us extra-temporal entities are the
intermediates interposed between two mutually exclusive states in time, how could such
entities be in conununication with, in contact with, or in relation with entities that are in
time? Does it even make sense to speak ofthings as either 'in' or 'out' oftime? We
usually speak ofevents as taking a long or a short time, but not as not occurring in or out
oftime.
Thirdly, the idea ofan instantaneous change, an event that does not take time or
have any duration, is thought by some to be a contradictory notion. Priest for example
claims he is "prepared to buy changes over very short times, but a change that QC(:UCS in
no time at all is difficuh to swallow...Surely, if something happens. it must take some
time. ,,209 Since the change takes no time there will be no time between its opposite states.
But ifthere is no time between the opposite states how could the change occur between
these opposite stales? Ifthe instant ofchange or the event ofchanging is durationless
would there be "no time left for the switching between states'''f 10 Priest argues that if
one accepts that changes take no time to occur and that change does not occur in time
then "there would be no time at which the state was chaTIKirw.'0211 We have seen,
however, that Plato argues we cannot analyse away the changing; though Priest would say
that this is exactly what Plato does when Plato argues that changes take no time or that
lCltpriest..1911J,p263.
IIOSlro!lach,I998,p45
changes are instantaneous events.
The fourth problem concerns Plato's neither/nor description of the state of the
object when it changes. This description, fiN;tly, violates Plato's claim that all objects arc
either in motion or at rest. The neither/nor description and Plato's removal of change
from time are, then, intimately related: if all objects in time are either in motion or at rest,
and if ever an objcct is neither in motion nor at rest, then that object must not be in time
when it is neither at rest nor in motion. The problem that arises from the neither/nor
description is that "it induces a cenain phenomenological unease when it comes, e.g., to
the question: What does anything look like when it is neither at rest nor in mOlionT.2\2
Fifllily, describing the change between two mutually exclusive states by means of
an interposed instantaneous state posits an additional two changes that must be accounted
for, namely the change from motion (say) to the neither/nor instant and from the
neither/nor instant to rest. One 'neither/nor' change leads, therefore, to two additional
changes. And we have a total of three: (I) from motion to rest; (2) from motion to
neither/nor; and (3) from neither/nor to rest.
If we adopt this neither/nor doctrine of change then the change (2) from motion to
the neither/nor instant and the change (3) from the neither/nor instant to rest are equally
changes that must be accounted for. Each of these two additional changes, as per Plato's
neither/nor option, would themselves require additional changcs. For if the before and
the after are separated by a 'neither before nor after', then this 'neither before nor after' is
"'Pricst,1981,p263
"'Strowch,1998,p12.
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after the before but before the after. In other words, ifone is less than two and two is less
than three, then 1 is.less than three; but that tv.'O is less than three does not mean that two
is nol greater than one. 1be before/after relation occurs between 1 and 3 and I and 2 and
2 and 3.
The result of tile repetition of the before*after relatKlU between the neither/nor
instant and the time before it and the time after it means that our original problem of
change from the before to the after remains only more so. Positing the instantaneous state
as the intermediate between the mutually exclusive before and after states raises the same
difficulty that the instantaneous stale was supposed to solve, namely the change from one
mutually exclusive state to .another. For the instantaneous state is itself mutually
exclusive with respect to the before and after state, as per Plato's premise. The notion of
the instantaneous neither/nor state, then, leads to a vicious regress that does not solve the
initial question; it only postpones the original difficulty ad infinitum.
What resuhs from Plato's neither/nor analysis is a conclusion such as Ov,·en's.
Owen says that the reason why Plato's neither/nor argument is invalid is that
The suggestion would set a regress on foot. For when we have postulated
one time*atom to house the change from not white to white, there will be
another change to be accommodated in the same way.213
Owen concludes that "it is a mistake to look for a special time*reference such that
the subject is then neither white nor non_white.'0214 The neither/nor option, argues Owen,
mOwen, 1975. P 124. Owen here is describing what he takes to be Aristotle's objection 10 Plato.
ll·Owen,197.'i,pI24.
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is inadequate. "It will not help," Ov.·en argues, "to postulate a time-atom between the
period in which something is not white and the subsequent period in which it is white,
with a view simply to providing a time for the change to occur from not-white to
Bostock agrees wnh characterizing Plato's neither/nor argument as involving a
regress.
On Plato's suggestion our thing changes from being in motion to being in
the sudden, and then from being in the sudden to being at rest. So we
started with one change, from motion to rest, and we located that at the
sudden. But now we find that we have two more changes to account for,
one from motion 10 the sudden and the other from the sudden to rest. We
might ask (though Plato does not): when do these changes occur?
Presumably they too will each occur at a sudden, and by the same
argument the two new suddens cannot be the same as the original one.
(For while a thing is coming to be in a sudden, it cannot already be in
ill16
Strobach does not agree with either Owen or Bostock on this matter ofthe regress.
Strobach argues that this danger is "avoided if one allows an event ofchanging only
between such slates which are themselves temporally extended but oot between an
extended state and an instantaneous event.'.217 There is not, however, any support for
Strobach's proviso in Plato's text. Nor does Strobach give a reason why we should
restrict changes in the way he suggests. What's more, the either/or option advocated by
Sorabji proved problematic due to Sorabji's appeal to instantaneous states. Plato's
"'Owcn, 1975,p 124.
2IOBostock,197S,p237.
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neither/nor option, which requires the notion of an instantaneous state, should not be over
hastily accepted for the same reason, namely that the notion ofan instantaneous state is
problematic.
Owen's argument about why the regress arises is wrong, however, though he is
correct to say that there is a regress. Plato does not, as Owen claims, "postulate a time-
atom...with a view simply to providing a time for the change to occur." Rather, the time-
atom in Plato is a possible consequence of instantaneous changes, though not necessary
for it. Plato's argument is that if there is changing then it must occur instantaneously, not
that changes occur at instants. Plato does not postulate time atoms. Plato· as Strobach
helpfully points out - ",ith his proviso qualifies events of changing not temporal entities.
Bostock's regress is, I think. correctly, derived from the notion of instantaneous
change and instantaneous states and not from some supposed postulate about time per se.
That 'time is a series of instants' is not a part of the argument used to isolate the moment
of change.
Given the regress along with the notion that atemporal entities exist and can
escape logical 'laws,' and given the problems with instantaneous states and durationless
events, let alone durationless times, Plato's neither/nor option is a problematic analysis of
change. The important points 10 remember about Plato's analysis are, first, what Strobach
called 'Plato's premise' and, secondly, Plato's claim that 'it cannot change without
changing'.
mStrobacb,I993,p46.
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2.8 Charles Hamblin's NeitherlNor Option
Charles Hamblin advocates the neither/nor option. But unlike Plato Hamblin does
not appeal to the notion of an instantaneous state or instant oftime to ground his
conclusion. Rather Hamblin ftts into group (2.2): for Hamblin statements about instants
cannot be made for the reason that instants are not the fundamental elements oftime.
"The ftrst and fundamental" part ofHamblin's position is an exploration of the
"properties of intervals, treated as entities in their own right and not necessarily as sets of
instants.'.2ll
As Hamblin sees it, the problem ofthe moment of change arises due to a logic and
language that we ineffectively try to impose on the world. Hamblin argues that our usual
logic and language attempts to apply a two-valued statement 10 any object at anyone
time. This means that, for example, we wish to say that 'x is in motion' is true or 'x is in
motion' is mise for any time t. Hamblin argues that "this is the project that runs into
difficuhies.',m
The difficulties and the problem arise, of course, wben we define t as the moment
when 'x is in motion' is true changes to 'x is in motion' is false. We have seen that when
t is the moment ofchanging it is problematic to detenninc the status ofx in terms of a
two-valued logic. Plato's premise is a plague upon such a two~v8lued determination.
For Hamblin, the problem ofthe moment ofchange arises when the language and
lllHamblin,I969,p41S.
ll'Hamblin,1969.p41S.
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the logic we wish to use for predicates and the language and logic we use for time conflict
with each other. This conflict between our language and logic of predicates with our
language and logic of time is most acute and problematic when
(1) 'Time' is thought to be composed ofa series of instants.
(2) Statements predicating properties ofobjects are thought to be
statements about those objects at instants of time.
(3) All statements are dcterminately either true or false.
Hamblin rejects (1) and therefore also (2), though Hamblin will accept (3). For
Hamblin, statements predicating properties ofobjects are not statements about an object's
instantaneous state nor about objects at instants. For Hamblin predicate statements are
made about intervals, even if such intervals have 'instants' as first or last elements. If
statements predicating properties to objects are not about objects at instants but about
objects in intervals then it is neither true nor false that an object has or does not have
some property at an instant or that an object has an instantaneous property (e.g. ' ...is
changing'). Strobach writes that for Hamblin ''an instant neither satisfies a predicate nor
does not, because there are no predicates taking instants.'.:uo Strobach writes that the
result of Hamblin's analysis is "that sentences such as 'the car is in motion at 8 a.m.' or 'a
is red at instant l' are nonsensicaJ.,,221 Such statements are neither true nor mise for they
cannot be either true or mise.
All the proposed solutions to the problem oftbe moment ofchange have so far
noStrobacb, 1969,p 179.
:l2IStrobacb,I969,pI79.
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varied with respect to the logic of changing predicates, not the logic oftime. The
either/or option employs a two valued logic. And it tries to non-arbitrarily decide which
ofthe two values obtains when the change takes place. In contrast Priest's both-states
option rejects two-valued logic and proposes a three valued logic claiming that 'neither
true nor mise' is the same as 'ooth true and mlse,.m Plato also proposes a three-valued
logic but only for instantaneous events ofchanging, events that are not 'in' time.
Hamblin's proposal for a solution to the problem oCthe moment or instant of
change is to work with the time·language that we use, not with the two-valued logic we
use when analysing a change in a thing's mutually exclusive predicates. Hamblin will
not, as Plato does, introduce a third. instantaneous state of'neither/nor' at the limiting
instant in a predicate change nor wiH Hamblin, like Priest, argue for a third value saying
that objective contradictions exists, options that would have us modify two-valued logic.
For Hamblin "a three-\lllued logic is in fact an embarrassment.»223
Hamblin's position begins by taking notice ofa point about the problem of the
instant or moment of change raised by Priest. Priest writes,
m A lthoughPriestcallshislogic Mdialeclicalll1nselogic'hislogicreallyhasnothing to do with an analysis
oftenseortime. Priest restricts his !llIlllysis to states and predic.ates ofobjects at the instant of changeand
admits that the whole problem ofthe instant ofch!lllge would disappear if one denied that time has inslll.nls,
WllIething he does not do in his essay. Priest would have been better to title his logic dialecticalpremcate
logic.
mHamblin,I969.p422.
W PriesI,1931,p254.
This assumption about the importance of instants for time is exactly what Hamblin
will deny. This is what I meant when I wrote that Hamblin works with our logic and
language oftime rather than two-valued predicate logic when he addresses the problem of
the moment ofchange. Embarrassing, three·valued logics, whether contradictory or not,
are for Hamblin the result ofa failure to address aspects or presuppositions about time
and a failure to keep aspectsofour predicate logic from tainting our conception oftime.
Plato, as we saw, came to the notion ofan instantaneous neitber/oor state via a
logical analysis ofthe predicate' ...is changing.' And Plato concluded that an entity could
only have this predicate fur a durationless amount of time, hence it could not have this
predicate 'in' time. Hamblin, however, will rule out the possibility ofan instantaneous
neither/nor state via an appeal to the logic oftime. Plato's premise in Plato's neither/nor
argwnent aJlows instantaneous change to occur such that there is an instantaneous stale of
neither motion oor rest. Hamblin equally argues that the moment ofchange should be
described as neither/oor but not because there is an instantaneous state of neither/nor. For
Hamblin statements about properties caMot be either true or false about anything with an
'instantaneous' nature, such as an instantaneous event or an instant oftime. What needs
to be kept clear is that when Plato asserts 'neither/nor' he is not in agreement with
Hamblin when Hamblin asserts neither/nor. Hamblin would contend that Plato's
predicate logic is affecting his temporal logic such that the limitations of predicate logic
imply the temporal notion of an instantaneous event.
For Hamblin, the problem ofthe (so-called) 'instant' ofchange may be addressed
with a "less lavish time scale containing short but not infmitesimal intervals." This time
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scale for Hamblin must have a "logic in which intervals are the primary elements."
Hamblin's "basic idea" is that "intervals may abut one llOOther independently of whether
there also exist other entities describable as 'points ofabutment.",m The 'poin!' of
abutment is here analogous to the instantaneous time of an instantaneous change. This
point of abutment is also analogous to Priest's singularity where some derivative is
undefmed. Of his system of temporal logic Hamblin writes "there is nothing in the
system that is far out of line with orthodox representations oftime. Only the absence of
'instants' is in any way unusual.,,226 The notionofan 'instant' or 'instantaneous event'
derives for Hamblin from our predicate logic. Hamblin argues such a notion should not
be transferred from our predicate logic onto our temporal logic. For Hamblin "changes of
value ofa predicate are the only true candidates for instantaneity. But. ifthis is so, why
should we ever talk about truth or falsity at an instant? If instants exist at all, it is surely
in some secondary sense.'.l27
For Hamblin 'instants' do nol exist as entities in their own right in spite ofthe fact
that we have a noun 'instant.' According to Hamblin we should not think that every
linguistic name we can employ actually denotes a detenninate entity. The number of
things in the world should not be multiplied by the number ofnames we can say. We
have words 'instantaneous event' or 'instant of time,' this is true. We have already seen
that, for example, Plato arrives at such a notion as 'instantaneous' by means ofan
analysis ofthe change in a two-valued predicate, not from an analysis of time as such (i.e.
lllHamblin,1969.p41S.
mHamhlin, 1969, p420.
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that 'time is a series of instants' is not a premise in the argument isolating the moment of
change). But, for Hamblin, that there is such a name 'instant oftime' or 'instantaneous
event: a name our predicate logic may lead us to declare, in no way guarantees that there
is such a thing. This means that Hamblin's logic and language oftime makes instants and
instantaneous states "victims ofOccam's razor.',m
For Hamblin we can understand change without having to claim that there are
instants oftime or instantaneous events. If instants or instantaneous events are not
needed to understand change; and ifentia non sunt multiplicaruJa praeter necessitatem,
then we should not assume that there are instants or instantaneous events. Thus, for
Hamblin, "it can be real progress in philosophy to notice that one noun (. phrase) or
another does not 'label' anyentity."l29 Hamblin's analysis oftime places instantaneous
states or instants of time in the same class as the present King of France, bald or not. The
instantaneous event ofchanging that a two-valued predicate logic implies given Plato's
premise is not for Hamblin a denotable entity in itself for such an entity is analysed away
as a denoting phrase with no referent. Hamblin wishes to relieve us oftile burden of
looking for instants or instantaneous events.
For Hamblin the problem ofthe moment ofchange arises when we (I) do not
separate our two-valued logic of predicates and its merely possible implications about
time from our logic and language oftime - especially ifour logic ofchanging predicates
has temporal implications, which the notion of an instantaneous event ofchanging
mHamblin. 1969. p414.
l2IStTobacb, 1998, P 176.
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cenainly bas. Additionally for Hamblin the problem of the moment ofchange arises
when we (2) try to make the latter, time, conform 10 the former, two-valued predicate
logic. Hamblin argues that what we need to ultimately come to understand is that two-
valued predicate statements
cannot flow smoothly from falsehood to truth, and yet our time-language
presents us with a continuum on which to define them.230
Hamblin begins constructing his temporaJ logic by defming his "primitive
notion," which he calls "abutment." To introduce Harnblin'~ definition ofabutment let's
fust consider what he means by ""precedes" or "is less than." In effect, abutment may be
defined as 'immediate intransitive precedence.'
For Hamblin 'a precedes b' means "either a abuts b or there is another interval c
such that a abuts c and c abuts b." To 'abut; for Hamblin, is defined as "a abuts b when
a precedes b and there is no interval c such that a is less than c and c is less than b. ,,2J]
This results in what Hamblin cal1s a ''reciprocal defmition"m ofprecedence in terms of
abutment. Hamblin's temporal logic employs abutting intervals as fundamental elements,
nol intervals that precede each other (even though abutting intervals precede each other).
jfwe were to take precedence and not abutment as the fundamental temporal
relation then we would slip into the notion that time is composed ofa series of instants,
ll'Strobach, 1998,p 176.
lloHamblin,1969,p414.
>l'Hamblin,I%9,p415.
mHamblin, 1%9, p417.
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where the 'instant' would be the time c between u and b. Ifa merely or simply preceded
b and if we forgot completely about the (more fundamental) relation of abutment then
there would be a c after a and before b. a would then precede c and c would precede b.
This repetition ofthe precedence relation between a and c and c and b would require there
to be a d less than c but greater than a and an e greater than c but less than b. This means
that the series (tlht3) ifonly or fundamentally related by means ofthe precedence
relation would yield the series (tI.4,t3,t5.t2). This latter series would then according to the
precedence relation yield the series (t1.4,4,h,t3. 4I,t5,t",t)). This repetition ofthe
precedence relation could conceivably be carried on ad infinitum. (Indeed, this is the
objection raised by Bostock about Plato's instantaneous change - there is always a need of
a preceding change for every preceding change such that "we shall need infmitely many
suddens [or instantaneous events or instants) before "''I: are finished."m)
Forgetting about the possible regress for the present. thinking of time in terms of
the precedence relation would additionally lead to the problematic infinitesimal instant,
tbe equally problematic limiting instant (in the case of those who deny infmitesimals in
their calculus). Or it would lead to the notion ofan instantaneous event ofchange
between two mutually exclusive intervals at either the infmitesimal or limiting instant.
Hamblin argues these three options in particular, and talk oftime-atoms, moments or
instants in general, give an incorrect analysis oftime due to the use of the relation of
precedence, rather than that ofabutment, as the fundamental temporal relation
For Hamblin. if interval a precedes interval b then interval a may not necessarily
ZllBos!ock,1971,p237.
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abut interval b. However if interval a abuts b then a will necessarily precede b. In other
words, I is less than 3 even though 2 is greater than 1 but is itself less than 3. 1,
therefore, precedes both 2 and 3. Abutmem. however, only occurs between I and 2 and 2
and 3. Abutment does not occur between I and 3 in spite ofthe fact that 1 precedes 3.
Hamblin wants us to understand that all abutments imply precedence, but oot that all
precedence implies abutment. Describing 'abutment' as immediate precedence may
capture the difference between abutment and precedence.
We may describe precedence as a 'transitive' relation while abutment as a non-
transitive relation. If 'a abuts b' then Hamblin writes "a < b" or "aAb". Ifwe adopt
'aPb' to mean that 'a precedes b' then to say that precedence is 'transitive' is to say that if
aPe and ePb lhen aPb. But to say that abutment is 'non-transitive' is to say that ifaAe
apd cAb, then a does not abut b. i.e. then -{aAb).
In terms of abutment and precedence, if we take the claim that in a change
Sltl *- .6$otl,..,.2"* 8.!t2. then Hamblin would say that (I) Sltl precedes 68"t1>",,"2 and 8212 and
that (2) 65;,tl>..,.2 precedes S2t2. Hamblin would also say that (3) Sltl abuts 65;,tl,...,.2 and
that (4) 65'otl>,.,.2aOOts S212. But he would not say that (5) Sltl abuts 8J;t2.
Hamblin writes that aAb "implies that a immediately precedes b so that bAa is not
equivalent to aAb." For Hamblin ifaAb or a < b is true then bALl or b < a is false. This
means that for Hamblin the non-transitive relation ofabutment and the transitive relation
ofprecedence are both asymmetrical: these relations are not equivalent to their converses.
lbis means that aAb and bM express radically different and mutually exclusive states
(ie. ifaAb or aPb is true then bAa and bPa must be false.) Nor, therefore, can the
asymmetrical relations ofabutment and precedence be neutral with respect to the order of
the elements in the relation.134 In effect then, the asymmetrical relations ofabutment and
precedence are designed to capture the order as much as the time ofan occurrence ofan
event like a change.
In effect, Hamblin's temporal logic rules out the instantaneous state interposed
between motion and rest by means ofthe use ofabutment. A state ofmotion and a state
ofrest abut one another. This means that the two mutually exclusive states (that, for
Hamblin, always occur over intervals and cannot ever occur within the same interval)
immediately precede eachotber such that there is not another, third state in the temporal
order ofthe object's existence, in spite ofthe fact that a two-vaJued predicate logic
suggests that there is such a third state. A two valued predicate logic suggests that there
is a preceding state between the first and second mutually exclusive states, but for
Hamblin the more fundamental temporaJ relation ofabutment shows that there is not such
an additional, third instantaneous state.
11le result of Hamblin's time-Iogic is that there is not a fundamental 'unit' oftime
ofa given length or duration, especially an instantaneous length. Intervals can be longer
or shaner than one another, but never absolutely short. What's more, predicates do not
apply to absolutely shan 'intervaJs' or 'tirne-instants.'
Hamblin argues "ifwe could subdivide intervals in some way which would lead
us eventually to 'atoms,' within anyone of which no change takes place, we would have
l."For more 011 the difference between COOver5C and neutral relations see Kit Fine's work 'Neutral
Relations.' The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No.1, January 2000, p 1-33. In short, consider this
example: if a is on top of b then b is not on top of a. Convtl"!icly, ifb is below a then a is not below b. But
with respect to 'vertical placemenl' it does not maUer ifaisvertical1yplaccd with respecttoborifbis
vertically placed with respect eo a: therelalion is tile same in both cases. Whereas with '00 top' or 'below'
itisnot.lntbela1tertheordermaUers,whCfCaSintheneutral(e.g.verticalpla~ment)relatiootheorder
does not maUtr.
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solved the problem."m Thus, for Hamblin there are "certain time-intervals which have a
privileged position. ,,236 Hamblin calls these privileged time intervals - his so-caJled
'atoms' - "elementary intervals." An elementary interval is one in which there are no
truth-value changes in any proposition about the states obtaining during the interval.
These always extended intervals ofvanous duration are Hamblin's so-called 'atoms,' i.e.
his fundamemal time units, though these units are 'atoms' that are not either instants or
durationless times defmed by instantaneous events. Hamblin writes,
Let us suppose thai our language contains elementary statements Ph P2,
PJ..., fmite or infinite in number, and imagine the universe as a time-
sequence of states describable by conjunction-chains oftbese statements,
straight or negated... An elementary interval is an interval within which no
change oftruth-value ofany ofthe P's occur.23J
Strobach calls these elementary intervals "maximally changeless pcriods."m Of
these elementary intervals or maximally changeless periods Strobach writes that they
Are an degant way ofworking with periods within the framework ofa two
valued logic without having to assume time-atoms.219
Indeed, Hamblin claims that his "logic of elementary intervals" is "fully two-
mHllITIblin, 1969, P 423.
23iiamblin, t969, P 423.
2l'Hamblin,1969,p424.
ZllStrobach, 19911,p i74.
mStrobach,19911,pI74.
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valued" and that it is a "complete basis for a logic oftime without instantS.'>240 But is this
logic up to tbe task ofaddressing the problem ofchange?
The fundamental reason why Hamblin's solution will not address the problem of
the moment ofchange is that Hamblin assents to Priest's claim that ''the whole discussion
[about the instant ofchange] so far has been predicated on the assumption that time has
instants.'>241 But what shouJd be obvious from the exposition of Plato is that the problem
ofchange derives from (I) a belief in an event ofchanging and from (2) Plato's premise.
Priest's claim is false: nowhere in the four-part argument used to raise the problem about
change is the claim that ''time is a series of instants." "The problem ofchange is not
predicated upon the assumption that time has instants. So analysing instants away,
replacing them with intervals, will not address the problem.
Priest himselfwarns us ofthe danger of the interval theory of time which denies
instants and instantaneous events ofchanging. Priest writes,
The interval thesis may well solve the problem of the instant ofchange.
However it does so only by producing a curious account ofchange. For
suppose that during a certain time a state 8 changes from So to St. Then
there must be two abutting intervals such that a wholly precedes b, So is
true throughout a and Sl throughout b. Now given that there is no instant
[or interval] dividing a and b we can not ask whether S is in.so or 81 at it.
However, because there is no such instant, there is no time at which the
situation is clumging: a is before the change, h is after it. Thus, in a sense,
there is no change in the world at al1. 242
"'HlIIJIblin, p 424-425.
WPriest,1981,p254.
,.lpriest,1981,p2S4.
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Like Plato and Priest, Strobach emphasis the danger ofanalysing away changing;
and like Priest Strobach agrees the 'abutting interval thesis' Hamblin advocates implies
that "no change is actually taking place; he [Hamblin] banishes change from any time he
permitS.',243 Hamblin fails to ac<:ount for Plato's premise and events of changing, the two
elements that lead to the notion of instantaneity and the problem ofthe moment of
change. Hamblin, therefore, has misconstrued the problem so his 'solution' obviously
will oot do.
Plato's premise in e~t defines' .. is changing' as a special sortofpredieate
called by Strobach an "instantaneous predicate" or a "p_predicate,.l44 A ,u-predicate is a
special sort ofpredicate that can be only be true or false of an instant. Hamblin cannot
ac<:ount for sueh a predicate in his time logic for he argues that predicates are true or fu1se
only for time intervals.
For Hamblin "predicates are durabIe."w By this he means that, for example, "the
red book on my desk could tum green for haifa second or haifa century but it could not
tum green temporarily and durationlessly at the stroke of twelve, remaining red at all
times earlier and later.',246 IfS,.tl is Hamblin's book being red and S,t2 is Hamblin's book
being red and these are two states funning abutting intervals of time, then an
instantaneous state of being green, Sgtl>tl>2, immediately after being red at S,.tl but
immediately before being red at S',t2 is temporally and predicatively impossible for
l41Strohacb,1998,p177.
l40Strobacb, 1998,p 179,
l4lHamblin,I969,p414.
l4lOHamblin,1969,p414.
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Hamblin.
For Hamblin instants do not exist in a temporally fundamental way and our
predicates cannot be true of durationless durations, so we should not try to talk of truth or
falsity at an instant. Strobach writes, "tbe only predicates Hamblin is prepared to allow
are 'durable predicates' which can only be satisfied by periods (Hamblin's 'intervals') but
not by instants (which do not exist anyway):,247 Strobach efficiently denot~ Hamblin's
position: "durable predicate + instant = nonsense."Z48
The problem with Hamblin's position is that we can accept the slogan 'durable
predicate + instant = nonsense.' But, as noted, Plato's premise suggests that •... is
changing' is a ,u-predicate or an instantaneous predicate rather than a durable predicate, or
a what I shall label a 'I)-predicate'. Admitting the distinction between ,u-predicates and I)-
predicates, something I think Plato's premise demands, would allow us to claim that',u-
predicates + instant:l: nonsense.' This means, writes Strobach, that we can accept
Hamblin's claim that there is "nothing to be said against the view that instants do not
belong to the domainofa durable predicate." But in taking this view "we need not
abolish ,u-predicates altogether, since they are not durable but instantaneous
predicates.,,249 And there is nothing against the view that instants "belong to the domain
ifa .u_predicate."2.S0 By failing to distinguish between .u-predicates and a-predicates
Hamblin analyses changing away, argues Strobach.
l"Strobach, 1998,p 173.
l.IStrobacb,I998,pI80.
wStrobach,I998,1'180.
llOStrobach, 1998,1' J&O.
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FOT the reason that Hamblin analyses changing away with his 'abutting internal
thesis' his neither/nor argument must be rejected as a thesis that, like Plato's neither/nor
argument, cannot satisfy an inquiry into the problem of the moment ofchange.
2.9 Neutral Instant Analysis
An Analysis of the (I) either/or-option. the (2) either-way option. the (3) both-
states option and the (4) neither/nor-option has revealed that each option has at (east one
significant problem that made it at least a questionable, if not an unintelligible or wholly
false, option. We now lastly come to what Strobach calls 'neutral instant analysis.'
There is a reason why we are dealing with this option last
That anyone ofthe first four options could not alone address the problem of the
moment ofchange "suggests looking for a mixed description of the moment of
change.',2~1 Strobach claims that "a good compromise could only be expected between
the either/or and the neither/nor option.',m Neutral instant analysis is such a mixed
compromise.
The problem with the notion ofsuch a mixed compromise ofthe either/or option
with tbe neither/nor option is that the weakness ofeach ofthe particular options arise
within the combination.
First, the NlA suffers from the problem Hamblin failed to address, namely the
'J'Strobacll,I998,pl8J.
lJlStrobach,I998.pI83.
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real.ityofchanging. In NIA flux and change seem to be a "mere illusion,••m writes
Strobach.
As a second example take the 'phenomenologk:al unease' raised in objection to
the neither/nor option as articulated by Plato. Strobach writes that "when dealing with the
NIA [neutral instant analysis] the phenomenological unease occurs:>254 What. Strobach
wonders, could a thing neither in motion nor at rest look like? "A satisfactory picture of
the moment ofchange must be able to remove this unease,,,m he writes.
To the extent that the objections against the to-be-mixed options equally apply to
the mixed-option, the NlA option may be rejected. Given this transfer ofthe problems of
the to-be-mixed options to the NlA option the particular details of the mixed NlA option
are not overly relevant. They will not therefore be given here.
2.10 Conclusion
The conclusion that follows from above is that (I) arguments against the reality of
change are unacceptable. And that (2) Strobach's five options for analysing the moment
ofchange are on their own and in combination insufficient to address the problem of
change.
We need now, in Chapter Three, to offer an ahemative position on change that (I)
does not deny the reality ofchange altogether nor (2) fall prey to any ofthe objections
lllStrobllch.I998,p197.
lWStrobach,I998,pI97.
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raised ofthe five options described.
lllStrobach,I993,pI97.
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3 Tensed or Tenseless Change?
The definition ofchange offered in Chapter One was that a 'change' is 'an object
having mutually exclusive properties at different times.' And in Chapter One it was said
that the ultimate aim ohhis thesis is to test the adequacy of this definition given
Strobach's problem ofthe moment ofchange. This problem ""115 discussed in Chapter
One and its (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) 'solutions' were documented in Chapter Two.
The questions that need be faced now are: is the above defmition ofchange
sufficient given Strobach's problem? And if the definition is not sufficient given the
problem of the moment ofchange then how can the defmition be augmented to give an
adequate treatment ofchange?
Alternatively, does this definition ofchange require a treatment that takes into
acCOWlt the problem ofthe moment ofchange? Thai is, is there an interpretation of
change that does not raise - let alone 'solve' - the problem oftbe DKlment ofchange as
that problem has been raised by Plato and chronicled by Strobach?
The above definition ofchange is employed by D.H. Mellor in his work Real
Time. There Mellor mites that change "is having a property at one time and not at
another. 2$6 Mellor unJike Strobach augments the defmition ofchange by focusing upon
the meaning oftime. Mellor writes, "more specifically, it [change] is something having
incompatible properties at different dlltes.'<2S7
ll6Mellor,1981,p8l.
m Me!lor,1981,p88.ItaJicsmine.
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Strobach shares with Mellor the notion that there are two states in a change, states
that Cannol both occur in the same object at the same time. Strobach writes that a change
''takes place between two opposite states. Their obtaining simultaneously wouki be a
contradiction.,.,lSi Newton-Smith also defmes change in a similar way in his work, The
Structure ofTime. Change fur Newton-Smith occurs when "something has such-and-such
a property (or, lacks such-and-such a property) at one time and then later the same thing
lacks that property (or, possesses that property)."m In other words, a change occurs
when a thing with property F at one time is the same thing at another, successive time
such that that thing is not-F. Ofsuch a change Strobach writes that "it is one ofthe oldest
problems in the philosophy ofspace and time; How is the change from one state to its
opposite to be described?,,260
Could it be the case that the problem ofthe moment ofchange is a problem that is
generated by the way Plato and Sirobach analyze lime, rather than from change per se?
Strobach writes that "we conjure up time by conjuring up the moment of change. Doing
so is a way of becoming aware oftime.,,261 But when we are aware of time just what is it
thai we are aware of'? How does an individual's conception oftime affect their
conception ofchange?
2lIStrobacb,I998.pl.
ll~e\\1on·Smitb,19W, p 14. This defmitiOil of change, we learned in Chapter One, is wha!Mark Heller
cal1edalriadiedefinitlOil. WealsolearnedtbatRussellsharc:sthisdefiuition.
l""strOOach.I998,prc!ilce.
l6JStrobach,I998,pl
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3.1 Three 'Metaphysical' Questions
That change is related to time, and that time is related to change, is not a blessing.
Strobach rightly adds that
Suddenly, we are facing questions of metaphysics. What is time? What is
:e;~~n~:;~i~~ed~fresent? How can a boundary in time be
Strobach carefully limits his inquiry into the moment ofchange. He acromplishes
this by making one ofms three metaphysical questions more important than the other
two. Which ofStrobach's three metaphysical questions is the most important? The first
two ofthe three questions Strobach raises are not the focus of his inquiry.
Of these questions it is not the big one concerning the nature oftime which
I want to tackle in this book. Rather, I want to deal with the question
concerning the structure ofa temporal boundary.26J
Strobach is concerned with the structure of a temporal boundary for the reason
that, for him, the event ofchanging that occurs at the moment ofchange is the time of
passage ofthe temporal boundary between the old and the new states. The problem of the
moment of change could then be rephrased as the 'problem oftbe passage ofa temporal
1.lStrobacb,I993,pl.
l6lStrohacb.I998,pl.1talicsaremine.
107
boundary.' Consider Strobach's first example, the change from 2002 to 2003 on New
Years Eve. He writes:
We wait for a certain position ofthe hands ofthe clock or for an
announcement on the radio, until, sure ofhaving passed a certain boundary
in time to which we have attached some meaning, we wish each other a
happy new year.264
When we focus upon the moment ofchange at the temporal boundary between the
earlier and the later state then we encounter problematic questions: When 2002 changes
to 2003 are we in 2002 still or 2003 yet? Ifwe are when 'we are changing from 2002 to
2003 no longer in 2002 still but are not in 2003 yet, then when we are passing or when we
are at the temporal boundary we cannot still be before the boundary (2002) nor can we yet
be after the boundary (2003). But ifat the boundary or when passing the boundary we
must be neither befure nor after the boundary, then for how much time are we neither in
2002 nor 2003? An infinitesimal amount oftime? And ifthat is too little an amount then
how about the smallest possible amount oftime? Bul how small is that? Perhaps then we
would be bener to agree with Plato that "when it changes it can be in no time.'.265 But
where, finally, would we be then?
lMStrooach,1998,pl,
'
6IPlato,1926.p299.
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3.2 Real Time: Strobacb's Teasn or Mellor's Dates?
D.H. Mellor's books Real Time and Real Time n, like Strobach's book, ask
'metaphysical' questions about time. In Real Time II Mellor writes that "like its ancestor,
Real Time, this book [Real Time fl} is about such of the metaphysics of time as follows
from settling the basis in reality of our distinctions between past, present, future.,,266 In
other words, of the three metaphysical questions Strobach raises, Mellor's books tackle
the big one, Strobach's first question. Mellor writes that his books are about "the most
intriguing and basic question in metaphysics: what is time?,,267 This question. 'What is
time?', says Mellor, demands that we investigate the status of what in Real Time he calls
"tense." Mellor writes,
Its [tense] status is itself the main and most comentious metaphysical
question about time, and on it depends much else besides.261
One ofthe things dependent upon the status of tense, continues Mellor, is "time's
intimate connection with change."26'J
I argue that by not answering his fITS! metaphysical question about time Strobach
implicitly assumes a tensed theory oftime. Secondly, I shall argue that, at least from
Mellor's perspective, the tensed theory oftime is contradictory and cannot be true.
UliMellor,199S,pl.
'.lMeHor,1993,1.
UlMellor,1931.pl.
'""Mellor,1931,pI.
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Thirdly I shan argue that Strobach's tensed assumptions about time lead to the problem of
the moment ofchange. And, fmally, I shall argue that by rejecting Strobach's tensed
assumptions about time, Mellor's account oftime and change pre-empts the problem of
the moment ofchange.
What is tense or a tense-theory oftime?
According to the tense theory of time there are (I) three specific temporal
locations: past, present, future. Tense also involves (2) an analysis of the changing
relations between these three temporal locations in so fur as what is present was future
and will be past. For tense theorists, then, (3) tcmporallocations change their temporal
location: for what is now (e.g. at tl) is not what is now (e.g. at t2). In other words, what is
now at 12 was future at tl; while what was now a1 tl is past at t2.
We should note that, in Real Time Jl Mellor excises his use ofthe tenn "tense."
Mellor prefers to call past, present and future "A_times.".270 Mellor wants it made clear
that 'tenses' or better still A-times are not merely grammatical. Mellor writes,
By changing to "A-times" from 'tense,' Mellor aims to make clear he is not
talking about the conjugation of verbs, and he aims to reinforce the importance ofthe
distinction for a "failure to observe this distinction [i.e. between grammar and time] still
17~eJJor,I99B,}Ii
llIMellor,I998,p}li.
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vitiates much philosophy oftime...m To inoculate us from this failure Mellor in Real
Time 1I restricts the use oftbc term 'tense.' "The tenns 'tensed' and 'tenseless' I confine
to their original, proper and trivial grammatical uses...m Mellor then directs us to
"McTaggan's DOW standard distinction bet....'C'e11 his A and B series...m
The reason why we should consider McTaggart's arguments in The Nature of
Existence regarding bis distinction between the A and the B series or the A-theory and the
B-theory oftime is lhat these theories are offered as answers to Strobacb's first question,
what is time? As we have seen, Strobach is not considering this flJ'Sl question in his book
The MomemofChdnge. As I am arguing t.ba1 as a result of DOt addressing the first
question Strobach implicitly assumes an A-theory oftime and that this is why~ finds
change problematic, it is prudent to consKler McTaggart for McTaggart (1) introduces the
distinction bctwt:en the A and the B theory and (mo~ importantly) McTaggart argues that
(2) the A-theory of time is not true for it cannot without contradiction IlCCOUDt for the
changes that are supposed to occur to it, namely the change ofthe temporal location ofA·
series temporal locations: for what is DOW (e.g. at tl) is not what is DOW (e.g. at 12).
To begin with McTaggart's A-timelB-time distinction, McTaggart says that
"positions in time, as time appears to usprimafacie, are distinguished in two ways." The
mMellor,I993,pxi.
nJMellor,I993,pxi.
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first way is by means of 'earlier than' or 'latertban', the second by means of 'past',
'present' and 'future'. And it is
For the sake of brevity [that] I [McTaggart] shall give the name oftbe A
series to that series of positions which runs from the far past through the
near past to the present, and then from the present through the near future
to the far future, or conversely. The series ofpositions which runs from
earlier to later, or conversely, I shall call the B series.m
The B-series is, for McTaggart, "a collectK>n of terms such that, of any two of
them, either the first is in this relation to the second, or the second is in this relatK>n to the
ftrst.'.276 Only one of'earlier than' or 'later than' is needed to form the B-series: both
'earlier than' and 'later than' are not required to form a B-series. For if the event M is
earlier than the event N then, ipso facto, N is later than M, and vice versa.
'Earlier tban' and 'Iatertban' are says McTaggart conversely related to each other.
Williamson defines a converse relation as the claim that "for x to have one to y is fur y to
have the other tox.'.2n McTaggart'S point is that the relation ofx to yean occur without
the relation ofy to x. but wherever there is a relation ofx to ythere will be a relation ofy
tox such that the relation ofy1o x will not be the same as the relationofx to y.
McTaggart writes that "to constitute a B·series there is required a transitive asymmetrical
relation... [and] we may take here either tbe relation of 'earlier than' or the relation of
mMellor,I998,pxi.
HlMcTaggart.1968,plO.
l16McTaggarl,I908,plO.
lllWilliam5Oll,1985,p249.
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'later than.' both ofwhicb, ofcourse, are transitive and asymmetrical.,,211
To say that 'earlier than' and 'later than' are transitive is to say that ifM is earlier
than N and N earlier than 0, tben M is earlier than 0. To say that 'earlier than' and 'later
than' are asymmetrical is to say that ifM is earlier than N then N is not earlier than M.
Defined by means of the notion ofa converse relation, an asymmetriGal relation is one
that is not equivalent to its converse relation: the relation of, say, x to y must not be the
same as the relation ofy to x.
As for the A-series - the series ofpositions which runs from the far past through
the near past to the present, and then from the present through the near future to the far
future, or conversely. McTaggart claims that any given A-series position and its contents
can only be one ofeither past, present or future. These three positions in the A-series, he
writes,
Are incompatible dctenninations. Every event must be one or the other,
but no even! can be more than one.279
Continuing, McTaggart writes that "if I say that any event is past, that implies that
it is neither present nor future, and so with the others.'.280
2nMcTaSl!art. 1968,p 10.
l"'McTaggart, 1908, P 20.
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3.4 Tbe Difference Between tbe A- and B..series
Tbere is a major and importance difference between the A-series and the B-series
and it is here where the problems with the A-series begin. McTaggart writes, "the
distinctions of [the a-series] are permanent, while those of the latter [the A-series] are
not. ,.l&l B-senes tempomllocations and their contents do not change their temporal
location, while A-series tCll1JX'Iral positions and their contents do. McTaggart concisely
makes his point when he writes
In the A-series, every event occurring at any given now, at any given present time
or any A-series time (I) was future in the past prior to (2) being present, and (3) it will be
past in the future after having been present. In other words, every event and position in
the A-series has every position in the A-series even though the positions are incompatible
detenninations. McTaggart writes, ''the three characteristic belong to each event." But
"how is this consistent with their being incompatible?,.lIJ
~IOMcTaggart, 1908. P 20.
UlMcTaggart,1908,p10
mMcTaggart, 1908,p 10.
1I~cTaggart,I908,p20.
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3.5 Tbe Contl'lldictioD in tbe A-series
McTaggart points out that it would be contradictory to say that an event was each
possible determination at the same time. This means that "it is never true," writes
McTaggart, ''that M is present, past and future.,.2M TIle only other way, argues
McTaggart, that each event and position in time could have the different, mutually
exclusive positions in time is by having each position successively. McTaggart writes,
"the attribution of the characteristics past, present and future to the terms of any series
leads to a contradiction. unless it is specified that they have them suo:essively."
The successive possession ofthe incompatible determinations is captured by
saying that what "is present, will be past, and has been future. Or it is past and has been
future and present, or again is future. and will be present and past."m The three
determinations cannot have all three determinations at the same time, so instead they can
only have them one after the other. The appeal to successive possession of the mutually
exclusive positions argues that
The characteristics are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and
there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all ofthem
successively.2s6
TIle problem with the appeal to successive possession is that the statement about
Z"McTaggart, 19O5,p21. ItalicsareMcTagg:art'~
1I5McTaggart, 19O5,p21. Italics McTaggart's.
ll6McTaggart, 19O5,p21.
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M's successive possession ofthe incompatible properties, namely that M is present, will
be past and has been future means argues McTaggart "that M is present at a moment of
present time, past at some moment of future time, and future at some moment of past
timC.,,217 1be moments, however, at which M is successively past, present and future are
themselves past, present and future and all are mutually exclusive ofeach other. This
means that, writes McTaggart, ''3 similar difficulty arises." There would be a
contradiction if it was said that these second order times governing the successive
possession ofthe ftrst order mutually exclusive times were each past, present and future
simultaneously. With these second order times we face McTaggart's only other option,
namely to say that the tenus are each had successively. But, McTaggart writes, to specify
that the tenus are had successively is to say
That they have them in relation to tenns specified as past, present and
future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction [i.e. the rontradietion
from simuhaoeous possession], must in turn be specified as past, present,
and future. And, since this continues infinitely, the first set oftenns never
escapes from rontradiction at all.2U
Simultaneous possession of A-series temporal locations is contradictory and the
theory ofsuccessive possession requires an infinite number of A-series. But "such an
infinity is vicious," writes McTaggart, it only prolongs the contradiction, rather than
eliminate it. The A-series, given its incapacity to account for the changes necessary for it
to be the A-series, must be regarded as false. ''The reality ofthe A-series," says
lI'McTaggart,I90S.p21.
mMcTaggart,I90S,p22.
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McTaggart, "leads to a contradiction and so must be rejected...nolhing is present, past or
future.,,289
Mellor agrees with McTaggart's anaJysis of the A-series and A-times. Mellor
writes, "the tensed view oftime is self-contradictory and so cannot be truc. McTaggart
showed that in 1908.,,290 Mellor agrees with the reason why the A~series is contradictory:
it cannot account for its own change. Mellor writes, "tenses [A-times] cannot change, as
they must to be tenses, and therefore cannot exist. Nothing reaJ therefore can depend on
the differences betwcen them.'.l91 Mellor summarizes McTaggart's argument in Real
Timell:
McTaggart's proof is simple. Many A-times are
incompatible with each other. An event that is yesterday,
for example, cannot also be tomorrow, because past,
present and future are mutually incompatible A-times. Yet
because each event is always changing its A-times, it has to
have all of them. But nothing can really have incompatible
properties, so nothing in reality has these times. The A-
series is amyth.292
Nor continues Mellor will arguing as McTaggart has already suggested that each
position is had succcssively. For then, Mellor writes,
Instead of three simple A-times [past, now, future or P, N, Fj, we have
'''McTaggart, t908,p22
""'Me]Jor,t981,p5.
Z91Mellor,t981.pl03.
mMellor,t998,p73.
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nine complex ones PP, PN, PF; NP, NN, NF; FP, FN, FF [i.e. past in the
past, past now, past in the future; now past, now now, now future, etc].
But McTaggart's argument applies equally to them. Since the A-times of
events are always changing, every event that has any ofthese nine-
complex A-times must have all ofthem; but not all ofthem are
compatible. :193
Giving even more complex times to govern the first nine complex A-times will
just produce more ofsame problem. The ultimate result is that "in short, we have an
endless regress, a regress that is vicious.,.,294 The A-theory then, for Mellor as much as
for McTaggan, is "guilty ofa capital offence, namely self-contradiction."m
3.6 Time and Change
One of the things dependent upon the status of tense, continues Mellor, is "lime's
intimate connection with change.,,296 After Mellor addresses the big question about time,
Mellor rejects - or at least greatly restricts, the reality oftense due to the contradiction in
the A-series resulting from its incapacity to account for its own changes.
Strobach's third question, the only question Strobach is addressing, the question
about the passage ofa temporal boundary, contains assumptions - tensed assumptions -
about time that Mellor rejects. ReaJ Time, for Mellor, is not tensed time.
By considering the three questions Strobach asks, I argue that the third question is
2'IlMellor,I998.p14.
'''Mellor,I998,p74.
2'/lMe!Jor,1998.p72.
''lOMellor,1981,pl.
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dependent upon the first question's answer. Mellor's rejection of A-time or tense and his
"B-Theory" of time and change is an answer to the first question, what is time? For
Mellor we are not bound within a present A-series moment that passes from, say, 2002 to
2003. In other words, the proposition 'it is 2002' does not fur Mellor change from being
true to being false on New Years Eve.
My thesis is that by attending to Mellor's treatment of time, an acCOWlt of change
may be given that does not mise the problem ofthe moment ofchange - the problem of
the passage ofa temporal boundary· fortbe reason that Mellor's treatment of time rejects
the tensed or A-time presuppositions necessary fur the problem ofthe passage of a
temporal boundary. This means that Strobach's third question. at least from Mellor's
perspective, is dead. The third question arises ifand only ifone answers Snobach's first
question - \\fhat is time? - with the answer 'time is an A_series.,297
Let's consider an example showing where the first question's answer affects the
third questioIL We will consider Strobach's use oftbe term 'event.'
3.7 EveDts: Tensed or Tenseless?
Why focus on events? Because the nature and temporal structure ofan event of
changing is at the heart ofthe problem ofthe moment of change. To be sure, the very
problem ofthe moment of change (qua event of changing) contains a temporal tenn,
29lThisisliOItosaythatlherearenOlA-lheorisisthatmodifytheirciaimssoastoavoid the problernsof
change. Whitehead and Pearce as well C.D. Broad offer differ conceptions oftime than either Plato,
Strobach or Mellor. My thesis h«c concerns only the objections that Mellor would rai~ against the
problem of change as that problem has been raised hyPlato and chronicled by Strohaeh.
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namely the notion ofa moment. lbc temporal structure ofevents cannot be ignored if
change is to be sufficiently analyzed. To give an adequate definition ofa temporal event
would require an answer to Strobach's frrst question, What is Time? But we have seen
that Strobach is not attempting to answer this particular question. The nature and
tempoml structure ofan event differentiates Mellor's account ofchange from Strobach's
account ofchange.
In effect, it is Strobach's lacle ofan account of tile natUteoftime and tbe temporal
structure ofan event that leads to the problem oftile moment ofchange. Strobach's third
question - the question be is addressing in his book - is about the structure ofa temporal
boundary, not an event. Strobach is concerned with the boundary for the reason that he is
analysing the event ofpassage ofsuch a boundary. But in order to need to worry about
the structl.O'e ofthe boundary Strobach frrst must assume that a tempoml event includes or
is the passage ofa temporal boundary. But whether or not there is such teIllfMJraJ passage
depends upon the answer to the metaphysical question about time (what is time?)· the
question that Strobach is not concerned with.
Instead ofgiving a thorough analysis of time and temporal events, Strobach
argues that be "can only appeal to our intuitive knowledge [of] how the word 'event' is
properly Used."Z9I To give meaning to the word 'event,' Strobach merely appeals to our
"linguistic intuitiOn.,,29\1 And Strobach claims that "this appeal [to linguistic intuition] is
201Strobach,I998,p6.ltalicsmine
1995trobach,I998,p7.
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legitimate since we have this knowledge as competent speakers ofEnglish."loo
Strobach's appeal to linguistic intuition to define the temporal structure ofan
event is not an appeal that can be accepted. With respect to Strobach's three
metaphysical questions about time, it is the answer to the fIrst question that would
detennine what the proper meaning of 'event' is. Strobach appeals to linguistic intuition
for the proper meaning ofthe term event for the reason that he has not explicitly
addressed his first question.
Unfortunately for Strobach's appeal, intuition does not guarantee either uniformity
of intuitive opinion, nor accuracy, nor does this appeal allow an exact understanding of
just what is supposed to be intuited as the proper meaning ofthe term 'event.' Strobach's
appeal to intuition is not an argument, let alone an acceptable argument, for the nature
and temporal structure ofan event. An appeal to intuition is not the same as an answer to
the fIrst metaphysical question about time. Should we, for example, intuit a proper
Strobachian event as an instantaneous A-series event or a B-series event? This question
cannot be answered until the fIrst metaphysical question has been fuUy answered: for the
temporal structure ofevents can be that ofan A-series if and only if time is an A-series,
but that time is an A-series is just what MeUor denies.
3.8 Truth-Functional Model o(Change
It is possible to model A-series and B-series change in a system of propositions,
WllStrobach,I99S,p7.
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their truth-values and their truth-conditions (i.e. the facts that make the propositions have
the truth value that they have when they have it). These propositions are about objects
and their properties at the times at which these objects have these properties. Modeling
change in this way will help clarify the problem of the moment of change. Modeling
change in this way will also enable us to exactly clarify the difference between Mellor's
and Strobach's account oftime and change. And such a model will help to explain the
objections to Mellor's account and how Mellor deals with the objections. An example
will help.
If the proposition 'tbe light is on at 11' is true; and ifthe proposition 'the light is on
at 12' is false, then that the light has changed from on 10 off can be modeled as the
difference obtaining amongst the truth-values ofthe two time-indexed propositions about
the same lamp's state. In the case oCit being true (f) that the lamp is on atone time (tl)
and false (F) that the lamp is on at some other time (12), that the lamp has changed from
on to oot-oo may be modeled as (Ttl, Fh). Russel~ in the Principles ofMathemalics,
defines change in this way. There he writes,
Change is the difference, in respect oftruth or falsehood, between a
proposition concerning an entity at a time T and a proposition concerning
the same emily at another time T', provided that the t .....,o propositions
differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T' occurs [in the
otber].JOI
Change, then, occurs to a self-same or identical thing over time. This means that
IlI'Russell, 1964, P 469. Emphasis mine.
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the same thing must occur or be referred to at both timeS.302 The two states and the two
times at which they occur are mutually exclusive. What is important to take notice of
here is that (1) at least two differem times must be referred to in a change. (2) A third
time is oot necessary. And (3) the truth value of the propositions about a changing thing
do not themselves change (i.e. the proposition about the lamp at tldoes not change its
truth value at 12).
On all these three points Strobach will object. I aim to show that Strobach objects
to (1), (2) and (3) due to his implicit A-series assumptions about time and change.
Whether or not the tnnh value ofa proposition changcs is at the heart ofthe
differencc between the A-series and the B-series. It also at the heart ofthe primary
objection to Mellor's account ofchange. As McTaggart said, B-series relations are
permanent, whereas A-series relations are not. So, if a proposition about a thing is ever
true it is always true (on the B-series); or if it ever was a fact at time h that P, then it
always will be and has been a fact that Patti. But on the A-series, if a proposition about
a thing is true now (e.g. at tl), then that proposition would have been false (when it was
future at 4,) and it will be mise (when it is past at t2)'
For Strobach, 'the lamp is on at tl' is true ifand only iftl is now. 'Now' is an A-
series tenn such that tl was future and will be past. When t l was future 'the lamp is on at
tl' was mIse - for tl is not now. And when tl is past 'the lamp is on at tl' will be false 4
lOllln Chapter One we learned that failure to accept this identity claus¢ would resull in confusing change
Wilh a simple succession ofdifferent things with different properties al different times. Also, Mellor
argiles, that without slIcb an idcntify claus¢ change could not be distinguished from variatioooverspace.
One of the objectioos agaiDstMellor's ae<:oUntis that it cannot distinguish change over time with variation
over space. Mellotargue5lhatthisobjeetionismllte. We shall consider objections to MellOl"s 3CC01lnt and
histtplies to them in duetitne.
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for, again, 1] is not now. In effect, the A~series requires constant change in the facts about
the world. All facts occur at specific times and what time it is is always changing
according to the A-series (i.e. the future becomes present then past). Strobach therefore
objects to point (3) above. The constant change in the A-series affects the filets occurring
at A-series times. A-series filets must themselves change. In effect, Strobach argues that
in order for change to occur the facts that make propositions true must change; thus a
proposition's truth value - which represents or models fucts - must also change when
these facts change. Strobach, then, gives assent to McTaggart's claim that
If, as r [McTaggart] have maintained, there can be no change unless facts
change, then there can be no change without an A-series... [forJ no fact
about anything can change unless it is a fact about its place in the A-series.
Whatever other qualities it has, it has always. But that which is future will
not always be future, and that 'which was past was not always past.JO)
As we shall see, Mellor disagrees with the claim that only the A-series could give
an account of change. For Mellor, unlike McTaggart and Strobach, the facts need not
change in order for things to change. This means, in terms ofour model, that for Mellor
the propositions expressing facts about things need not change their truth value in order
for change to be, whereas for McTaggart and Strobach the propositions must change their
truth-value in order for change to be.304 On Mellor's account, the B-series can give an
lOlMcTaggart, 1963, II 14. McTaggart argues that such A-series change cannot occur, and thai there really
is no change in the world at all. It should be noted that Strobach does not make any mention of
McTaggart's analysis. Strobach's position can be classified in terms of McTaggart's analysis. Strobach,
like McTaggart, argues that the B-series cannot account for change; but unlike McTaggart, Strobach argues
thai the A·theory eM. Mellot agrees with McTaggart's argument against the A-series; though he disagrees
with McTaggart about !he B-series' capacily to explain change.
llWAs we have sem McTaggart argues !hat this A-series change cannot oocur, so for McTaggart there is in
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adequate treatment ofchange even though no fuels expressed in B·series terms ever
change.
Because Strobach objects to (3). (2) and (1) must go as well For Strobaeh no less
than three times must be included in the model ofchange. A·series time analyses time as
a three tenn series ofeither (a) past, present (or now). future; or (~) earlier and later.
where 'earlier' and 'later' are defined as either before or after the 'present' (i.e. as earlier.
present (now), later). Strobach's third moment (in number) in his analysis ofchange is
the second moment in order in a tensed temporal series. It is at this third moment that,
Strobach claims. the proposition's truth value changes from being true to being fuJse. It is
at this moment that the lamp would satisfy the predicate' ...is changing.'
This means that Strobach describes change as an ordered triplet oftimc·indexed
tenns. Ordered are the states ofthings and the events they undergo; and both of these
(states and events) are dated in time. With respect to the order ofchange, the first state is
followed by an event ofchanging of states and this is in tum followed by the second state.
These three states are all mutually exclusive, they cannot occur at the same time.
Strobach's analysis ofchange requires three different successive times with three
different successive 'states,' the second of which is an event ofchanging . a state ofthe
coming to be oftbe difference between states. This moment when present and active is
used to date the first state as earlier lhan the second state. Moreover, for Strobach without
the temporall)' interposed present and active event ofchanging at the third time there
reaJity no change. Strobach,howevtf,thinksthalsuchA·serieschangeeanoecurwilltoulwhichtbere
would be no change. Whereas Mellor agrees lItat A·series change cannot occur but unlike McTaggart and
Strobach MeUor argues that the B-series can account forcbange.
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could not and would not be an)' difference between the state before and the state after.
Unless the interposed event of changing is included, the proposition 'the lamp is on'
would not change from being true to being mise; that is, without the event of changing
there would be no difference between the lamp's earlier and later states. For Strobach to
leave out this time oftruth-value change would be to analyze change away.30' Strobach,
then, agrees with McTaggart's statement that "there can be no change unless some
propositions are sometimes true and sometimes false.'>3Ob
In terms ofour mode~ the problem ofthe moment ofchange arises from the
premise that iftbe lamp is on at tl then not-on at t2; that is if(Ttl, Ft2), then there must be
a moment after tl but before 12, namely the moment tl>IP2, at which the evem ofchanging
from on to offeither occurs or is occurring. For Strobach there must be a moment or time
in the lamp's existence during which is it on. Following this moment or time of being-on
there must be a moment or a time at or during which the lamp 'is changing' from being-
on to not-being-on. The lamp must undergo an event ofchanging if it is to be a lamp that
changes, and this event must occur according to the proper order, an order which puts the
event ofchanging after the first state but before the second. Accordingly, a proposition
modeling change in the lamp must also change its truth-value at or dwing the moment of
1~IThat change is analysed away is the obj«:tion that Strobach raises again!lt Charles Hamblin's position
(we COIIsidercd Hamblin's poMition in Chapter Two). Hamblin's ~elementary intcrvals~ arc defined as
follows. MLet us suppose that our language contains elementary statements P" P2, fJ, .., finite or infinite in
nUlllbcr, and imagine lh.e univcrse as a time-SC(juence ohtates describable byconjunetion-chainsofthese
slaICtDents,str&ightornegated.. .AnelementaryinlenoaJisanintenoalwilhi"whichno changeofil'/llh-valile
0/any o/the p's octllr~ [Hamblin, 1969, p 424J. Strobach calls these elementary intetVals "maximally
changeless periods" [Strobach, 1998, P 174]. Strobach obje<:ls to Hamblin's position by writing that "no
change is actually taking place; he [Hamblin] banuhe$ change from any time he pcrmits.~ [Strobach, 1998,
pl77]
l~cTaggart,I968,pH.
change. At this moment the event ofa change in truth-value (aTFt l"",.2) occurs. But at
this moment in a Strobachian change· the moment when the lamp satisfies the predicate
' ...is changing' - it is almost impossible to say of the lamp that it is either on or not~n, or
to say ofthe proposition 'the lamp is on' that it is either true or false. 101
Is it true or false that 'the lamp is on' and why? What non-arbitrary rule would
settle the questionro" Could it be the case that the lamp is on, on: not-on and not-off at
the moment it changes from on to off'?l09 Or could 'the lamp is on' be both true and false
at tl>n>2? And if so are we prepared to say that contradictions exist-r IO Perhaps 'the lamp
is on' is neither true nor false at the instant of change.lll or that "it is impossible to know
which."l12 What is the truth-value ofthe proposition asserting that 'the lamp is on' when
that lamp is changing from being on to not-being on? To answer this question is to
'solve' the problem ofthe moment of change.
lOlMCTaggan. ofcourse, denies thai sucb change can OCCIJT.
""We learned in Chapter Two that Richard Sorabji's argument may be charged with arbitrariness. S«
Time, Crealion and the Comilluum. Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1983, Chapter 26.
JO'IThis, we learned iD Cbaptertwu, is Brian Medlin's confused attempt to address the problem in 'The
Origin DfMotion.' Mind, Vol. LXXII, No. 2&6, April 1963, p 155-175.
lIOln ChaplerTwo we leamed thaI Gfflham Priest argues in favour of objective contradictions in 'To Be and
Not to Be: Dialectical Tense Logic' . .'III/diG Logica, Vol. 41, 2/3,1981, P 249-268.
lllCharles Hamblin, in his essay, 'Starting and Stopping,' The Monisl, 53, 1969, p410-425, advocatCli the
neitherlnor oplion, though we learned in Chapter Two lhat Hamblin's analysis leaves no lime for change,
thlll is, Hamblin analyses change away.
112PriesI,1981,p252
3.9 Tense Logic
In Real Time and Real Time II Mellor discusses "an academic industry kno",n as
tense logic."lll In Real Time IJ Mellor lells us "what makes tense logic worth studying."
What makes it wonh studying is thai tense logic attempts to "make tnnhs false and
falsehoods true...:l 14 Tense logic is supposed to help explain change in so far as the
proposition 'the lamp is on' is true at one time that is now and not-true (or false) at some
other time which is now.
Take, for example, Graham Priest's essay 'To Be and Not to Be: Dialectical Tense
Logic,' which we discussed in Chapter Two. Here Priest argues that when a lamp is
changing from being-on to not·being-on the lamp is neither on nor oot-on. Priest argues,
via logic, that for a lamp to be neither on nor not-on is for that lamp to be both on and
not-on. The result of Priest's analysis by means of tense logic is the conclusion/solution
that it is true that the lamp is on and it is also true that the lamp is oot-on when the lamp is
changing from being on to not-being-on. For Priest a "contradiction is realized"llS at the
moment ofchange: propositions about the lamp being either on or not on will be both true
and false when the lamp (and the propositions about it - e.g. 'the lamp is on') changes
from being true to being false.
Mellor in his account of change does oot accept the claim that the truth-value of
the propositions about a changing thing themselves change in a change. The facts need
lIlMcllor,198I.p22.
"'Mellor. 1998,p 14
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not change in order for things to change, argues Mellor. In oontrast, Strobach's moment
ofchange is the moment when the true claim that 'the car is red at t]' changes to being a
false claim at h. In oontrast, for Mellor, if 'the car is red at tl' is true at tl then at t2 that
'the car is red at tj' is still true. Tenseless or B-theory relations do not change. For
Mellor, if it is true that the 'car is red at tl' then it need not be fitlse that the car is red at tl
when at t2 it is true that the car is nor.red. Mellor does not add, either explicitly or
implicitly, a tensed or A-series analysis oftime. The truth or falsity of ' the car is red at tl'
does not, for Mellor, depend upon it being a fact that tl is now. But to understand why
Mellor argues in this way we need consider what he calls "temporal truthmakers."
3.10 Temporal Truthmaken: A-facts or B-facts
In the terms ofour model ofchange, T and F represent the lamp being on and the
lamp not-being on, while tl and 12 represent the times at which the proposition 'the lamp
is on' is true and false respectively. What is represented are, simply, the 'facts', such as
the fact that the light is on then not-on at tl and h respectively. Facts are what make our
propositions true; or, rather, propositions express or state filets and such propositions are
true if and only ifthe fact thai is expressed exists. Distinguishing between our
propositions (which are either true or false) from the facts that make such propositions
true, facts that either exist or do not exi<;t, will allow us to concentrate upon and explicitly
discuss the latter. the facts that make our propositions either true or false. When we
lIIPriesI,19S1,p249.
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consider the problem of the moment of change we see that the propositions used to
express it make reference to time. It is for this reason that we need to give close attention
to what Mellor calls "temporal trutlunakers."m These are the temporal facts, so to speak,
that make temporal propositions eIther true or false.
1bere is an important point being made by Mellor when be makes this distinction
between (1) a true proposition and (2) the fact, temporal or otherwise, that makes it true.
Mellor's point is that all propositions (at least) express a fact; but the filet that is simply
expressed may not, in fact, exist. Or, in other words, users of a language can talk about
things or generate semantically correct propositions that clearly express facts that do not,
in futt, exist. It is fur this reason that Strobach's appeal to linguistic intuition to define
the structure oftime and temporal events is insufficient. An example will help clarify
this; but I should quickly add a premise about this chapter's argument so as to make clear
why we need to discuss the temporal facts that make temporal sentences true.
Strobach's analysis ofchange, I claim, uses what Mellor calls A-facts. Mellor's
account does not. Mellor analyses change using B·facts. Mellor additionally argues that
A-facts do not exist - the notion ofan A-fact is, says Mellor, self.contradictory, according
10 the argument given by McTaggart. The self-contradictory character of A·facts is what,
I claim, leads Strobacb and others to the problem of the moment ofchange. Looking for
or believing in A-facts that make proJXlsitions about changing things either true or false is
what, I think, generates the problem ofthe moment ofchange. This contradictory
character of A·fact analysis. or what is also referred to as 'tense logic,' leads a writer like
11~fel1or,J998,p23.
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Priest to develop a ..d.iakctical tense logic" that makes it "plausibk to suppose t.ba1 true
contradictions are realized in 90me changes.".m In other words, when Priesr. is faced with
the IOOment ofchange, Priest offers a teme logic that Strob8ch classifies as supporting the
"both-states option,..m ie., for Priest. the lamp is roth on and DOt-on or 'the lamp is on'
is both true and fuJse. Mellor, in contrast, does 00{ use tense logic 10 anaIyzt: time or
change for the reason thaI Mellor does not think that the temporal fBcts appealed to to
make tensed propositions true exist. There are DO A-facts for Mellor~ tensed propositions
cannot be made true by tensed facts.
I have endeavoured to show that Strobach's moment ofchange is a tensed
moment and that propositions arout it require tensed facts or tensed temporal truthmakers
in order to be true. For these two reasons Strobach's tensed moment ofchange
(.6.TFtl~2) is logica.l1y diffkult. Mellor in contrast does not have such a problematic
tensed momcm ofcbange. In Mellor's B-theory or 'date' theory "'there are DO analogous
facts about B-times for a 'dale logic' to stale..,]19
There is not according to Mellor's account ofchange., a tensed moment when a
proposition's truth value changes. In other v,urds, for Mellor the facts and the
propositions expressing them need DOt change in order for things to change. For Melior
"we can easily omit this gratuitous A-scale information.")20 Consequemly, in tenns of
Jilpriest, 1931, p249. A "ace on terms. Mellor's terms A-Ilnd B, theories correspond 10 a distinction
between theleMcdand uI1Iu/cssschools 00 time.
JIIStrobach,1998.cltJ,pI61.168.
JI'Mellor, 1998,p 15.
J~ellor,I99S.pIO.
1J1
our mode~ for Mellor the truth value of the propositions expressing the facts about a
changing thing do oot themselves ehange when things change. And the reason why there
is not such a change in the truth value of tile propositions is that time is not for Mellor an
A-series or tensed temporal series. According to Mellor's B-theory ''the B-times of
events, unlike their A-times, never change.,,321 This means, Mellor ~Tites in Real Time,
that propositions modeling change "neither acquire nor then lose truth-value."m
Continuing Mellor \\Ifites that "it is varying truth values that we [Mellor] find hard to
handle, not unvarying ones.,,31J
In Mellor's model ofchange true propositions need not become false propositions
in order for change to be modeled. Here Mellor is arguing against McTaggart's claim
that unless the facts about, say, a poker change, the poker itselfdoes not change.
McTaggart writes,
ifmy poker, for example, is hot on a particular Monday, and never before
or since, the event oftlle poker being hot [on that Monday] does oot
change...But this makes no change in the qualities of the poker. It is
always a quality ofthat poker that it is one which is hot on that particular
Monday. And it is always a quality of that poker that it is one which is not
hot at any other time. Both these qualities are true of it at any time - the
time when it is hot and the time when it is cold. And therefore it seems to
be erroneous to say that there is any change in the poker. The fact that it is
hot at one poin1 in a series and cold at other points cannot give change, if
neither ofthese fucts change - and neither ofthemdo.m
ll'Me!lor,I998,pll.
J]1Metlor, 1981,p 103.
ll)Mellor,I998,p27.
""M~Taggart, 1968,p 15.
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Mellor disagrees with McTaggart. MeUor distinguishes between things· such as a
poker - from the facts about such things- such as 'the poker is hot on Monday.' Things,
for Mellor, change, while the facts about them do not. Mellor's objection to McTaggart
and to those like Strobach who employ a tensed analysis ofchange is that they fail to
make the distinction between things and facts. Mellor writes,
Ifthe facts, for example, are that a poker was hot one day and cold the
next, why is that not change, just because those always were and always
will be facts? Why should things be unable to change unless facts do?325
By distinguishing things from facts, Mellor need not appeal to the A-series in
order to argue that change exists. For althoughfacts expressed on the B-series do not
change, the things the facts are about do indeed change. As soon as the distinction
between things and facts is reinforced then objections to the B-theory ofchange become
mute, as does the need for a tensed analysis ofchange. Therefore Strobach is wrong to
argue that propositions expressing facts must change their truth value in order for change
to occur to the things that the fucts are about.326
Mellor augments his discussion oftime and change by "explaining away A-
fucts." Mellor not only argues that changing A-facts are not needed in order for change to
be: as we have already seen he argues, using 'McTaggart's proof,' that A·facts do not
exists for they are self-contradictory.
lllMe!lor, 1981, P 103. The empllllSis on things and facts is mine.
mWc have already secn that Strobach objects to Charles Hamblin's position based upon the fact thai none
of Hamblin's propositions in his elementary iDtcrvals change their truth vallie
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Mellor asks the question. "are A-beliefs made true by A·faets., as A-theorists
believe, or by B-facts, as we [i.e. Mellor] believe?,,321 Mellor says that the debate
between A-theorists and B-theorists can "'look pointless. But it is not." And he clarifies
the debate by writing that "what we [A-theorists and B-theorists] disagree about is
whether A-fucts or B-facts - in the substantial sense of'fuet' [i.e. the truthmaker sense] -
make temporal beliefs true."
Mellor asks us 10 consider the proposition 'x is p' where x is "Nobody" and P is
.is smaller than a flea."m 'Nobody is smaller than a flea' is true ofanybody, especially
nobody, and we would all (I think) be prepared to accept this as true. But we must, says
Mellor, accept that 'nobody is smaller than a flea' is true without believing that there is in
fitct in existence a Nobody who is smaller than a flea. The filet that makes the proJXlsition
'Nobody is smaller than a flea' true is not the fitct that Nobody is smaller than a flea.
Mellor writes,
What makes this ['Nobody is smaller than a flea'] true is not that there is
such a person as Nobody, who is smaller than a flea, but that no person is
thatsmall. J29
The point of this example is to show that we must carefully analyze our
propositions otherwise we might believe that there exists something that does not exist,
such as the existence ofa Nobody or the present King of France, bald or not. This is 00
m MdJor,1998.p23.
llIMellor,1998,p2.
llOMellor,J998,p2.
J)4
less the case for any of our propositions that include a time in its truth conditions, that is,
in propositions that must have temporal truthmakers or temporal facts in order to be true.
MeUor distinguishes between two types oftemporal propositions or statements., A·
propositions or statements and a-propositions or statements. We can, for Mellor, have
true A-propositions and true B-propositions. But for Mellor we need not believe in the
existence of A-facts (facts using A-times). Nor for Mellor should we believe in A-facts
given McTaggart's proof. For Mellor"tbe tensed view oftime is self-contradictory and
so cannot be true.")]() The existence of A-facts, argues Mellor, is "a myth.',:HJ
3.11 Token ReDerive Truth Conditions
The objection that Mellor faces when he says that there are no A-facts is that
human beings can certainly express A-propositions and know them to be either true or
false, just as we can know that 'nobody is smaller than a flea' is true. But how can we
know A-propositions to be true ifthe existence of A-facts is a myth? An objector will
point out that we know, for example, that ifJim races on June 2"" and it is June 3rd, then
'Jim races tomorrow' and 'Jim is racing now' are both false, for said on June Jill 'Jim
races tomorrow' entails that Jim races on June 4 lb ; while said on June)'d 'Jim is racing
now' implies that Jim is racing on June 3'd.
The token-reflexive account of the truth conditions oftensed or A-propositions is
instrumental for Mellor's argument. The theory oftoken reflexive truth conditions is
JlOMeJlor.1981,p5.
ll'Mellor,1981,p34.
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what Mellor uses to account for the fact that tensed or A-propositions can be known to be
either true or faJse without their actually being any A-facts to make them true. The token
reflexive account is what Mellor uses to explain away A-series facts, to show that B·
series facts can account for the truth of tensed or A-propositions.
Mellor distinguishes between types of sentences and tokens of them. A type ofa
sentence is all the sentences ofa given sort; it is akin to a class or a set of all the actual
token sentences of the class. The token sentence is a particular manifestation ofa
sentence ofa given type. Mellor writes, "a token ofa word or sentence is a particular
specimen of it, in the sensc in which a horse is a specimen of that species (or type) of
animal.,,))2
Take Mellor's desire to listen to a daily radio program every day of the week at
onc o'clock. All the sentences stating that 'it is now one o'clock' that Mellor utters
during the week arc tokens of the sentence type 'it is now one o'clock.' There is not
according to Mellor's view a tensed fact 'it is now one o'clock' that will make each of
these tokcn sentences true or false. Such a fact would not be of much use anyway, for it
is always true that it is now one o'clock at one o'clock. For Mellor, what makes any
token of 'it is now one o'clock' true is the fact that the token's date occurs simultaneously
with the date one o'clock. But that the token about one o'clock occurs at one o'clock is a
B-fact, not an A-fact: for it is always truc that it is now one o'clock at one o'clock.
Mellor's token reflexive theory aims to find "B-truthmakers for A-
mMellor,t981,p35.
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proJX>sitions."m And he writes "that B-facts can be tokens ofA-propositions is crucial to
the B_theory."n4 Mellor uses as his example the claim that'Jim races tOtlKlITOW,' What
makes this claim true is that it occurs a day earlier than Jim's race, not that there is a
tomorrow in the future that will soon be present. Mellor writes,
Even ifl know on I June that Jim races tomorrow, which does entail that
he races then, my token knowledge is still not an A-fact...all it entails is
that my belief that Jim races tomorrow is true, not that what makes it true
is an A-fact, which is the point at issue.ns
Mellor gives a general formula or algorithm for determining the B-truth4
conditions for any A4statement. The purpose of this formula is to determine what B4fact
makes an A4proposition true. As we have already seen, for Mellor, what filet makes
'Nobody is smaller than a flea' true is not the fact that there is a Nobody who is that
small. In the same way, in the case of A-propositions, there is 00 truth-making A-fact
despite what A4propositions seem to suggest. Mellor's formula analyses away A4filcts,
just as an analysis of 'Nobody is smaller than a flea' analyses away the Nobody who is
that small. For every A-proposition 'P' about any event e," writes Mellor,
Any token of 'P' is true ifand only if it [the token of'P'] is as much
earlier or later than e as 'P' says the present is than e.336
lllMellor,I998,p29.
ll'Mellor,1998,p29.
Jl'Mtllor,1998,p29-30.
mMtl1or,I998,p31.
il7
Mellor restates the fonnula to account for statements about the future, the past and
the present. He writes,
If'P' says that e is n units (seconds, yeMS•.• )future, then its tokens are true
ifand only if they are n units earlier than e. Similarly, if'P' says that e is
n units past, then its tokens are true nand only if they are n units later than
e...{and] if'P' says that e ispresent, then its tokens are true ifand only if
they are simultaneoU!l with e. H7
'Earlier than', 'later than' and 'simultaneous with' are all B-series terms. Thus
Mellor's fonnula allows us to understand how each and every A-proposition can be
known to be either true or false without there being any A·facts. Mellor writes,
This [formula] shows how the truth value ofa token U ofan A·proposition
about an event e varies with facts about how much earlier or later u is than
e. These facts moreover are all B-facts, since they entail no A·facts: 'u is
n units earlierllater than e' entails nothing about the A-time of either e or
u. So we B-theorists can use these facts to say what makes (tokens of) A·
propositions true or false. J31
Mellor calls his account of time and change the "token reflexive B_theory..Jl9
Strobach does not make this distinction between types of sentences and tokens of
them. When Strobach models change he argues tbat a contradiction occurs when, for
example, 'Jim races tomorrow' is true on, say, June I", and when 'Jim races tomorrow' is
false on June 3n!. For Strobach, 'Jim races tomorrow' being true on June 1'" contradicts
lHMellor,1998,p31.
m Mellor,I998.p32.
119Mellor,I998,p32.
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itselfon June 3N when 'Jim races tomorrow' is false. For Mellor this is not the case. For
ahhough 'Jim races tomorrow' said on June l!ll and June 3N are the same type of
proposition, the l!ll ofJune's and the)N ofJune's propositions are different tokens of that
type. And two different tokens differing in their truth no more contradict each other than
do two different propositions differing in their truth.
3.12 The Need for Teo8e
As we have seen Mellor does not accept the claim that there are tensed facts and
the token reflexive theory is used to explain away A-facts. Mellor does, however, accept
the claim that there are tensed beliefs. The reason Mellor adds tensed beliefs to his
analysis oftime without admitting that anything else is tensed is to accommodate human
action. MeUor claims that without tensed beliefs humans could not be the particular
agents that they are, active, perceptive agents that need to act at certain times. "Whatever
acts on its perceptions must have tensed beliefs. Action is what really makes tensed
beliefs indispensable."l40 Mellor writes,
We must obviously know more than the dates and grid references of
things and events. To govern our interaction with them, and with other
people, we must also know which we are faced with at any time, i.e.
which are spatially and temporally present.341
H"Mellar,1981,p82.
l<lMcllot,1931,p78.
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Again. take Mellor's desire to listen to a radio program at one o'clock. That it is
one o'clock at one o'clock is true at all times, even when it is not one o'clock. It: then,
we are to listen to the radio program at one o'clock, we need know more than that it is
one o'clock at one o'clock. What we additionally need to know is that one o'clock is
now. Mellor writes,
Suppose ...that 1want to hear the one o'clock. news; so 1push the switch at
one o'clock. Why did I do that at one o'clock and not minutes or hours
earlier or later? Obviously, what 1need to believe is that it is now one
o'clock. Until I acquire that present tense beliefl shall do nothing,
however much 1want to hear the news.J.42
Our tensed beliefs, like tenseless propositions purportedly expressing fucts, may
be true or false. But the truth ofour tensed beliefs in no way, argues Mellor, implies that
there are tensed facts. We need tensed beliefs only in SO far as we need to act on our
beliefs in the world. The truth ofour belief that it is now one o'clock in conjunction with
our knowledge that the radio program begins at one o'clock is what leads to our timely
action. Without the former the latter is insufficient to lead us to tum on the radio. But
Mellor has denied that there are tensed facts so bow could we ever act on a belief that is
tensed? In believe that, say, it is now one o'clock, what will make my tensed belief true
and lead me to act upon my belief ifthere are no tensed truth conditions? Mellor does not
think this is a question overly difficult to answer. He writes,
Action will be timely if it satisfics the token reflexive conditions ofthe
"'Mellor, 1981,p82.
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tensed beliefs it depends on. To hear the one o'clock news, I need to tum
the radio on at one o'clock. I tum it on when I believe that it is now one
o'clock because the truth conditions ofthat belief are satisfied, and only
satisfied, at one o'clock. It is a belief such that, if I act on it when it is
true, my action will succeed. And to have that desirable property, it must
be tensed, because only tensed beliefs have truth conditions that include
the time at which the belief is held.343
In other words, as long as my belief is simultaneous with the date one o'clock,
then my action will succeed.
But to say that two things are simuhaneous is to say that they share the same date,
not that they are both occurring now. 'It is now one o'clock,' on the token reflexive
theory, means that one o'clock is neither earlier nor later than the time of the utterance of
the token 'it is now one o'clock.' And that is all that is needed to make the act of turning
on the radio occur at the right time. A tensed fuet 'it is now' is not needed. Mellor writes
that
We have seen that using tensed sentences demands nothing llXlre than
knowledge ofwhen they are true and when false, i.e. oftheir tenseless
token reflexive truth conditions; so that, I suggest, is all there is to the
tensed beliefs they express. The idea that tensed sentences also express
non-taken-reflexive beliefs in tensed facts...is a gratuitous and idle
supposition.344
And in Real Time II Mellor writes that
Suppose I look at the clock at 2. I5. Since the clock is right, it says '2.15,'
l<J MeJlOf,J981,p83.
"'MellOf,1981,p87.
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a token ofthe now·propositions 'It is now 2.15.' So ifl trust the clock., it
will cause me to believe that very proposition. And since it is right, then
(ignoring the time it takes me to believe it) it will cause me to believe 'It is
now 2.15' at 2.15. thus causing me to have this no.....·beliefwhen it is true.
This, in B-theory tenns, is what a good dock does: it causes those ofus
who look at and trust it to have now-beliefs about the time which are true
when we have them. And that, after all, is what we want our clocks to
do. l4S
Mellor. then, does not wholly explain away tense - he only explains away tensed
facts. Tensed beliefs Mellor accepts, but be explains bow we can know these beliefs to be
true or false without an appeal to tensed fuets.
3.13 Obsen-ed Time: The Presence ofEIperient:e
Opponents of Mellor's position argue against his tenseless, token reflexive
account of the truth conditions oftensed facts by claiming that we have an immediate
awareness of the present. The claim is that all ofour experiences are known to occur
now. No argwnent, the objection runs, can explain away this fact ofexperience. Mellor
describes the objection.
B·trndunllkers fail to capture a key llSpect ofexperience, namely its
temporal presence. Being present seems to be essential to any experience,
i.e. essential to it being an experience. To give only the B-times of my
experiences, without saying which ofthem I am having now, is to leave out
precisely what makes them experiences.:l46
WMellor,I99S,p45.
l<'Mellor,l998,p41.
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This objection to Mellor's account oftime and change requires that Mellor give a
tenseless account ofthe presence ofexperience. "The presence of experience is the
crux," writes Mellor. "We need a credible a-theory ofit before we can begin to deny the
existence of A_facts.,;J.47 On this point Mellor is arguing against tbose who claim that we
"directly observe the A-times of events."m
Mellor argues that he easily meets this objection. Mellor claims that we believe
that our experiences occur in the present, but this belief is no guarantee that there is, in
fact, such a present. Likewise, we believe that nobody is smaller than a flea even though
there is not a Nobody who is that small. Mellor writes, "even when our observations and
other experiences tell us truly that they are present, they really are not ..J49 The idea that
there is such a preset time results from an invalid extension of our experience on to the
objects that we are experiencing. The beliefthat there are A-times, writes Mellor, results
solely from "our interest." Mellor writes,
This temptation to adopt an A-theory oftime [due to the 'presence' of
experience] should be resisted. For even when our interest in events is
what we may call an A-interest, that, as we shall see, is a property not of
the events themselves but ofour interest in them.)SO
As we have seen Mellor claims that his token reflexive theory can accommodate
for our A-time interests without the need to posit the existence of A-times. Those who
WMe llor,I993,p41.
14SMellor, 1998,p IS.
l·~ellor,1998,pI7.
JIOMellor. 1998,p 16.
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have the idea that observation and experience show that there are A-times are those who
confuse (1) what we observe with (2) our observation of it.
The result ofportraying Mellor against Strobach and other tense analysts (e.g.
Prior, Priest, Hamblin etc.) with regard to their belief in the existence of A-filets due to
the presence ofexperience, is that the champions of tense have not paid attention to what
I shall call 'Russell's Caveat.' Russell writes that
It is ofthe utmost importance not to confuse time-relations of subject and
object with time-relations ofobjeet and object; in fact, many of the worst
difficulties in the psychology and metaphysics oftime have arisen from
this confusion.m
A-facts appear to exist due to our relation as subjects of experience to the objects
ofour experience. 1bere appears to us to be a present time that is now, and we can make
true statements about the present time, such as it is now 1:40 PM on October 1st. But just
as we should not assume that there is a Nobody who is smaller than a flea who makes
'Nobody is smaller than a flea' true, so we must not assume that, because we can make
true statements about what appears to us in our present experience, that there is in fuCI a
'present' that makes, say, 'e is present' true. Russell writes,
Past, present, and future arise from time-relations of subject and object,
while earlier and later arise from time-relations of object and object. In a
world in which there was no experience there would be no past, present, or
future, but there might well be earlier and later.352
mRussell,194S,p212.
lllRussell,194S,p212.
Strobach claims the main problem surrounding time and change is to 'fmd a
satisfactory conceptual treatment of what we observe; for what L'l happening i'l
obvious."m Mellor however, will argue that 'what is happening' is not simply obvious.
Mellor writes, "ideas about past, present and future are central to our concept of time.
But they are not self-evidently right. They want explanation.,>354 When Mellor analyses
time he concludes that "we do not really observe the A-times ofevents,,,m Mellor, then,
questions what we can "directly observe:>3S6 After his analysis he claims ''the world, I
believe, is a B-world: no event is in itself either past, present or future:,J~7 But this is to
argue that what we immediately observe to be present is not, in filet, present. To believe
there is a present that is now because all ofour experience occurs 10 us as present results,
argues Mellor, from "confusing what we observe with the experience ofobserving it:>3S1
3.14 Strobllcb's Assumption: Instantaneous Events
There is aoother feature that distinguishes Mellor from Strobacb. Strobach argues
lllStrobacb,I998,p2.
ll'Mellor,J998.p7,
HlMellor.I998,p16.
l"'Mellor.J998.pl5.
"'Mellor.I998.pI5.
JlIMellor,I998,p17.
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that changes "have no duration."m Change, for Strobaeh, is an instantaneous event: it
does not take time to occur. "r propose," Strobach writes, "to regard changes as
instantaneous events:.J60 For Strobach, then, a solution to tbe problem oftbe moment of
change must be "centred around a theory of instantaneous states.'.J61 Instantaneous
events and states have "no temporal extension whatsoever," says Strobach.
We need now recall from Chapter Two Charles Hamblin's essay 'Starting and
Stopping.' There Hamblin advocates a time-system about which "only the absence of
instants is any way unusual.,,}62 Hamblin offers a tense-logic without instants for the
reason that "the concept of time as a series of instants has itselfrun us into trouble."J63
Whitehead also issues a warning against instants as well, writing that for him "the
primordial element is nothing at an instant.'.J64
Continuing, Strobach writes that "they [instants] are limits in time, mere
boundaries ofperiods."36s Even though instants are mere boundaries of periods, and in
spite ofthe difficulties concerning the existence of 'instants' and the notion of
lJ'Strobacll,1998,p2.
lOOStrobacll, 1998,p 12.
U1Strobach.1998,pxi.
161Hamblin, 1969,p420. ltalicsmine
l'IHambJin,1969,p415.
I"See Whitehead's Science and the Modern World, Macmillan, New York, 1926, p 52-56. Ciled from
Milic Capec's The Concept$ o/Space and nme: Their SlrUC/llrc ond lheir De1Ie!opftltlnt. 537. D. Reidel,
Boston. Boston Sludies in/he Philosophy o/Science, Vol. XXIl. Whitehead's selection from Science and
the Modern World is entitled (I assume by Capec) 'The Inapplicability of the Conct:pl oflnSlant OIl the
Quantum Level,' p 535 - 537. D. Reidel, Boston. Bo~on Studie$ in the Philosophy o/Science, Vol. xxn.
J61Strobach, 1998,p 15.
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'instantaneity,' problems raised by both Hamblin and Whitehead, Strobacb will "assume
that instants are there anY""'ay."l66 And he assumes that an event can wholly occur within
an instant.
We learned that, for Strobach, change is three-fold: when analyzed in terms ofa
thing's states Strobach analyses change as a three-term successive, temporal series such
change as a three term series; Ttl, dTFtl~2, Ft2. In either manner ofexpression (i.e. in
tenns ofstates ofthings orthe truth-value of propositions), Strobach's analysis includes
three distinct times that occur in a distinct order. The second time in the three-term series
is for Strobach when an event ofchanging is supposed to occur.
In contrast, Mellor's account ofchange is only two-fold. For Mellor only two
times are employed, tl and 12, and these are related as either 'earlier than' or 'later than.'
Mellor's two-fold analysis ofchange involves removing the third A-time at which the
Mntl~2 (the event ofchanging ofstates) or the t..TFtl>,p2 (the event ofchanging oftruth
values) is supposed by Strobach to occur. Mellor removes Strobach's moment ofehange
for two reasons.
First, for Mellor there are no instantaneous events, so there cannot be an
instantaneous event ofchanging interposed between tl and h. In Real Time [J Mellor
....mtesthat,
Neither people nor weddings are instantaneous: we can no more locate
either at a single moment than we can locate them at a single spatial
'''Strobacll,1993,pI6.
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point.167
In effect, Strobach argues that an event can be located wholly at a single moment.
Secondly, Mellor argues that events have temporal parts: more than one time or
more than one temporal part is required for an event to be an event. What does Mellor
mean by a 'temporal part'? Mellor argues that a temporal part is wholly analogous to a
spatial part in so far as the whole ofwhich the part is a part is not wholly located in that
part, such that a part ofthe whole can exist independently of the whole of which it is a
part. Mellor writes that by a temporal part he means
What we all mean by spatial parts, like the parts of our bodies: namely,
things or events whose existence is logically independent of the wholes
they are parts 0(>68
Mark HeUer. in his paper 'Things Change,' writes about how ''to make sense of
temporal parts." Heller writes that
Temporal parts are parts in lhe same sense as spatial parts are. Just as
ri;~;J::~ ~~~~ ~~:.~~;~~o~sr:e:~~.3~r the whole, temporal parts
Thus my foot is a spatial part ofme because I can, for example. cut offmy fool
and I would still exist as much as my foot even though we have been separated from each
U'MellOf,1998.p8.
*'Meltor,1998.p87.
l~Heller, 1992,p695.
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other. Likewise, the event 'eating dinner' begins with an appetizer - the first temporal part
ofeating dinner, then a main course follows as the second temporal part, and this is in
tum followed by the third temporal part, dessert. Each course is a temporal part ofthe
event 'eating dinner,' and just as it is easy to cut off my foot and so distinguish a spatial
part ofme from me, so we can distinguish the appetizer from the dessert, and both from
the whole meal. After all, I am not wholly in my foot, and the event 'eating dinner' does
not wholly occur when I am finally eating the last ofmy dessert. An event's teInJXlral
parts aretben analogous to a thing's spatial parts.
Mellor argues that even though events have temporal parts, things do not. Mellor
writes that not all things "have temporal parts. Events do: each course ofa meal is a
temporal part of it. But things do not [have temporal parts]: atoms, people, and planets
have only spatial parts...31ll
Given that Mellor ~gues events have temporal parts, an event for Mellor cannot
wholly occur in an instant, for by definition an instant has the smallest possible (if not an
absolutely small or zero) temporal extension, which means that an instant cannot be an
aggregate of smaller temporal units. As Mellor argues that events have temporal parts,
events for Mellor cannot be instantaneous. Mellor uses as his example the climbing (an
event) of Mount Everest (a thing) by Hillary and Norgay (two things). Mellor argues that
no one should
Say that only parts ofSir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay climbed
only a part ofEverest in 1953...those two whole men climbed that whole
I7CMel1or,1998,p86.
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mountain, and both were whony present throughout every temporal part of
that historic event,J71
Neither should we say that Mount Everest changed from being unclimbed to being
climbed instantaneously, although on Strobach's theory we would be committed to saying
such, As good as Hillary and Norgay were, they could not climb Everest that quickly.
With the rejection ofSlrobach's two key assumptions, namely (I) that time is a
three-fold A-series and that (2) there are instantaneous events or events without temporal
parts, Mellor's account of change does not raise the problem of the moment of change as
that problem has been raised by Plato and chronicled by Strobach,
3.15 The First Objection: Definition or Reduction?
For Strobach, to not include the third, albeit problematic, moment T" after Tbut
before T would be 10 eliminate all change from the whole of reality. If T" or (6.TFtl>n>2)
is excised then, for Strobach, the results of an event of changing would exist without the
event of changing ever having existed; but how the could results ofan event be if the
eventnevcrwas?
Strobach argues that the two-time definition of change offered by Mellor and
Russell reduces change to 'being different at different times.' We need now consider
what Strobach means by 'reduction.' We will use the definition ofmotion as an example
to illustrate what I shall call a 'reducing' or 'reductionlst' definition.
lJ1Mcllor,I998,p86.
We need ronsider this notion of reduction for the reason that Strobach's objection
against a tenseless defmition ofchange such as that offered by Mellor is that the two-time
definition ofchange reduces change to being differern at different times such that there is
no changing in the world. Strobach argues that Menor's and RusseU's two-time
definition implies that the predicate •...is changing' would never be satisfied by any
object. The reason why we shall use the definition of motion as the example to help
illustrate what is meant by a reductionist definition is that Strobach makes the same
objection against Russell's definition of motion.
Strobach claims Russell's definition of motion is also a 'reduction' analogous to
the reduction in Russell's two-time definition ofchange. Likewise, Strobach argues that
Russell's defInition of motion implies that no object satisfies the predicate ' ... is moving.'
If'motion' is defined as 'being in different places al different, successive times'
then' .. is moving' is omitted, or reduced or boiled away, so to speak, from the definition.
For Russell, even ifwe do obsen'e that a thing is first in one place then in another we
must "entirely reject the notion ofa state of motion"m Russell announces his
reductionist acC<lunt of motion when he writes "motion ronsists merely in the occupation
ofdifferent places at different times:,37J Continuing, Russell writes "'there is no transition
from place to place, no rol1SCCutive moment or consecutive position, no such thing as
velocity:'3U This means that for Russell ''the concept of motion is logically subsequent
l7lRussell.1964,p473,§447.ltalicsareRussell's
l1lRussell.1964.p473,§447. rlalicsll1cRussell's
"'Russell,1964,p47J,§447.
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to that ofocclIpying a place at a time."m
Whitehead in &ience and the Modern World characterizes the resulting view of
motion. "It is as tbough an automobile, moving at the average rate of thirty miles an bour
along a road, did not traverse the road continuously; but appeared successively at the
successive milestones, remaining for two minutes at each milestone.'u76 There are other
characterizations of this conception of motion.377
The objection to this reductionist conception ofmotion is indicated by Priest when
he asks "can a going somewhere be composed ofan aggregate ofgoing nowberes?"m
Being at different places at different times is not the same as moving from one place to
another, even if it is true that ifsomething is moving from one place to aoother it will he
in different places at different times.
Stroboch, against Russell's reductionist defInition of motion, says that "reduction
is not the same as definition.'.J7') Strobach argues that, altbough it may be true to say that
if something is moving it will be in different places at different times, "it is impossible to
reduce motion to being in different places or rest to being in the same place a1 different
lllRussell.I964,p469,§442.
l7OWhitebead. Science and The Modern World. See Milic Cap«, Ed., The Concepts ofSpace and Tillie
TMir Structure QI/d 'heir Devefoptrlen/. D. Reidel, Boston. Boston SluditIJ II/,he Phi/oIJophy ofScienct,
Vol.Xxn.
mSee, for example, Colin Strang's and K..W. MiUs, 'Plato and the Instant' Proceedings if/he A.m/oklian
Society,Suppl. Vol.IN8, 1974,p63-79, especially p 74. ForStrobacb'sdiscussionofStnmg's"graphical
rcpresentation~of motion see Strobach, 1998, p 38-39. This referred to as the ~staircase the<ll),.ft
mpriest. Graham, 'InCOllsistencies in Motion,' A.merican Philosophical Quarter})" 22, 1985, P 339-346, P
340_citedinStrobach,I998,p203.
l79Strobach,I998,p201.
1S2
instants...380 Strobach adds some clauses about the nature of definition.
Strobach ¥.Tites that "we require ofa definition that the definiendum is true
whenever the definiens is true and vice versa."lll In the case ofthe reduetionist definition
of motion. if'o is in motion' is true then '0 is in different places at different times' will be
true. But, adds Strobach, "motion might still be more than tOOt...312
Analogously, Strobach, adds a stronger sense to his definition of 'change: just as
he adds a stronger sense to his defInition of motion. And he adds the stronger sense to
both 'motion' and 'change' by means ofhis anti-reductionist stance. Therefore in
addition to being different at different times., by 'change' Strobach also means 'coming to
be different.'
Strobach argues that in the two-time defmition ofchange there is no time at or
during which the thing comes to be different, and this precludes the reality of all change
altogether. For Strobacb a thing cannot be different at two different times unless it fIrst
becomes different at some third time. This is the exact objection raised by Strobach
against Hamblin's 'neither/nor-option,' which we considered in Chapter Two. Strobach
says of Hamblin's 'Interval Theory' that "if this is what Hamblin wants to say, no change
is actually taking place, he banishes change from any time he pennits."m
Strobach cites Priest's analysis ofchange in support of the view that without an
intervening, third time in the ordered series in a change there would be no change in the
I'llStrobacb,I998,p201.
lIlSlrobacb,I998,p201
JI1Strobacb, 1998, p201.
ltlStTobacb, 1998,p 177.
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world at alL Priest writes that the two-time definition ofchange succeeds "only by
producing a curious account ofchange."JU Priest excellently sets fonh the argument for
the third time.
Suppose that during a certain time a state 8cbanges fromSo to 81• Then
there must be two abutting intervals a and b such that a wholly proceeds b,
So is true throughout a and 81 is true throughout b. Now given that there is
no instant dividing a and b we can not ask whether 8 is in So or 81 at it.
However, because there is no such instant, there is no time at which the
situation is changing: a is before the change, b is after it. Thus, in a sense,
there is no change in the world at all, just a series of different statcs
patched together. The universe would appear to be more like a series of
photographic stills shown consecutively, than something in a genuine state
of flux or change.l85
Strobach claims that all reduetionist definitions fuJI prey to the "snapshot myth."
And all such definitions fail to accommodate for the reality ofgenuine change or flux.
Indeed, Priest raises the same objection against Russell's defmition ofmotion. Priest
writes, "on this account motion is rathcr like a sequence ofphotographic stills shown so
fast that the body appears to move.'.J16
Mellor, however, argues that he avoids the charge ofgiving a reductionist account
of change. Mellor argues that the objection that his theory ''reduces change to changeless
facts" is ''not an objection.,,3l7 One who makes this objection fails to appreciate the
1I'Priest,1931,p254.
lIIPriest.1931,p254.
1lOpriest, Graham, 'Inconsistencies in motioo,' AmericollPhi/OJophicaf Quarterly, 22, 1935, P 339-346, P
340. CitedinStrobach, 1998, P 203.
IIlMellor,1993,p84.
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distinction between things and thefacts about such things. The latter need not change in
order for the former to change.
As for the claim that according to Mellor's theory there is no genuine flux, Mellor
would argue that this is a wholly false characterization ofbis position.
Mellor argues that time is "the causal dimension of spacetime:JU What provides
'genuine flux' for Mellor's theory is causal activity. Mellor's causal theory of time is
somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis on change. However it must be noted that
Mellor's causal theory of time gives him a unique position on time. Many philosophers
use, writes Mellor, "the time order of events to fix their causal order, defining a cause as
the earlier oftwo causally related evems. I do it the other way round, using an
independently defmed causal order to fix the time order ofa11 events."m By adopting a
causal theory of time, the 'genuine flux' that the likes ofStrobachand Priest desire is
given by causal activity, not the passage or flow of A-theory time.390
3.16 The Second Objection: Change and Spatial Variation
The second objection to Mellor's account is that it "has no ","ay ofdistinguishing
"'MeJlor,I998,pxiiiandp84.
It'MeHor, 1998, P S. This means dUll Mellor conSIroClS the transitive, asymmetrical B-time scale by means
of the causal relation, which is itself transitive and asymmetrical.
l'lOln a way, then, for Mellor the temporal order bas a nOll-temporal source. Scott Hestevold, in 'Passage
and the Presence of Experience,' Phi/owphyand PlrenomencJogit;al Re.fCarch, Vol. L, No.3, March 199(1,
p 537-552, describes Mellor's positiOIl 011 time as invoking a doctrine of"static time" [p 537]. However, it
should be c!ear that this isan inaCCllraterepresentation ofMellor. Although Mellor does not advoeate the
passage of A-theory time, Mellor's causal theory of time requires causal activity, wbicb is far from being a
static account.
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properties varying over time from properties varying over space." Mellor argues that this
objection "isfu.lse."m
Mellor puts great emphasis upon the capacity to distinguish (a) change from (~)
spatial variation. That things do not have temporal parts must, argues Mellor, be accepted
in order to distinguish change from spatial variation. For Mellor, in so far as any
conception of change cannot make the distinction between (a) and (~) clear and
unambiguous, to that extent that conception ofchange should be rejected.
Mellor argues that the belief that things have temporal parts cannot make (a) and (~)
clear. What's more, confusing time with space would surreptitiously eliminate all
change. The beliefthat things had temporal parts would mistakenly treat (a) as wholly
analogous to (~), resulting in a confusion oftime with space and the rejection ofchange.
Mellor writes that
There is no spatial change in a poker being at once hot at one end and cold
at the other. The bot and cold ends ofa poker are not a case ofcbange
because they [the spatial parts ofthe poker] coexist: the spatially tenseless
world contains them both, only located in different parts oftenseless
space.J92
The coexisting spatial parts ofthe poker do not themselves change as one move in
space from,. say, the left side oftbe jX}kerto the right side of the poker. In this case the
whole poker does not change from being bot at one end and cold at another. Things have
spatial parts, so there is no change over space because none ofthe spatial parts change.
m Mellor,J99S,pS4.
mMellor,IIlSl,pllO.
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What we have in the case ofthe poker hot at one end and cold at the other is different
(spatial) parts with different properties.
The poker is hot at one end and is cold at the other end; there is no change
occurring in the whole poker for none of its (spatial) parts change. There are differences
amongst the parts of the poker; but what we need to take heed ofbere is that differences
amongst tbe parts of a thing are not changes in the thing. Mellor writes, '"'the whole poker
is neither bot nor cold - only its ends are - and ajorlior; does not change from being bot
to being cold...393
Thus in the case oftbe poker there is no change in the poker for the reason that the
whole JXlker is not (spatially) present in anyone single spatial part. Mellor 'Mites "the
poker at once hot at one end and cold at the other is not wholly present at each end as a
poker first hot and then cold is wholly present at both times. .,394 Change over time is real
change and not simple variation for the reason that, for Mellor, things do not have
temporal parts.
3.17 ConclusioD
The to-be-tested definition ofchange - that change is an object having mutually
exclusive properties at different times - can. argues Mellor, be augmented by a B-theory
oflime. Mellor's B-theory of time eliminates the problem of the moment ofchange as
l'lMellor.1931,plll.
"'Mellor,1931,pl11.
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that problem has been raised by Plato and chronicled by Strobaeh.
Plato's and Strobaeh's account of change assumes a particular version ofthe A-
theory of time. Plato and Strobach employ instantaneous events. They do not reinforce
the distinction between things and filets, and they wish the laner to change if the former
change. It is for these two reasons that both find change problematic.
Mellor, by rejecting the problematic A·theory elements of time given by Plato
and Strobaeh, argues that the problem is a dead problem. Mellor argues that the B-theory
oftime and change is preferable, and Mellor argues that he can meet the most significant
objections to his B-theory of time, namely that it reduces change to changeless facts and it
fails to distinguish time from space.
This is not to say that there are not other versions of A-theory time that avoid the
problem that arises from Plalo's and Strobaeh's A-theory. Nor are there not difficult
questions to be asked of Mellor's account, especially questions about the source of his 8-
series and his definition of time as the causal dimension of space-time. But other A-
theories and detailed questions about the intricacies of Mellor's account are beyond our
scope.
This thesis is limited to (I) giving Plato's and Strobaeh's A-theory oftime and
change, (2) to showing the problems that arise within this theory, (3) to showing how
these problems have been dealt with by others and (4) 10 giving Mellor's argument in
favour ofa B-theory oftime and change.
It is hoped that both theories and the arguments in favour and against each are
clear.
'"
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